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Chapter 1
General Introduction
This dissertation comprises four self-contained chapters that address questions from very
diverse fields of research, including mortality research, social interactions, international
cooperation, and statistical software development. While the empirical questions covered
are interdisciplinary in nature and combine the field of economics with demography as well
as political science, it is the underlying common methodology that connects all chapters.
Specifically, each chapter addresses or uses a multiple duration framework that belongs
to the class of multivariate mixed proportional hazard models or constitutes a variation
or extension of this class of models.
The multivariate mixed proportional hazard model is a reduced-form multiple duration
framework, with the marginal duration distributions each satisfying the popular mixed
proportional hazard specification (see Van den Berg, 2001, for an overview). This model
class is designed for use with clustered duration data, whereby spells of the same cluster
are dependent due to unobservable determinants. The clustered spells often reflect several
spells of the same unit, with examples including the life-spans of twin pairs (Chapter 2),
the age of first substance use of siblings living in the same household (Chapter 3), or
the time until several countries incorporate an international agreement into domestic law
(Chapter 4). Here, the unobservable determinants causing a dependence within the cluster
are shared family characteristics and the similar genetic makeup among siblings in the
first two examples and unobserved characteristics of international agreements in the latter
example.
With the timing-of-events approach, Abbring and van den Berg (2003b) introduce a second
source of dependence to the multivariate mixed proportional hazard model for the case
1
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of two parallel durations.1 When duration 2 ends, the subsequent survival of duration 1
is a↵ected via a treatment e↵ect function. Numerous empirical studies use this model to
evaluate the e↵ects of treatments in a bivariate duration framework. While the main field
of application is the evaluation of labor market programs (e.g., see Van den Berg et al.,
2004; Lalive et al., 2005; Abbring et al., 2005), other examples include the e↵ect of patent
grants on the timing of licensing by start-up technology entrepreneurs (Gans et al., 2008),
the e↵ect of cannabis use on cocaine use (Van Ours, 2003) and school dropout (Van Ours
and Williams, 2009), the e↵ect of child birth on relationship duration (Svarer and Verner,
2008), and the e↵ect of bereavement on the spouse’s survival (Van den Berg et al., 2011).
Variations and extensions to the timing-of-events model are presented in Chapters 2 and 3
with the aim of extending its usability to new fields of research. In Chapter 2, we introduce
together with Gerard van den Berg a symmetric version of the timing-of-events approach
to study bereavement e↵ects in twin pairs. Furthermore, in Chapter 3 with Georgios
E↵raimidis, we investigate an extension to multiple spells to study social interaction
e↵ects between siblings for the first-time use of marijuana.
Chapters 4 and 5 address very diverse topics, with the only common theme being the
underlying methodology. A multivariate mixed proportional hazard model is used in
Chapter 4 to study ine ciencies in international cooperation in the Southern Common
Market (with Christian Arnold and Gerard van den Berg). Finally, in Chapter 5, we
consider together with Gerard van den Berg likelihood-based statistical inference with
left-truncated data in the shared frailty model. This model constitutes a special case of
the multivariate mixed proportional hazard model, whereby the unobserved determinants
are shared within a cluster.
In Chapter 2, we address the question of whether losing your co-twin can a↵ect your
remaining life-span. Twins share a unique bond that can lead to severe emotional stress
and health deterioration once, the bond is broken. We present new empirical evidence
suggesting that the loss of the co-twin can shorten the remaining life-span of the surviving
twin. The identification of such bereavement e↵ects is severely complicated by the similar
genetic makeup and early childhood experiences of twins, which constitute a major source
of the dependence between twin life-spans and are typically not observed. Previous studies
1It should be pointed out that the timing-of-events approach is based on a censored data structure.
Once duration 1 ends, this implies immediate right-censoring of duration 2.
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of twin lifespans limit their attention exclusively to one of the two sources of dependence,
namely the bereavement e↵ect or genetic factors. We present a new identification result on
a symmetric version of the timing-of-events model of Abbring and Van den Berg (2003),
which enables us to unite both strands of the literature in one model by exploiting only
weak covariate variation. Our empirical analysis is based on 9,268 twin pairs from the
Danish Twin Registry, with the results suggesting that a male twin who has lost his
identical co-twin when he reached the age of 75 will live on average 1.6 years shorter due
to the experience of this loss. This bereavement e↵ect is less severe for non-identical twins
or if the loss is experienced at a higher age.
In Chapter 3, we use multivariate duration methods to study social interaction e↵ects. The
behavior of interest in many studies of social interactions is characterized by a transition
time, with examples including the time a person purchases a new product, moves out of the
neighborhood or starts smoking. We introduce a new strategy to identify social interaction
e↵ects from grouped transition data that exploits information in the timing of transitions.
In particular, we account for two sources of dependence between the behavior of members
of a peer group: (1) Once a group member starts to smoke, this directly a↵ects the
subsequent risk of the other group members starting to smoke (‘social interaction e↵ect’).
Such social interaction e↵ects may be highly flexible and di↵er across group members,
covariates and over successive transitions in the group; and (2) Group members may have
similar unobserved characteristics such as risk attitudes or tastes (‘correlated e↵ect’).
This approach is based on the timing-of-events model by Abbring and van den Berg
(2003b), which we extend to multiple parallel spells with varying entry dates and a highly
flexible pattern of successive interactions between di↵erent group members. Moreover, we
present an identification result for this model. The definition of social interactions in terms
of a lagged e↵ect in time enables overcoming the reflection problem (Manski, 1993) in the
presence of correlated e↵ects, without making use of an exclusion restriction. Additionally,
given that the model accounts for selection e↵ects, it enables the study of peer e↵ects in
natural peer groups such as a circle of friends, work colleagues or neighborhoods, which are
often the result of a self-selection process based on similar unobservable characteristics.
This new approach is used to study social interaction e↵ects in the first-time use of
marijuana among siblings growing up together in American households, using data from
the NLSY79. We find that once the oldest sibling in the household starts using marijuana,
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this makes it more likely for his younger siblings to engage in the same habit. Conversely,
the marijuana use decision of the younger siblings does not seem to have a contagious
e↵ect on the behavior of the other siblings.
Chapter 4 is concerned with ine ciencies arising in international cooperation. Compliance
is a key concern in international cooperation, given that contracting is based on the
reliability of all partners. Typically, free-riding is believed to be its main impediment in
international relations. We present an institutional outlier that solves this issue, albeit only
at the cost of other strategic ine ciencies. In the Southern Common Market (Mercosur),
its four member states of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay cannot benefit
from the cooperation e↵orts of others, yet are rather inclined to make false promises.
International agreements normally become legally binding once a state incorporates the
international contract at the domestic level. However, in Mercosur, policies are only legally
binding when all four countries have passed a provision. Given Mercosur’s weak provisions
for enforcement, actors prefer to reap benefits from contracting alone, knowing that they
can easily prevent the policy from taking e↵ect at a later stage. We o↵er a formal model
that demonstrates the consistency of our argument.
Empirically, we substantiate our claims with the complete incorporation record of all
Mercosur regulations between 1994 and 2008. A striking feature of Mercosur’s ratification
record is that half of the regulations introduced before 2004 have not entered into force
after five years. We jointly model the ratification hazards of the four members, accounting
for the change of the economic and political environment in the four member countries
over time, as well as unobserved regulation-specific characteristics. For regulations with
high media coverage and political relevance, we find that political actors are more likely
to first make an initial public promise to their Mercosur partners, before subsequently
prolonging ratification at the domestic level when public interest is low.
Finally, Chapter 5 addresses inference in parametric multivariate mixed proportional
hazard models with shared unobserved determinants. With multiple-spell duration data,
an unobserved shared component for groups of spells is often specified in the form of a
shared frailty term. We consider random-e↵ects likelihood-based statistical inference if the
duration data are subject to left-truncation. Such inference with left-truncated data can
be performed in the Stata software package for parametric and semi-parametric shared
frailty models. We show that with left-truncated data, the commands ignore the weeding-
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out process before the left-truncation points, a↵ecting the distribution of unobserved
determinants among group members in the data, namely among the group members
who survive until their truncation points. We critically examine studies in the statistical
literature on this issue as well as published empirical studies that use the commands.
Simulations illustrate the size of the (asymptotic) bias and its dependence on the degree
of truncation. We provide a Stata command file for the parametric case that maximizes
the likelihood function that properly takes account of the interplay between truncation
and dynamic selection.
5

Chapter 2
A Unique Bond: Does Losing your
Co-twin a↵ect your Remaining
Life-Span?1
2.1 Introduction
The lives of twins are fundamentally intertwined. Twins share a unique bond, and the
life of one twin may have a direct influence on the life of the other. Studies with bereaved
twins document how the loss of the co-twin can cause severe psychological stress that can
also lead to health deterioration (e.g., see Woodward, 1988; Segal et al., 1995; Segal and
Ream, 1998). The aim of this paper is to identify the e↵ect of bereavement experienced
in adulthood on the residual life expectancy of the surviving twin. Endogeneity concerns
have hampered the empirical analysis of this e↵ect so far (see Hougaard et al., 1992a). As
a main obstacle, twins usually share childhood experiences and have a similar or identical
genetic makeup. Such factors are typically unobservable and strongly influence health
outcomes throughout the whole life cycle of both twins. Overall, it is a challenging task
to capture the complex dependence structure between twin life-spans.
We introduce a new binary survival model to the twin mortality literature that allows to
study the e↵ects of bereavement on the subsequent survival of the bereaved twin and at
the same time accounts for unobservable childhood or genetic e↵ects. The new model is
1This chapter is joint work with Gerard van den Berg. We thank the Danish Twin Registry and Kaare
Christensen for kindly allowing us to use their data.
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used to estimate bereavement e↵ects in 9,270 adult twin pairs born in Denmark between
1873 and 1930. Our results suggest that a male twin, who has lost his identical co-twin
when he reached the age of 75, will live on average 1.6 years shorter due to the experience
of the loss. This e↵ect is less severe for non-identical twins or if the loss is experienced at
a higher age.
Previous studies are limited to modeling either the bereavement e↵ect or the influence of
genetic factors. Tomassini et al. (2001; 2002)2 and Hougaard et al. (1992a) use survival
models for each twin life-span and include the life-span of the co-twin as an exogenous
time dependent covariate. Hougaard et al. point out the problem with this approach.
Their estimated e↵ect does not only capture the e↵ect of bereavement but also captures
the dependence due to shared genetic factors. The other strand of literature focuses on
this latter type of dependence. The most elaborate approach is based on a bivariate
frailty model that specifies a flexible dependence structure between the frailty terms (e.g.
Hougaard et al., 1992a,b; Yashin and Iachine, 1995a; Wienke et al., 2001). Here, the frailty
terms reflect the influence of unobservable factors such as childhood or genetic e↵ects.
In her discussion of Hougaard et al.’s (1992a) paper, Flourney (1992) argues that a super-
model is needed that accounts for both e↵ect simultaneously: the bereavement e↵ect
and the influence of unobservable correlated factors. In this paper we present such a
unifying model. We include the life-span of the co-twin as a time-dependent covariate in
the model and account for the endogeneity of this variable by including it in the model
as a second equation. With a flexible dependence structure between the two frailty terms
we account for the influence of childhood and genetic e↵ects. Related models are used in
empirical econometric studies on the e↵ect of labor market programs on unemployment
durations. Here, we adapt the established timing of events model by Abbring and Van den
Berg (2003b) to fit our symmetric setup of twins and show that with minimal covariate
variation in the data the components of this new model including the bereavement e↵ect
can be identified from the observed joint distribution of twin life-spans.
In our application we use data on 2,808 monozygotic and 6,462 dizygotic twin pairs from
the Danish Twin Registry. As our analysis exploits the timing of deaths, it is advantageous
2Tomassini et al. (2002; 2001) use a model in which they match each bereaved twin to two not
bereaved twins based on zygosity, age, and sex and compare the two resulting hazard rates after the
age when bereavement takes place. Note that this method also ignores the endogeneity of the time of
bereavement caused by shared genetic factors.
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to observe as many exits as possible in the data. The Danish Twin Registry is one of the
oldest existing twin datasets and allows us to use cohorts from 1873 to 1930, ensuring
that 80.8% of the twins have uncensored exits before our window of observation ends
in 2004. The drawback of using such old cohorts is the limited information available on
the twin pairs. The Danish Twin Registry is designed as a medical dataset, providing
information on dates of exit on a daily basis but has very limited information on other
characteristics of the twins. In particular, the observable characteristics available do not
vary within same-sex twin pairs.3 The identification result of Abbring and Van den Berg
(2003b) relies on the assumption of su cient covariate variation within the unit of interest,
the twin pair in our case. Consequently, their identification result does not apply to our
dataset. In Section 2.3 we present a new identification result for a symmetric4 version of
the timing-of-events model that does not rely on this assumption.5
Our semi-parametric identification result has a wider relevance for the empirical study of
parallel systems and networks and for epidemiological research. The symmetric timing-of-
events model describes a very general setting in which two parallel durations are connected
due to both, observable characteristics and unobservable time-constant factors, and at
the same time the first exit potentially a↵ects the survival of the other. In the most
extreme case, the complete symmetry of our model allows for the two durations to be
indistinguishable in terms of observable characteristics. So even if the durations can
not be indexed (or the index is uninformative) and the only observable covariates are
characteristics of the pair, our identification result still applies. This result is relevant
in cases of datasets with limited observable covariates, such as data of old cohorts or
datasets in which the available covariates, creating the otherwise necessary variation
within duration pairs, are potentially endogenous and therefore have to be excluded.
Our model allows an estimation of bereavement e↵ects among twins while controlling for
the influence of shared genetic factors. However, the symmetric timing-of-events model,
we present for this purpose, can also be used to estimate the dependence between twin
life-spans caused by shared genetic factors while controlling for a potential additional
3The major part of the dataset comprises same-sex twin pairs, since less e↵ort was put into following
up on di↵erent-sex twins in the Danish Twin Registry.
4In contrast to the original timing-of-events model, the model we use here allows for treatment in
both directions. Before the first exit occurs, both life-spans can potentially a↵ect each other.
5Note that in contrast to the model by Abbring and van den Berg, in the identification result presented
here a multiplicative structure is imposed on the bereavement e↵ect function.
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causal dependence. There is an extensive field of research with the purpose to quantify
the influence of genetic factors on mortality using data sets similar to ours (e.g., see
Hougaard et al., 1992a,b; Yashin and Iachine, 1995a). Our model allows a comparison of
these di↵erent approaches. In our empirical analysis, we show that the magnitude of the
estimated e↵ects change considerably when either the bereavement e↵ect or the influence
of genetic factors is ignored.
Many bereavement studies focus on conjugal bereavement (e.g., see Bowling, 1987;
Lichtenstein et al., 1998; Lindeboom et al., 2002; Manor and Eisenbach, 2003; Van den
Berg et al., 2011). These studies find convincing evidence that the loss of a spouse can
severely a↵ect mortality shortly after bereavement. However, it remains unclear whether
the measured e↵ect on mortality originates exclusively from emotional stress since the loss
of the spouse also greatly a↵ects the everyday life of the surviving partner. In contrast
to spouses, most adult twins have separate families and support systems. This suggests
that a causal dependence between twin life-spans should be in large part attributed to
the e↵ect of emotional bereavement.
After a brief literature review of the link between bereavement and mortality in Section
2.2, we introduce the symmetric timing-of-events model and address identification in
Section 2.3. In Section 2.4, we shortly introduce the twin dataset from the Danish Twin
Registry. For the purpose of our empirical analysis, we impose some additional structure
on the general symmetric timing-of-events model in Section 2.5 using functional forms
that are well established in the twin mortality literature. Subsequently, our estimation
results are presented in Section 2.6. We sum up with a discussion of our results in Section
2.7 and a brief outlook in Section 2.8.
2.2 The link between bereavement and mortality
The twin studies by Segal et al. (1995, 2002); Segal and Ream (1998) and Woodward
(1988) document how the loss of the co-twin can cause severe emotional stress. The grief
intensity for an identical (monozygotic) twin is often higher than that for other relatives
or spouses (see Segal and Bouchard, 1993; Segal et al., 1995). Besides feelings of despair,
depersonalization (numbness, shock), rumination (preoccupation with the deceased) and
loss of control, bereaved twins also show symptoms such as loss of appetite and vigor, as
well as other physical symptoms (Segal and Blozis, 2002).
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According to Selye’s General Adaptation Syndrome (1936; 1955), psychological stress
can be a major cause of disease, given that chronic stress causes long-term biochemical
changes.
Every stress leaves an indelible scar, and the organism pays for its survival
after a stressful situation by becoming a little older. (Hans Selye, Smith, 1969)
Stress theories are specifically applied to bereavement (e.g., see Stroebe and Stroebe,
1987; Stroebe et al., 1993), which is considered a stressful life event with physical health
consequences.6
The psychological manifestations of grief are generally well-documented, and twin studies
have established the existence of a strong psychological reaction to the loss of the co-twin.
Furthermore, the work by Selye (1936; 1955) and Stroebe et al. (1987; 1993) explain the
direct link between the emotional stress of bereavement and health outcomes. However, no
empirical study to date has clearly established a causal dependence between bereavement
and mortality for twins.
2.3 Model and identification result
In the following, we introduce the new bivariate model for twin life-spans, which
constitutes a symmetric version of the timing-of-events model by Abbring and van den
Berg (2003b) (see also Abbring and Heckman, 2007). Following a continuous duration
framework, at age t 2 [0,1) each twin faces a certain risk of dying, given that he has
survived up to this point (mortality hazard). Since we are interested in measuring the
causal e↵ect of the end of one life-span on the subsequent residual life-span of the other
(bereavement e↵ect), we specify the mortality hazard of each twin j = 1, 2 conditional on
the realization of the life-span of the co-twin Tk. Additionally, we condition on observable
characteristics of the twin pair x and the realization of frailty terms Vj to account for
childhood e↵ects and the genetic makeup. The resulting mortality hazards of the two
twins are almost symmetric, i.e. their functional forms only di↵er due to the possibly
di↵erent realizations of V1 and V2.
6Furthermore, Sanders (1999) integrates Selye’s well-established general theory of stress in her
Integrative Theory of Bereavement. She points out that besides the familiar stages of grief, patients also
show physiological changes and consequent vulnerability to illness after bereavement (see also Sanders,
1980)
11
CHAPTER 2. TWIN BEREAVEMENT AND MORTALITY
Model 2.1. The hazard rates of T1|(T2 = t2, x, V1) and T2|(T1 = t1, x, V2) are given by
✓(t|T2 = t2, x, V1) =  (t) (x) (t, t2, x)I(t>t2)V1
✓(t|T1 = t1, x, V2) =  (t) (x) (t, t1, x)I(t>t1)V2,
where the vector of frailties V = (V1, V2)0 is assumed to be drawn from the bivariate
distribution G(v1, v2) and the bereavement e↵ect function is multiplicative in two of its
arguments  (t, tk, x) =  a(t  tk) b(tk, x).
In Model 2.1, as long as both twins are alive, each twin j faces a mortality hazard of
 (t) (x)Vj. Once the co-twin dies, the mortality hazard of the surviving twin is rescaled
by  a(t  tk) b(tk, x), reflecting the bereavement e↵ect. Here, the first multiplicative term
 a describes the dependence of the bereavement e↵ect on the time passed since the loss
occurred, while  b accounts for the dependence on the age at the time of bereavement and
the observable variables x. I(t > tk) denotes an indicator function that is 1 if the loss
has occurred and 0 otherwise. The function  (t) captures the dependence of the mortality
hazard on age and  (x) holds the e↵ect of the covariates.
Note that given the observed twin pair characteristics x, Model 2.1 allows for two sources
of dependence between life-spans T1 and T2, the first of which is reflected in the joint
distribution of V1 and V2. For instance, for monozyotic twin pairs, we would expect a high
positive correlation between the two terms, due to the twins’ identical genetic makeup.
The second type of dependence is reflected in the bereavement e↵ect function  (t, tk, x).
Note that, conditional on x and V , the only dependence between life-spans T1 and T2
comes from the bereavement e↵ect function  (t, tk, x). Consequently, this function can be
given a causal interpretation as the e↵ect of the end of one life-span on the other.
In contrast to the frailty terms V that reflect the influence of all time constant unobserved
characteristics such as the genetic makeup, the bereavement e↵ect accounts for the timing
of deaths. This is why the bereavement e↵ect in Model 2.1 can be seen as a local e↵ect,
given that it only a↵ects the hazard rate of the surviving twin after the exit of the
other has occurred. Accordingly, the influence of time-constant unobservable factors V
can be seen as a global e↵ect, since characteristics shaped during childhood and genetic
dispositions influence the mortality hazard of the two twins over their whole life-span,
i.e. 8t 2 [0,1). This terminology provides an intuition for the identifiability of Model
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2.1. Since the bereavement e↵ect is assumed to be a local e↵ect, whereas the influence of
upbringing and the genetic makeup is assumed to be global (time-constant), both can be
distinguished.
The structure imposed on the conditional mortality hazards in Model 2.1 assures the
clear distinction between the local bereavement and the global e↵ect of unobservable
factors. Note that the local characteristic of the bereavement e↵ect in Model 2.1 rules out
anticipatory e↵ects, particularly a scenario in which a twin anticipates the future date of
death of his co-twin and is a↵ected by this knowledge to the degree that his mortality
hazard today is a↵ected. Furthermore, the unobservable influences V are assumed to be
purely time-constant (global), thus ruling out unobservable shocks that a↵ect both twins,
such as local epidemics or major events within the family.
In contrast to Model 2.1, the functions   and   in the timing-of-events model of Abbring
and van den Berg (2003b) are allowed to di↵er across the two hazards and only the hazard
of duration 1 can be directly a↵ected by the exit of duration 2.7 In their paper, the authors
already point out that their identification results can be extended in a straightforward
manner to a setting in which the full distribution of (T1, T2)|x is observable and both
durations can potentially be a↵ected by the exit of the other, similar to our setup.
However, a di↵erent identification strategy is needed to identify Model 2.1 in which  
and in particular   is the same in both hazards. The latter implies that all covariates
in the vector x enter both hazards with the same value and have the same e↵ect. The
di culty arises from this complete symmetry in the covariate e↵ects  (x).
The result by Abbring and van den Berg (2003b) uses the fact that, the two durations are
competing risks until the first exit occurs. Therefore, their proof exploits an identification
result of the mixed proportional hazard competing risk model (Abbring and van den Berg,
2003a). Such a competing risks model requires variation of the covariate e↵ects across the
two hazards in order to trace out the bivariate frailty distribution G(v1, v2). In particular,
it must be assumed that ( 1(x), 2(x)) can attain all values over a nonempty open set
  ⇢ (0,1)2 when x is varied over its support X .8 Since it holds in our symmetric setup
that  1(x) =  2(x) =  (x), we cannot exploit this exogenous variation across the two
7The original model also does not need the assumption that the treatment e↵ect can be separated
into two multiplicative parts.
8If  j(x) = e
 Tj x then it would be su cient that the vector x has two continuous covariates that a↵ect
the hazard rates of both risks but with di↵erent nonzero coe cients, and that are not perfectly collinear.
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hazards in our model.9
Although the original model of Abbring and van den Berg is in some respects more
flexible than Model 2.1, given that it allows for di↵erent baseline hazards and regression
component functions across the two equations, it is also more restrictive in the sense that it
relies on su cient variation of the covariate e↵ects across the two hazards. Therefore, the
symmetric case of Model 2.1 is not covered by their result. The main di↵erence in terms
of the identification strategy is that while Abbring and Van den Berg’s result exploits
the results from the mixed proportional hazard competing risk model, our identification
strategy exploits the symmetry of the model, enabling us to use of the identification
results of the univariate mixed proportional hazard model by Elbers and Ridder (1982).
By imposing a multiplicative structure on the treatment e↵ect function, we are able to
split the hazard rate into three multiplicative parts reflecting the dependence on time
t, observables x, and unobservable influences V , which is characteristic for a mixed
proportional hazard model. We exploit this structure at several steps throughout our
proof.10
For the purpose of identification, we impose the following assumptions:
Assumption 2.1. The vector x is k-dimensional with 1  k < 1 and   : X ! U ⇢
(0,1). The set X ⇢ Rk contains at least two values.
Assumption 2.2.  a : R+ ! (0,1) with lims#0  a(s) < 1 and for  b : [0,1) ⇥ X !
(0,1) it holds that @ c 2 (0,1) s.t.  b(0, x) = c (x) 1 8x 2 X .
Assumption 2.3. For the function   : [0,1) ! (0,1) it holds that for all t 2 (0,1)
lims#t  (s) <1 and has integral ⇤(t) :=
R t
0  (⌧) d⌧ <1, 8 t   0 and further
⇤˜(t, s) :=
Z t
s
 (⌧) a(⌧   s) d⌧ <1, 8 {(t, s) 2 [0,1)2 : t > s}.
9For twins it is very unlikely that observable characteristics such as sex or cohort will a↵ect twin 1
systematically di↵erent compared to twin 2. In our dataset, twins are indexed according to their order
of births. The firstborn has index 1 and the second index 2. But this information is extremely unreliable
especially for the older cohorts. Note further, that since we use cohorts from 1873 onwards, we only have
a very limited set of covariates available in our analysis none of which vary within same-sex twin pairs.
Therefore, we can not rely on su cient exogenous variation within twin pairs.
10Note that the identification results presented in this section can be straightforwardly extended to
the case where the bereavement e↵ect function di↵ers between the two durations. Thus, if the two spells
can be distinguished in the data, it is possible to identify two separate bereavement e↵ects  1(t, t2, x) and
 2(t, t1, x). The first measures the e↵ect of the exit of duration 1 on duration 2 and the other the e↵ect of
the exit of duration 2 on duration 1. However, in most applications including our twin model the causal
e↵ect is symmetric.
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For some a priori chosen t0, t⇤0 and x0, it holds that
R t0
0  (⌧) d⌧ = 1,R t⇤0
0  (⌧) a(⌧) d⌧ = 1 and  (x0) = 1.
Assumption 2.4. V is an R2+-valued time-invariant random vector (V1, V2)0 and is drawn
from distribution G, which does not depend on x, and has a finite positive mean. G is such
that P (V 2 (0,1)2) = 1. Furthermore, for all (t, x) 2 (0,1)⇥X lims#tE(Vj|Tj   s, Tk =
t, x) = E(Vj|Tj   t, Tk = t, x).
Assumption 2.5. 9 an open set  2 (0,1)2 with t1 > t2 8 (t1, t2) 2  s.t. at all points
(t1, t2) 2  the function  (t1, t2, x) = ⇤˜(t1, t2) b(t2, x) is continuously di↵erentiable with
respect to t2.11
Note that for Assumption 2.1, a single dummy variable x that does not need to vary across
the two hazards su ces, provided that it has an e↵ect. In such a case,  (x) takes on only
two values on X . The timing-of-events model of Abbring and van den Berg (2003b) usually
requires two continuous variables with di↵erent e↵ects to assure identification. For our
model, the most limited case of covariate variation in form of a single dummy variable
su ces.
Assumption 2.3 restricts the baseline hazard function to be continuous from the right for
all t 2 (0,1). Note that this does not rule out the piecewise constant case or most
functional forms. Furthermore, given that this property only has to hold for strictly
positive values, functional forms with lims#0  (s) = 1 such as the Weibull function are
not ruled out. However, the initial jump of the bereavement e↵ect has to have a finite
limit. Consequently, functional forms of  a with lims#0  a(s) =1 are excluded.
Note that, in contrast to Abbring and van den Berg (2003b), we do not make the
assumption of varying covariates between the two durations, but rather impose a
multiplicative structure on the treatment e↵ect. We also use slightly di↵erent regularity
assumptions because our proof exploits identification results from the mixed proportional
hazard model.
With Assumptions 2.1-2.5, we formulate the following two propositions:
Proposition 2.1. If Assumptions 2.1-2.4 are satisfied, then the functions  , ,  a,  b from
11Alternative assumption 5: The open set  2 (0,1)2 could also exist for t1 < t2 8 (t1, t2) 2  s.t. at
all points (t1, t2) 2  the function  (t2, t1, x) is continuously di↵erentiable with respect to t1.
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Model 2.1 are non-parametrically identified (up to a scaling factor) from the distribution
of (T1, T2)|x.
Note that G remains undetermined in Proposition 2.1. This leads to:
Proposition 2.2. If Assumptions 2.1-2.5 are satisfied, then Model 2.1, which is
characterized by the functions G, , ,  a,  b, is non-parametrically identified (up to a
scaling factor) from the distribution of (T1, T2)|x.
Proof of Proposition 2.1. Identification of   and  : Let Z = min{T1, T2} be the
minimum of the two durations T1 and T2. The survival function of Z|x is given as (see
Appendix 2.A.1 for details)
SZ(t|x) =
Z 1
0
e ⇤(t) (x)w dGW (w), with W = V1 + V2. (2.1)
Note that, due to the symmetry of Model 2.1, the distribution of Z has a hazard rate
of the mixed proportional form: ✓z(t|x,W ) = ✓(t|T2   t, x, V1) + ✓(t|T1   t, x, V2) =
 (t) (x)W with frailty W = V1 + V2 drawn from distribution GW . The results by Elbers
and Ridder (1982), (see also Lancaster, 1990; Van den Berg, 2001, for an overview)12 on
the identification of the mixed proportional hazard model imply that, under Assumptions
2.1-2.4, the model in Equation (2.1), characterized by the functions  ,   and GW , is
identified up to a scaling factor (see Appendix 2.A.1 for details).
Identification of  a: The survival function of duration Tj given x and given that the exit
of the other duration occurred at Tk = 0, can be expressed as follows
S(t|Tk = 0, x) =
Z 1
0
e 
R t
0 ✓(⌧ |Tk=0,x,Vj) d⌧ dGVj |Tk=0,x(vj),
with ✓(t|Tk = 0, x, Vj) =  (t) (x) a(t   0) b(0, x)Vj. Here, we make use of the subset
Tj|(Tk = 0, x) of the observable bivariate distribution (T1, T2)|x. Here, duration k exits at
time Tk = 0, and therefore the hazard of the other duration is a↵ected by bereavement
over the full interval (0,1). Due to the multiplicative structure of the bereavement e↵ect
function, the distribution of Tj|(Tk = 0, x) has a hazard rate of the mixed proportional
form: ✓(t|Tk = 0, x, Vj) =  ˜(t) ˜(x)Vj with  ˜(t) =  (t) a(t) and  ˜(x) =  (x) b(0, x).
Again, the results by Elbers and Ridder imply that, under Assumptions 2.1-2.4, the mixed
12See also Kortram et al. (1995a) for the case of only two possible values for  (x).
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proportional hazard model defined by { ˜,  ˜, GVj |Tk=0,x} is identified up to a scaling factor;
moreover, given that   is known, this also identifies  a. Note that a key feature of the mixed
proportional hazard model is the independence of observable variables x and unobservable
frailties V . In Appendix 2.A.2, we show that under Assumptions 2.1-2.4, the conditional
frailty distribution GVj |Tk=0,x does not depend on x. Furthermore, Assumption 2.2 states
that the functions  (x) and  b(0, x) are not proportional, assuring that the function  ˆ(x) =
 (x) b(0, x) generates su cient exogenous variation.
Identification of  b: In the following, we exploit information on the jump of the hazard
rate at the moment of bereavement
lims#t ✓(s|Tk = t, x)
✓(t|Tk = t, x) =
 (x) b(t, x) lims#t  a(s  t) (s)E(Vj|Tj   s, Tk = t, x)
 (x) (t)E(Vj|Tj   t, Tk = t, x)
=  b(t, x) lim
s#t
 a(s  t) lims#t  (s)
 (t)
. (2.2)
Assumptions 2.2 and 2.3 assure the existence of lims#t  a(s t) and lims#t  (s). Accordingly,
the second equality directly follows from Assumption 2.4, stating that lims#tE(Vj|Tj  
s, Tk = t, x) = E(Vj|Tj   t, Tk = t, x). Note, that the left hand side of Equation 2.2 is
observable for all (t, x) 2 (0,1)⇥X . Since lims#t  a(s  t), lims#t  (s) and  (t) are known
from previous steps, we can trace out the function  b(t, x) over (0,1)⇥ X .13
Proof of Proposition 2.2. Identification of G: Recall that the functions  , ,  a,  b in
Model 2.1 are identified under Assumptions 2.1-2.2. The only function that remains
undetermined is the bivariate frailty distribution G. For this last step, we exploit
information of the observed density f(t1, t2|x) for t1 > t2 (see Appendix 2.A.3)
f(t1, t2|x) = c(t1, t2, x)@2s1,s2LG
 
 (x)(⇤(t2) +  (t1, t2, x)), (x)⇤(t2)
 
, (2.3)
with c(t1, t2, x) =  (t1) (t2) (x)2 a(t1   t2) b(t2, x) and  (t1, t2, x) = ⇤˜(t1, t2) b(t2, x).
Note that all functions on the right hand side of Equation 2.3 are identified, apart
from the cross derivative of the bivariate Laplace transformation @2s1,s2LG(s1, s2), with
arguments s1 =  (x)(⇤(t2)+ (t1, t2, x)) and s2 =  (x)⇤(t2). The Laplace transformation
LG(s1, s2) is known to be a completely monotone function. This property implies that
13Here,  b(0, x) is already known from the last identification step.
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its cross derivative @2s1,s2LG(s1, s2) is also completely monotone (see Appendix 2.A.3).
Given that completely monotone functions are real analytic, and that real analytic
functions are uniquely determined by their values on a nonempty open set, the function
@2s1,s2LG(s1, s2) can be identified on its whole support S = [0,1)2 if we know all its
values on a nonempty open set. In Appendix 2.A.3, we show that under Assumption 2.5,
the function ( (x)(⇤(t2) +  (t1, t2, x)), (x)⇤(t2)) attains all values on a nonempty open
set ⌥ ⇢ (0,1)2 when t1 and t2 vary over  ⇢ (0,1)2 with t1 > t2.14 This identifies
@2s1,s2LG(s1, s2) and the integral
R s1
0
R s2
0 @
2
s1,s2LG(u1, u2) du1du2 subsequently gives us LG.
Due to the uniqueness of the Laplace transformation, G is uniquely determined.
2.4 The Danish Twin Registry
In our empirical analysis we use data from the Danish Twin Registry. The registry was
first established in 1954 with the goal of following up on all same-sex twins born since
1873 and surviving as twins at least until the age of 6. However, there is some selectivity in
the very early cohorts, with twins who died young less likely to be included in the sample.
Furthermore, most of the information on characteristics is only available for twins who
survived January 1, 1943. Therefore, we restrict attention to twin pairs still alive at this
date. However, this is not a serious limitation given that we are particularly interested
in the e↵ects of bereavement at higher ages. We use cohorts from 1873 to 1930, assuring
that we observe the exit of most twins prior to January 1, 2004, when our window of
observation ends. While the registry contains some di↵erent-sex twin pairs, most e↵ort
was devoted to following up on same-sex and particularly monozygotic twin pairs. We
refer to Skytthe et al. (2002) for detailed descriptions of the registry and the way in which
it has been collected.
As a result, our sample includes 2,806 monozygotic and 6,462 dizygotic twin pairs, 1,219
of which are di↵erent sex twin pairs. All twins are born between 1873 and 1930 and
both twins in all pairs survived at least until January 1, 1943. The birth and death dates
and resulting individual lifetime durations are observed in days. Individuals still alive
on January 1, 2004 or had emigrated have right-censored durations. Overall, the death
14Note, that if t1 < t2 8 (t1, t2) 2  then the same reasoning can be applied to the function
( (x)⇤(t1), (x)(⇤(t1) +  (t2, t1, x))), which then holds the arguments of @2s1,s2LG in Equation (2.3)
for the case t1 < t2.
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date is observed for 80% of the individuals in our sample. We observe the death cause
for 94.4% of this group, which is classified according to the International Classification
of Diseases(ICD) system, versions 5-8, at the 3-digit level. These are grouped into 12
categories, with the following groups being of specific interest: ‘cardiovascular’ (32.42%,
death due to cardiovascular malfunctions or diseases), ‘apoplexy’ (14.13%), ‘cancer’
(26.03%, death due to malignant neoplasms), ‘suicide’ (1.03%), ‘accidents’ (3.7%) and
‘other’ (including death due to tuberculosis, other infectious diseases, diseases of the
respiratory, digestive or uro-genital system).
For each twin pair in our sample, we observe zygosity, sex, year of birth, season of birth
and region of birth. Note that none of the available covariates vary within the twin pair,
apart from sex. In the previous section, we showed that our model does not rely on this
kind of variation. The information on zygosity is very accurate with a misclassification
rate below 5% (see Holm, 1983; Lykken, 1978). In our analysis, we use an indicator for
being born in Copenhagen to distinguish between rural and urban areas in Denmark.
The additional distinctions between small towns and rural areas outside of Copenhagen
proved to be uninformative in our empirical analysis.
Besides having one of the oldest existing twin datasets in the world, the country of
Denmark is particularly suited for mortality studies using individual lifetime data over a
long time interval. At the beginning of our window of observation in the 1870s, Denmark
already had a quite well-established and comprehensive health care system compared
to the rest of Europe. This is of particular importance for our purposes, given that a
functioning health care system dampens economic shocks that twin pairs are exposed to
over their whole life. Moreover, there were also no major epidemics in Denmark between
1873 and 2004. Recent studies have compared international mortality levels for 1918,
finding that Denmark stands out as the country with the lowest levels of excess mortality
for the 1918–/1919 worldwide influenza pandemic (see Canudas-Romo and Erlangsen,
2008; Ansart et al., 2009). Furthermore, Denmark remained neutral in both World Wars,
and despite being occupied by Germany during the Second World War, casualties were
negligible compared to the rest of Europe. In summary, lifetime data from Denmark from
the 1870s to present provides a dataset that is little a↵ected by economic or direct health
shocks, compared to the rest of Europe.
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2.5 Model of twin life-spans
In the following, we apply the symmetric timing-of-events model introduced in Section
2.3 to the dataset of life-spans from the Danish Twin Registry. For this purpose, we
need to impose additional structure on the functions  , ,   and G in (Model 2.1). In
particular, the vector of frailties (V1, V2) for each twin pair is assumed to be drawn from a
Cherian bivariate Gamma distribution15, which is often used in lifetime models for twins
(see Yashin and Iachine, 1995b; Wienke et al., 2001, 2002) and allows the interpretation
of the individual frailty term as the sum of a shared twin pair-specific term V˜0 and an
individual-specific term V˜1:
Vj = V˜0 + V˜j for j 2 1, 2.
Here, each term V˜1, V˜2 and V˜0 is independently drawn from a Gamma distribution.
With this structure, the bivariate Gamma distribution of (V1, V2) has identical marginal
distributions, reflecting the symmetry of life-spans within twin pairs. Their mean is
normalized to one, and consequently the joint distribution of (V1, V2) can be fully described
by two parameters: the variance  2 of Vj and correlation ⇢ of V1 and V2. The latter
is computed as the ratio of the shared and total variation ⇢ = V ar(V˜0)
V ar(V˜0+V˜j)
. Recall that
our sample includes monozygotic (MZ) and dizygotic (DZ) twin pairs. Accordingly, we
estimate separate parameters for both types of zygosity:  2MZ , ⇢MZ and  
2
DZ , ⇢DZ .
In the following, we denote the two life-spans of each twin pair by the vector of random
variables (T1 T2) and their realizations by (t1 t2). The twin life-spans follow a distribution
given by the bivariate survival function S(t1, t2|x) = P (T1 > t1, T2 > t2|x). For a small
part of the twin pairs in our sample, at least one twin is still alive at the end of the
observation window on January 1, 2004. Since the censoring points are determined by the
cohort of the twin pair, this assures independent censoring in our data. Furthermore, the
life-span of one twin is right-censored for a few twin pairs, while the co-twin is observed
to live past this censoring point. Here, right-censoring may occur due to immigration,
for instance, which implies that we do not observe the exact time of bereavement
15Given that we have substantial left-truncation in our dataset, the Gamma distribution would still
be a justified approximation if the true underlying distribution were to di↵er (Abbring and van den Berg,
2007).
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for the co-twin. The first exit could occur any time between the censoring point and
1. Consequently, we have to integrate over the respective interval to account for the
occurrence of all possible exit times.16
S(t1, t2|x) =
8><>:S
⇤(t1, t1|x) 
R t1
t2
St2(t1, ⌧ |x) d⌧ , for t1   t2
S⇤(t2, t2|x) 
R t2
t1
St1(⌧, t2|x) d⌧ , for t1 < t2
with S⇤(t1, t2|x) = (1 +  2 (x)[⇤(t1) + ⇤(t2)]) 
⇢
 2
(1 +  2 (x)⇤(t1))
  (1 ⇢)
 2 (1 +  2 (x)⇤(t2))
  (1 ⇢)
 2 (2.4)
and partial derivatives Stj(t1, t2|x) = @S(t1,t2|x)@tj , for (j = 1, 2).
As already mentioned in the data section, our dataset only includes twin pairs for which
both twins were still alive on January 1, 1943. This truncation of data has to also be
reflected in the likelihood function. For this purpose, we denote the age of twin j on
January 1, 1943 by tj,age43. This leads to the survival function conditional on both twins
surviving January 1, 1943
S(t1, t2|T1 > t1,age43, T2 > t2,age43, x) = S(t1, t2|x)S(t1,age43, t2,age43|x) 1
With this, we can derive the likelihood contribution of a twin pair
L(t1, t2, c1, c2|x) = [ c1c2S(t1, t2|x)  c1(1  c2)St2(t1, t2|x)
 (1  c1)c2St1(t1, t2|x) + (1  c1)(1  c2)St1,t2(t1, t2|x) ]
S(t1,age43, t2,age43|x) 1. (2.5)
Here, c1 and c2 denote the censoring indicators for T1 and T2 and St1,t2(t1, t2|x) =
@2S(t1,t2|x)
@t1@t2
. Note that due to the specific functional form of the Cherian bivariate Gamma
distribution, the likelihood function has a closed form17. The functional forms of S, St1 ,
St2 and St1,t2 and their derivation are presented in Appendix 2.A.4.
16The integrals
R t1
t2
St2(t1, ⌧ |x) d⌧ and
R t2
t1
St1(⌧, t2|x) d⌧ are approximated with numerical integration
methods.
17The only exception are the integrals over the interval of all possible bereavement times for censored
twin pairs.
21
CHAPTER 2. TWIN BEREAVEMENT AND MORTALITY
For the purpose of our empirical analysis, we also impose additional structure on the
functions  , ,  a,  b of Model 2.1. The logarithm of  a(t) is specified as piecewise constant
with three time intervals after bereavement occurred: the first year after bereavement, the
second to fourth year and after the fourth year. The function ln( b(tk, x)) =  
age
l +  
T
  x
models the dependence of the bereavement e↵ect on the twin’s age at the time tk that
she/he experiences the loss of the co-twin and the dependence on observable characteristics
x such as sex and zygosity. Here, p indicates the age interval in which the loss occurred:
ages below 65, 66 to 79 and above 80. The covariate e↵ects enter the hazard as e 
Tx, which
is the standard choice in mixed proportional hazard models and the duration dependence
function   is assumed to follow a flexible version of the Gompertz function, i.e.  (t) =
e↵1t+↵2t
2+↵3t3 .
We choose a flexible baseline hazard that includes the Gompertz function as a special case
for ↵2 = ↵3 = 0, which is often used in mortality models and is known to give an acceptable
fit. Specifying the correct functional form for the baseline hazard is particularly important
for our analysis, given that we are measuring the impact of intermediate events in a
lifetime. For instance, if the baseline hazard function were specified to be too restrictive
in terms of the slope at higher ages, this lack of flexibility would be reflected in the
causal bereavement e↵ect, which in most cases occurs at higher ages. Note that we use
a very wide range of cohorts 1873 to 1930 in our analysis, for which the aging process
has evidently changed over time. In particular, the life expectancy at higher ages has
drastically increased between 1873 and 1930 (see Gavrilov and Nosov, 1985). In order to
account for this change in the shape of the duration dependence function, we estimate
separate sets of parameters ↵c1,↵c2 and ↵c3 for three di↵erent cohort groups c 2 {1, 2, 3}:
1873-1899, 1900-1915 and 1916-1930.
With this structure, we can express our model in terms of the logarithm of the hazard
rates of twin 1 and 2 conditional on observable and unobservable variables x and V and
the realization of the other duration
ln ✓(t|T2 = t2, x, V1) = ↵c1t+ ↵c2t2 + ↵c3t3 +  0x+ I(t > t2)( tq +  agep + x0 x) + ln(V1)
ln ✓(t|T1 = t1, x, V2) = ↵c1t+ ↵c2t2 + ↵c3t3 +  0x+ I(t > t1)( tq +  agep + x0 x) + ln(V2). (2.6)
Here,  tq,  
age
p ,  
x are parameters that model the e↵ect of bereavement. The indicator for
the three time intervals after bereavement is denoted by q = 1, 2, 3 and p = 1, 2 is the
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indicator for the three age groups at which bereavement occurs, with ages below 65 being
the reference group.
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Figure 2.1: Flexible Gompertz-type baseline hazard functions by cohort groups
Note: The baseline hazard functions are based on the estimates of Model IV. A flexible
version of the Gompertz baseline hazard is assumed:  (t) = exp(↵c1t+ ↵c2t2 + ↵c3t3).
Left line: cohort group 1873-1899, Middle line: cohort group 1900-1915, Right line:
cohort group 1916-1930.
2.6 Empirical analysis
2.6.1 Estimation results
In our empirical analysis, we estimate four di↵erent bivariate survival models (Table 2.1:
Models I-IV). Models III and IV are the models of interest, while Models I and II are used
for the purpose of comparing our approach to previous models used in the twin mortality
literature. Model II is a correlated frailty model that does not include a bereavement
e↵ect. It represents the strand in the epidemiological literature that models the influence
of shared genetic factors by allowing for a dependence between frailty terms (see Yashin
and Iachine, 1995a; Wienke et al., 2001). Note that a potential causal dependence between
twin life-spans is ignored in these models. In Equations (2.4) - (2.6), this corresponds to
the case of  a =  age =  x = 0. On the other hand, Model I is a bivariate survival model,
where the only dependence between twin life-spans conditional on covariates is modeled
via a bereavement e↵ect function. In fact, Model I does not allow for any influence due
to unobservable characteristics of the twin pair. This corresponds to  2 = 0 in Equations
(2.4) - (2.6) and represents the approach in the twin bereavement literature whereby
bereavement is modeled as an exogenous event, ignoring the influence of shared genetic
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factors (see Hougaard et al., 1992a; Tomassini et al., 2002). Finally, Model III represents
the symmetric timing-of-events model that accounts for both the influence of shared
genetic factors and a causal dependence between twin life-spans (Equations (2.4) - (2.6)
with  age =  x = 0 18). In Model IV, we include a more flexible bereavement e↵ect
function allowing, besides zygosity, for a dependence on sex and the age at bereavement.
This corresponds to the model in Equations (2.4) - (2.6).
When comparing the estimates of the correlated Gamma frailty distribution in Model
II to those from Model III, one finds considerably higher estimates of the variance
and the correlation parameters in Model II. This is true for the frailty distribution of
monozygotic ( 2MZ , ⇢MZ), as well as that of dizygotic ( 
2
DZ , ⇢DZ) twin pairs. In particular,
the correlation between frailties reflecting the influence of shared genetic factors decreases
strongly (around 30%) when including the bereavement e↵ect in Model III. It is clear
from this comparison that the estimated correlation in Model II not only reflects the
time-invariant influence of shared genetic factors but also captures some time-varying
influences such as a causal dependence between twin life-spans.
In Model I, we find relatively high estimates for the bereavement e↵ect, implying that
a monozygotic male twin who is 75 years old and has lost his co-twin at the age of 70
would die on average 2.2 years earlier compared to if he had never experienced this loss.
These high estimates are unsurprising given that they not only capture a bereavement
e↵ect but also the influence of shared genetic factors. We control for this influence in
Models III and IV, finding considerably lower estimates (28% less in terms of residual life
expectancy in Model IV). This illustrates how strongly the estimates of the bereavement
e↵ect are biased in the presence of unobserved shared genetic factors when the model
fails to control for them. Considering these results, it also becomes clear to what extent
previous empirical studies have overestimated a bereavement e↵ect for twins.
Note that we do not report the estimated parameters of the baseline hazard function
in Table 2.1. In Figure 2.1, the function  (t) = e↵c1t+↵c2t
2+↵c3t3 is plotted over the age
interval 0-120 for the three cohort groups c = 1, 2, 3 implied by the estimated parameters
in Model IV. Evidently, younger cohorts have a considerably lower mortality hazard at
higher ages compared to the older cohorts. This change in the aging process over time is
known as the late-life mortality deceleration (see Gavrilov and Nosov, 1985).
18The only exception to  x = 0 is the dependence of the bereavement e↵ect on zygosity.
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In Model IV, we find a highly significant positive e↵ect of being male (0.513), reflecting the
shorter life expectancy for males compared to females. When comparing monozygotic male
twins to monozygotic female twins, this estimate implies a higher residual life expectancy
of 2.38 years for females at the age of 75 (see Tables 2a and 2b). Being born in spring has
a weakly significant positive e↵ect on the mortality hazard, in line with the findings of
Doblhammer (2004). If a twin is born in Copenhagen, this increases mortality considerably
(21.4% of the e↵ect of being male), possibly due to a greater exposition to diseases,
pollution or other risk factors in urban areas. Note that despite dizygotic twins being
known to live slightly longer than monozygotic twins, we find a positive e↵ect on mortality
for dizygotic twins compared to monozygotic twins. However, considering that we restrict
attention in this study to twins who survived infancy, this result may be explained by the
fact that identical twins face a higher infant mortality risk compared to fraternal twins,
leading to a selective sample that over-represents healthy identical twins.
We estimate a piecewise constant bereavement e↵ect in Model IV, accounting for three
di↵erent time intervals after bereavement occurred: the fist year after the loss, second to
fourth year and after four years. The overall positive e↵ect is highly significant and slightly
decreases over time. Furthermore, the size of the bereavement e↵ect strongly depends on
zygosity, however we do not find evidence for a dependence on the sex of the twin. The size
of the bereavement e↵ect is almost twice the size for monozygotic compared to dizygotic
twins. This large di↵erence is in line with the findings from psychological studies (see Segal
and Bouchard, 1993; Segal et al., 1995).19 In Model IV, the bereavement e↵ect function
also depends on the age at bereavement. We distinguish between the ages before 65 and
above 80, while ages 66 to 79 constitute the reference group. Evidently, there is a decrease
of the e↵ect of bereavement in the age at which the loss occurs. In particular, the e↵ect
of losing your co-twin after the age of 80 is relatively small, with an implied decrease in
residual life expectancy of 0.58 years (for age 85, monozygotic males).
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Table 2.2: Residual life expectancies for monozygotic male twins
Age No Bereav. Experienced Bereav. at age
60 70 80 90
65 14.22 11.22 - - -
75 7.85 5.82 6.26 - -
85 3.31 2.27 2.48 2.73 -
95 .91 .58 .65 .72 .72
Note: Residual life expectancies in years for monozygotic male
twins implied by the estimates of Model IV. The first column
denotes the age of the twin. Columns 2 to 6 report the
corresponding residual life expectancy, given that bereavement is
never experienced, or experienced at ages 60, 70, 80 or 90.
Table 2.3: Residual life expectancies for monozygotic female twins
Age No Bereav. Experienced Bereav. at age
60 70 80 90
65 17.48 14.26 - - -
75 10.23 7.88 8.4 - -
85 4.67 3.32 3.61 3.93 -
95 1.41 .92 1.01 1.13 1.13
Note: Residual life expectancies in years for monozygotic male
twins implied by the estimates of Model IV. The first column
denotes the age of the twin. Columns 2 to 6 report the
corresponding residual life expectancy, given that bereavement is
never experienced, or experienced at ages 60, 70, 80 or 90.
2.6.2 Residual life expectancies
One advantage of modeling twin life-spans at the individual level is the possibility to
make predictions about residual life expectancies depending on the time when the loss
is experienced. Expected residual lifetimes are relevant for health care policy and are
frequently calculated within demographic and gerontological literature. The expected
19These studies conduct studies with bereaved twins and construct measures of grief intensities for
monzygotic and dizygotic twins. Overall, they document grief intensities of monozygotic twins which are
twice as large as the grief intensities observed for dizygotic twins.
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Table 2.4: Residual life expectancies for dizygotic male twins
Age No Bereav. Experienced Bereav. at age
60 70 80 90
65 13.55 11.91 - - -
75 7.38 6.27 6.73 - -
85 3.06 2.49 2.72 2.98 -
95 .83 .65 .72 .8 .8
Note: Residual life expectancies in years for monozygotic male
twins implied by the estimates of Model IV. The first column
denotes the age of the twin. Columns 2 to 6 report the
corresponding residual life expectancy, given that bereavement is
never experienced, or experienced at ages 60, 70, 80 or 90.
Table 2.5: Residual life expectancies for dizygotic female twins
Age No Bereav. Experienced Bereav. at age
60 70 80 90
65 16.77 15.01 - - -
75 9.7 8.41 8.95 - -
85 4.35 3.62 3.92 4.26 -
95 1.29 1.02 1.12 1.25 1.25
Note: Residual life expectancies in years for monozygotic male
twins implied by the estimates of Model IV. The first column
denotes the age of the twin. Columns 2 to 6 report the
corresponding residual life expectancy, given that bereavement is
never experienced, or experienced at ages 60, 70, 80 or 90.
residual lifetime at age s is computed as follows (see Lancaster, 1990)
E(s) =
R1
s S(t|x) dt
S(s|x) .
The residual life expectancies for male, female, monozygotic, and dizygotic twins implied
by the estimates of Model IV (Table 2.1) are presented in Tables 2.2-2.5. A male
monozygotic twin who has reached the age of 65 and lost his co-twin at the age of 60
will live on average for 11.22 remaining years. If he never had experienced this loss, he
would live on average for 2 years longer (Tables 2.2) . A very similar pattern is observed
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for female twins (Tables 2.3, 2.5). Since the dependence of the bereavement e↵ect on sex
is insignificant, we set this e↵ect to zero in our calculations in Tables 2.2-2.5.
2.7 Discussion
The structure of the symmetric timing-of-events model in Equation (2.1) in Section 2.3
imposes some implicit assumptions on the underlying process generating the pairs of
twin life-spans. Since identification of the model exploits the timing of the loss, a key
assumption is that the event of losing your co-twin at age t does not a↵ect your own
mortality hazard prior to that date. Abbring and van den Berg (2003b) call this the ‘no-
anticipation’ assumption. In the case of a severe long-term illness, a twin usually learns
about the increased risk of dying of his co-twin when he is diagnosed with a severe illness
before the actual loss occurs. However, this only constitutes a problem in terms of our
model if the own mortality hazard reacts prior to the loss. In any case, some of the
psychological symptoms of grief may already manifest at an early stage when the co-twin
is diagnosed. We argue that following the true meaning of the word, ‘bereavement’ only
takes place when the other person is really gone. Furthermore, the exact timing of the
loss is usually not anticipated. Nevertheless, with long-term terminal illnesses the process
of bereavement may to some degree already take place during the last stage of illness and
the additional e↵ect of loss will be small. In this case, our model would underestimated
the true bereavement e↵ect.20 In light of this, one should interpret our estimated e↵ect
as the e↵ect of actual bereavement, meaning the e↵ect of physically losing the co-twin.
In the symmetric timing-of-events model all unobserved shared factors causing a
dependence between the two life-spans of the twin pair are assumed to be time-invariant
influences. In other words, our model accounts for all unobserved shared factors such
as the genetic makeup or early childhood experiences as long as their influence on the
mortality hazard is time-invariant. But some genetic dispositions manifest themselves
more strongly during a certain stage in your life, leading to an increased mortality hazard.
This additional source of dependence between twin life-spans would lead to an upward
20Consider the case in which a twin whose co-twin is diagnosed with a terminal illness is so severely
a↵ected by this anticipated loss that he himself dies before his co-twin. This very extreme case would
constitute a problem for our model since anticipation would cause the estimated bereavement e↵ect to
capture a causal e↵ect that is reverse.
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biased bereavement e↵ect. The investigation of this issue is left to further research. In
particular, one could exploit the detailed information on death causes available in the
Danish Twin Registry. In summary, it is conceivable that unobserved time-varying shared
influences are partly responsible for the dependence between twin life-spans that our
model can-not capture. However, in contrary to previous studies our model controls for
the major source of dependence between twin life-spans, in the form of childhood and
genetic makeup e↵ects.
An additional source for unobserved time-varying shared variation are events that a↵ect
the health of both twins at the same time during their life. However, twins typically have
their own family and support systems and often don’t life in the same area. Furthermore,
living in Denmark during the period 1873 to 2004 reduces the probability of being exposed
to shocks on the national level such as major wars or epidemics. Additionally, the impact
of health shocks is dampened by a well established health care system (see Section 2.4 for
more details).
2.8 Conclusion
The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, we show that the symmetric version
of the timing-of-events model (Model 2.1) can be identified from very limited covariate
variation by imposing a multiplicative structure on the bereavement e↵ect function. More
specifically, the only exogenous variation that we exploit can be generated by a single
dummy variable that does not need to vary between the two durations. The identification
result of this symmetric model has wider relevance for the empirical study of parallel
systems and networks and for epidemiological research. Model 2.1 can be applied to any
symmetric bivariate duration model in which the dependence between durations is caused
by two e↵ects: the influence of time-invariant common factors and a causal e↵ect. In
particular, our identification result still applies if the two durations are not distinguishable
from each other in any way, i.e. the index of duration 1 and 2 is completely uninformative
and the only available covariates are characteristics of the duration pair.
Moreover, our empirical analysis unites two models that previously have exclusively been
used separately by studies analyzing twin life-spans. The symmetric timing-of-events
model allows to disentangle both e↵ects of interest in this strand in the literature: the
causal e↵ect of bereavement and the influence of time-constant shared factors. Further,
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our results reveal that previous studies that ignored the influence of childhood and genetic
e↵ects, severely overestimated the bereavement e↵ect for twins.
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2.A Appendix
2.A.1 Identification of   and  
The survival function of Z|x with Z = min{T1, T2} is derived as follows
P (Z > t|x) = P (T1 > t, T2 > t|x)
=
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
P (T1 > t|x, V1)P (T2 > t|x, V2) dG(v1, v2)
=
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
e  (x)⇤(t)(V1+V2) dG(v1, v2)
=
Z 1
0
e  (x)⇤(t)W dGW (w) ,with W = V1 + V2. (2.7)
Note, that for the second equality we exploit that before the first exit occurs no
bereavement e↵ect will cause a dependence between T1 and T2. Consequently, conditional
on x and V the events (T1 > t) and (T2 > t) are independent. We further use Assumption
4 which implies G(v1, v2|x) = G(v1, v2).
In the following, we briefly discuss some of the assumptions used by Elbers and Ridder
(1982) for the identification of a mixed proportional hazard model in view of the model
given in Equation (2.7). Assumption 2.1 assures su cient covariate variation in form of
at least one dummy variable.21 Further, the distribution of W has to be independent of x
and has a positive and finite mean. Assumption 2.4 assures the independence of (V1, V2)
and x. From this the independence of W = V1 + V2 directly follows. Similarly, as V1 and
V2 are assumed to have finite positive mean, so does W .
2.A.2 Identification of  a
We consider the following hazard rate of mixed proportional form:
✓(t|Tk = 0, x, Vj) =  ˜j(t) ˜j(x)Vj with  ˜j(t) =  (t) a,  ˜j(x) =  (x) b(0, x), (2.8)
21Also see Kortram et al. (1995b) for the case of only two possible values for  (x).
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where the frailties Vj are drawn from GVj |Tk=0,x for j, k 2 {1, 2} and j 6= k. One necessary
assumption for the identifiability of this mixed proportional hazard model is that the
frailty distribution does not depend on x. Note, that in the above model, the frailties
Vj are drawn from a conditional distribution. Therefore, we need to show that GVj |Tk=0,x
does not depend on x. The conditional density of Vj|(Tk = 0, x) is given by:
f(vj|Tk = 0, x) = ✓k(0|x, Vj)Sk(0|x, Vj)f(vj|x)
✓k(0|x)Sk(0|x)
=
R1
0  (0) (x)vk dG(vk|x, Vj)f(vj|x)R1
0  (0) (x)vk dG(vk|x)
=
E(Vk|x, Vj)f(vj|x)
E(Vk|x) . (2.9)
According to Assumption 2.4 (V1, V2) are independent of x. Therefore, Equation (2.9)
simplifies to
f(vj|Tk = 0, x) = E(Vk|Vj)f(vj)
E(Vk)
. (2.10)
From Equation (2.10) it also follows that the distribution of (Vj|Tk = 0) for j, k 2 {1, 2}
and j 6= k has a positive and finite mean, since G(v1, v2) has this property.
2.A.3 Identification of G
Derivation of a mixing distribution: The density f(t1, t2|x) for t1 > t2 can be expressed
as follows
f(t1, t2|x) =
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
f(t1|T2 = t2, x, V1)f(t2|x, V2) dG(v1, v2)
= c(t1, t2, x)
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
V1V2e
  (x)(⇤(t2)+ 1(t1,t2,x))V1e  (x)⇤(t2)V2 dG(v1, v2)
= c(t1, t2, x)@
2
s1,s2LG
 
 (x)(⇤(t2) +  1(t1, t2, x)), (x)⇤(t2)
 
,
with c(t1, t2, x) =  (t1) (t2) (x)2 a(t1   t2) b(t2, x),  (t1, t2, x) = ⇤˜(t1, t2) b(t2, x) and
bivariate Laplace transformation LG with cross derivative @2s1,s2LG.
Complete monotonicity: First, we state the definition of absolute monotonicity.
Definition 2.1. Let ⌦ be a nonempty open set in Rn. A function f : ⌦ ! R is absolutely
monotone if it is nonnegative and has nonnegative continuous partial derivatives of all
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orders. f is completely monotone if f   m is absolutely monotone, where m : x 2 {! 2
Rn :  ! 2 ⌦}!  x.22
Note, that this definition states that a function f is completely monotone if it’s derivatives
of all orders exist, and if these derivatives are continuous and have switching signs for each
order (starting with a positive first derivative). From this definition it follows directly that
if a function f is completely monotone then all derivatives of second order of f will also
be completely monotone. Since the bivariate Laplace transformation LG(s1, s2) is known
to be a completely monotone function, it directly follows from Definition 1 that the cross
derivative of L given by @2s1,s2LG(s1, s2) = @
2LG(s1,s2)
@s1@s2
is also completely monotone.
Tracing out the Laplace transformation: The function f : R2+ ! R2+ is given by f(t1, t2) =
( (x)(⇤(t2)+ (t1, t2, x)), (x)⇤(t2)). It maps the vector (t1, t2) on the vector of arguments
of the Laplace transformation (s1, s2), with s1 =  (x)(⇤(t2) +  (t1, t2, x)) and s2 =
 (x)⇤(t2). In the following we will show that we can vary (t1, t2) on an open set such
that f(t1, t2) will also attain all values in a nonempty open set. Under Assumption 2.5
(with t1 > t2 8 (t1, t2) 2  ) it holds that at all points (t1, t2) in the open set  the first
derivatives of f exist and are continuous and f has Jacobian
Jf (t1, t2) =
24 (x) (t1) (t1, t2, x)  (x)( (t2) + @ (t1,t2,x)t2 )
0  (x) (t2)
35 .
Note, that the determinant of Jf is given by det(Jf (t1, t2)) =  (x)2 (t1) (t2) 1(t1, t2, x),
and since under Assumptions 1-4 the functions  , ,  a,  b can only attain strictly positive
(and finite) values on  , it follows that det(Jf (t1, t2)) 6= 0 8 (t1, t2) 2  . Assumption 5
assures that @ (t1,t2,x)t2 exists and is continuous on  . Therefore, on the nonempty open set
 the function f(t1, t2) is continuously di↵erentiable with invertible Jacobian Jf . From
the Inverse-Function Theorem it directly follows that there exists an nonempty open set
⌥ ⇢ (0,1)2 such that the function f(t1, t2) attains all values in ⌥ when t1 and t2 vary
over  ⇢ (0,1)2.
22For n = 1 this definition reduces to the familiar definitions in Widder (1946).
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2.A.4 Derivation of the likelihood function
In the following the functional forms of S, St1 , St2 and St1,t2 are derived. We start with
the survival function S(t1, t2|x) = P (T1 > t1, T2 > t2|x):
S(t1, t2|x) =
8><>:S
⇤(t1, t1|x) 
R t1
t2
St2(t1, ⌧ |x) d⌧ , for t1   t2
S⇤(t2, t2|x) 
R t2
t1
St1(⌧, t2|x) d⌧ , for t1 < t2
Recall, that in the case when the first exit is not observable due to censoring we have
to integrate over all possible exit times. The resulting integrals
R t1
t2
St2(t1, ⌧ |x) d⌧ andR t2
t1
St1(⌧, t2|x) d⌧ are approximated with numerical integration methods. Here, S⇤(t1, t2|x)
denotes the survival function in the absence of a bereavement e↵ect
S⇤(t1, t2|x) =
ZZ 1
0
P (T1 > t1|x, V1)P (T2 > t2|x, V2) dG(v1, v2)
=
ZZZ 1
0
e (x)⇤(t1)(V˜0+V˜1)e (x)⇤(t2)(V˜0+V˜2) dG(v˜0)dG(v˜1)dG(v˜2)
=
Z 1
0
e (x)[⇤(t1)+⇤(t2)]V˜0 dG(v˜0)
Z 1
0
e (x)⇤(t1)V˜1 dG(v˜1)
Z 1
0
e (x)⇤(t2)V˜2 dG(v˜2)
= (1 +  2 (x)[⇤(t1) + ⇤(t2)])
  ⇢
 2 (1 +  2 (x)⇤(t1))
  (1 ⇢)
 2 (1 +  2 (x)⇤(t2))
  (1 ⇢)
 2 .
The last three equalities follow from the assumption that G(v1, v2) is a Cherian bivariate
Gamma distribution with independent terms V˜0, V˜1, V˜2 drawn from Gamma distributions
V˜0 ⇠  (⇢  2,   2) and V˜1, V˜2 ⇠  ((1  ⇢)  2,   2).
In the following Stj is derived. For this purpose we define the functions ga, gb and gc
ga(s1, s2, x) = 1 +  
2 (x)[⇤(s2) +  (s1|s2, x)]
gb(s1, s2, x) = 1 +  
2 (x)[2⇤(s2) +  (s1|s2, x)]
gc(s, x) = 1 +  
2 (x)⇤(s).
with  (s1|s2, x) =
R s1
s2
 (u) t(u  s2) age,x(s2, x) du.
We can now derive Stj(tj, tk|x) = @S(tj ,tk|x)@tj =  P (Tj = tj, Tk > tk|x). Let tj   tk with
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j, k 2 {1, 2}, j 6= k
Stk(tj, tk|x) =
ZZ 1
0
P (Tj > tj|Tk = tk, x, Vj)P (Tk = tk|x, Vk) dG(vj, vk)
=  (x) (tk)ZZZ 1
0
(V˜0 + V˜k)e
 (x)[⇤(tk)+ (tj |tk,x)](V˜0+V˜j)e (x)⇤(tk)(V˜0+V˜k) dG(v˜0)dG(v˜j)dG(v˜k)
=  (x) (tk)gb(tj, tk, x)
 ( ⇢
 2
+1)gc(tk, x)
 ( (1 ⇢)
 2
)ga(tj, tk, x)
 ( (1 ⇢)
 2
+1)
[⇢ga(tj, tk, x) + (1  ⇢)gb(tj, tk, x)].
This yields
Stj(tj, tk|x) =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
@S⇤(tj ,tj |x)
@tj
+
R tj
tk
St1,t2(t1, ⌧ |x) d⌧ , for tj > tk
 (x) (tk)gb(tj, tk, x)
 ( ⇢
 2
+1)gc(tk, x)
 ( (1 ⇢)
 2
)
ga(tj, tk, x)
 ( (1 ⇢)
 2
+1)[⇢ga(tj, tk, x) + (1  ⇢)gb(tj, tk, x)] , for tj  tk.
Finally, St1,t2(t1, t2|x) = @
2S(t1,t2|x)
@t1@t2
= P (T1 = t1, T2 = t2|x) = f ⇤(max{t1, t2},min{t1, t2})
with
f ⇤(tj, tk) =  (x)2 (tj) (tk) t(tj   tk) age,x(tk, x)
gb(tj, tk, x)
 ( ⇢
 2
+2)ga(tj, tk, x)
 ( (1 ⇢)
 2
+1)gc(tk, x)
 ( (1 ⇢)
 2
+1)
[⇢(⇢+  2)ga(tj, tk, x)gc(tk, x) + ⇢(1  ⇢)gb(tj, tk, x)gc(tk, x)
⇢(1  ⇢)gb(tj, tk, x)ga(tj, tk, x) + (1  ⇢)2gb(tj, tk, x)2].
37

Chapter 3
Social Interaction E↵ects in
Duration Models: The First-Time
Use of Marijuana among Siblings1
3.1 Introduction
The study of social interactions has been of constant interest in economics and sociology
over the past two decades (e.g., see Borjas, 1995; Manski, 2000; Brock and Durlauf,
2001a,b; Mo tt, 2001; Sampson et al., 2002; Calvo´-Armengol et al., 2009) with the
main di culty in the identification of social interactions laid out in the seminal work
by Manski (1993). Labeled the reflection problem, in a reduced form linear model, in
which the reference group’s average outcome measures the behavior of peers, it is di cult
to determine if a person’s behavior a↵ects their peers or vice versa. 2 In this paper, we
introduce a new strategy to identify social interaction e↵ects from grouped transition
data, using a multivariate duration framework. We use this model to study marijuana
use of siblings, allowing for two sources of dependence between the behavior of siblings
conditional on observable characteristics: (1) Once a teenager starts using marijuana, this
may directly a↵ect the subsequent risk of his siblings to engage in the same behavior
(‘social interaction e↵ect’); (2) Siblings may behave similarly due to unobserved family
characteristics (‘correlated e↵ect’). The definition of social interactions in terms of a
1This chapter is joint work with Georgios E↵raimidis.
2Di↵erent versions of Manski’s model are widely used in applications estimating peer e↵ects (e.g., see
Gaviria and Raphael, 2001; Sacerdote, 2001; Cohen-Cole and Fletcher, 2008).
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lagged3 e↵ect in time allows overcoming the reflection problem in the presence of correlated
e↵ects without making use of an instrument as used by Case and Katz (1991) or Monstad
et al. (2011) or an exclusion restriction as suggested by Mo tt (2001). Furthermore, given
that our approach accounts for unobserved group characteristics, this allows studying
social interactions in natural peer groups such as a circle of friends, work colleagues or
neighborhoods, which are often the result of a self-selection process based on similar
unobservable characteristics. Additionally, social interaction e↵ects are highly flexible in
our model, and may di↵er across di↵erent group members, covariates and over successive
transitions in the group.
In many applications of social interactions, the behavior of interest is characterized by
a transition at a particular point in time following some entry point. Examples include
the time at which a person purchases a new product following its release, or the age at
which a person first has sexual intercourse, moves out of the neighborhood or starts/stops
using drugs. In our empirical application, we study social interaction e↵ects in the use
of marijuana by siblings growing up together in American households4. Substance use is
considered a highly social behavior (see Gaviria and Raphael, 2001; Kawaguchi, 2004).
When a teenager uses marijuana for the first time, this may directly a↵ect the subsequent
behavior of his siblings through several di↵erent channels. To begin with, this transition
may cause his siblings to copy his behavior. Alternatively, such a change in behavior
within the household may reduce the stigma attached to using cannabis, or simply raise
curiosity. Besides these classical channels of social interaction or peer e↵ects, a response
could also be triggered by an information e↵ect or the accessibility of drugs. In particular,
the first transition within a group often constitutes a release of new information, and
additionally, in the case of substance use, an e↵ect of accessibility. One advantage of our
approach is that it can distinguish5 between the e↵ect of the first transition and the
e↵ects of subsequent transitions within a group. Based on this distinction, to some extend
accessibility and information e↵ects may be separated from classical peer e↵ects.6
3Given that our identification results are based on a model in continuous time, the period between
transition and response is practically zero.
4In our application, instead of classical peer groups, we study teenagers growing up in the same
household. Here, ‘correlated e↵ects’ do not arise due to selection e↵ects but rather to similar genetic
factors and childhood e↵ects.
5In our empirical analysis we have not implemented this distinction at this point.
6Although we are aware that our definition of ‘social interaction e↵ects’ in this paper does not only
capture classical peer e↵ects/social interaction e↵ects, we will use this terminology throughout this paper.
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In the model by Manski (1993), social interaction e↵ects are assumed to be homogeneous
across group members, i.e. the action of every group member has the same e↵ect on any
other member. In this chapter, we show that the joined observation of transition times
allows to identify additional dynamics within a group of socially interacting individuals.
Firstly, the degree to which a transition of a group member j a↵ects the behavior of
another member k may depend on the social status or reputation of both members j and
k within the group, as well as the combination of their observable characteristics xj and
xk. For example, the oldest sibling may have a unique social role within the household,
increasing the degree to which his behavior a↵ects the younger siblings. At the same time,
the oldest sibling may not be as strongly influenced by the behavior of his younger siblings.
In our application, we find evidence for a significant influence of the behavior of the oldest
sibling, but no evidence for an e↵ect of a transition by a younger sibling.7 Similarly, peers
may more strongly a↵ect each other if they have the same gender or belong to the same
age group.
Secondly, the strength of an e↵ect may strongly depend on how many transitions have
been experienced within the group up to this point. Since social interactions may
exhibit di↵erent degrees of contagiousness, we allow for the strength of the e↵ect to
increase/decrease or follow any other pattern with each additional transition experienced
within the group.8 This also captures the extreme case where no transitions have any
e↵ect, apart from the first. With marijuana use, this pattern could arise if interaction
e↵ects are purely driven by the e↵ect of new information or accessibility.
The identification of such patterns facilitates a deeper understanding of how social
interaction e↵ects evolve over time, depending on the composition of the peer group.
It enables policy makers to intervene more e↵ectively by targeting the key members of
groups. If we consider a policy aimed at preventing the early cannabis use of teenagers,
our model can be used to predict how drug use spreads throughout the group over time
and how this pattern depends on the group member initially targeted by such a policy.
The distinct role of such ‘key’, ‘high status’, or ‘influential’ individuals in social networks
is addressed by Ballester et al. (2006), Iyengar et al. (2009) and Aral and Walker (2012).
7A di↵erent application constitutes a supervisor who has a unique social role at their workplace,
increasing the degree to which their behavior may a↵ect his employees. At the same time, the behavior
of employees may strongly influence other co-workers but not necessarily the supervisor.
8Our model also includes the possibility of a negative interaction e↵ect i.e. a transition of a group
member decreases the probability of subsequent transitions within the group.
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Individuals often enter a (peer) group at di↵erent calendar dates. For example, new co-
workers are hired, teenagers join a circle of friends/social network or new children are
born in a household. The key members may be those who enter the group first, such as
the oldest sibling being the first child in the household. In our main model specification,
group members are labeled according to their order of entry.9 Varying entry points play a
crucial role in many applications, because they determine the di↵erent starting points
of an underlying risk process faced by each individual in the sample. In the case of
siblings, this process represents the dependence of the risk to start using marijuana on
age. Besides varying entry points, we also consider the case of a common entry point for
all group members. One such example is the release of a new product, whereby after the
day of release, all members of a peer group simultaneously start to face a certain risk of
purchasing the new product.
In this paper, we present a multivariate mixed (proportional)10 hazard type model that
uses the information in the timing of transitions within groups to identify social interaction
e↵ects in the presence of correlated unobserved characteristics. The idea of exploiting
the timing of events to disentangle a causal e↵ect from a selection e↵ect is introduced
by Abbring and van den Berg (2003b), in the context of treatment evaluation in a
bivariate duration framework. A symmetric version of this two spell model11 is presented in
Chapter 2 to study bereavement e↵ects within twin pairs. Extending the timing-of-events
approach to a general model of multiple parallel spells raises several new issues that are
not encountered in the two-spell setting, such as di↵erences of interaction e↵ects across
di↵erent combinations of group members and how e↵ects may change over subsequent
transitions within the group. Furthermore, we account for di↵erent entry dates across
members and discuss the relaxation of the proportionality assumption. In the following
section, we present our identification results for this extended model.
There is a straightforward intuition for the identification of models exploiting the timing
9This restricts the variation in entry dates to a setting with a predefined entry order, which complicates
identification. In our main model specification, we focus on this case of ordered entry dates. The case of
unrestricted variation in entry times is also discussed briefly. Our results can be extended to this case in
a straightforward manner.
10In Section 3.2.3, we discuss conditions under which the proportionality assumption can be dropped,
leading to a multivariate mixed hazard type model.
11Abbring and van den Berg (2003b) highlight that their model can be straightforwardly extended to
a setting with two full spells, whereby the exit of each spell can a↵ect the survival of the other (also see
Abbring and Heckman, 2007).
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of events.12 The process of successive transitions and responses of the transition hazards
within a group generates distinct patterns in the data, which provides information on
the existence of ‘interaction e↵ects’ vs. ‘correlated e↵ects’. For instance, if transitions
are observed within increasingly shorter intervals, irrespective of when the first transition
occurs, such epidemics-type clustering of transitions indicates that the transitions of peers
positively a↵ect the subsequent transition hazard of the other group members (positive
interaction e↵ect). On the other hand, ‘correlated e↵ects’ create heterogeneity across
groups in the data.13
In the field of discrete choice models, social interaction e↵ects are frequently captured
by a penalty term for deviating from the behavior of other group members in the utility
function of agents (see Brock and Durlauf, 2001b; Blume et al., 2010, for overviews).
Honore´ and de Paula (2010) introduce a model of two durations with an endogenous
e↵ect, building on a two player simultaneous game where the exit of one player increases
the potential payo↵ of the other once they also exit. In contrast to this strand of literature
that uses equilibrium models with interdependent utility functions, we do not specify
the underlying behavioral model of social interactions. Rather than assuming that the
observed behavior represents an equilibrium outcome, we understand social interactions
as a dynamic process of successive actions and reactions within a group. A key feature of
the extended timing-of-events approach is that the transition hazard of a group member
may directly react in response to transitions of other members.14
In order to define a social interaction e↵ect in terms of a response in the transition
hazard, we assume that this response does not take place before the transition causing
it has occurred. This corresponds to the ‘no-anticipation’ assumption of Abbring and
van den Berg (2003b). This assumption states that individuals either do not anticipate
the action of fellow peers, or if they do, they do not react to this anticipated action before
it takes place. In applications where forward looking and strategic incentives dominate
the behavior of group members, equilibrium models are more suitable to capture such
dynamics (e.g., see Honore´ and de Paula, 2010, 2013). In contrast, our approach focuses
on applications where a transition of a group member is comparable to an unanticipated
12Abbring and van den Berg (2003b) provide a similar intuition for the two spell setting.
13Here, in order to disentangle ‘interaction e↵ects’ from ‘correlated e↵ects’, a crucial identifying
assumption is that correlated unobservable characteristics remain constant over time.
14This is a fundamental di↵erence from the model of Honore´ and de Paula (2010), where this type of
direct response in the hazard rate is ruled out.
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shock that causes a systematic change in the behavior of the other members. We argue
that the first-time substance use among siblings constitutes such an event. Teenagers are
often influenced by sources outside the own household that are di cult to foresee by other
household members. If a teenager is exposed to marijuana at his school, the change in his
behavior is similar to an unanticipated shock to his siblings.
Social interaction e↵ects in cannabis use are studied by e.g. Kandel (1978); Kawaguchi
(2004); Eisenberg (2004) and Clark and Loheac (2007) for American adolescents and by
Pudney (2002); Moriarty et al. (2012) and McVicar and Polanski (2013) for adolescents
living in the United Kingdom. Popular choices of reference/peer groups are the school
grade, classmates or nominated friends.
Additionally, peer e↵ects in smoking or substance use among siblings are addressed
by several studies. Using a large dataset on cigarette smoking from the U.S. Current
Population Surveys, Harris and Gonza´lez Lo´pez-Valca´rcel (2008) find that each additional
smoking sibling in the household raised a young person’s probability of smoking by 7.6%.15
Krauth (2005) uses data on smoking among Canadian youths and finds a small positive
sibling e↵ect after controlling for selection e↵ects, proxied by the degree of selection on
observable variables. Similarly to our empirical study, Altonji et al. (2010) study substance
use among siblings using data from the NLSY97. In contrast to our identification strategy,
their approach relies on an exclusion restriction, i.e. it is assumed that only the substance
use behavior of the older siblings can a↵ect the behavior of the younger siblings but not
vice versa, thereby circumventing the reflection problem. Based on this assumption, the
authors find that marijuana use of younger siblings is positively a↵ected by the example
of their older siblings.
In our empirical analysis, we use data from the National Longitudinal Surveys (NLSY79),
observing the first-time use of marijuana by 8,684 siblings in 5,810 American households,
including 1,549 two-sibling households and 669 households with more than two siblings
growing up together. We find that the first-time use of marijuana by the oldest sibling
in the household has a significant positive e↵ect on the subsequent drug use behavior of
his younger siblings. However, we do not find evidence for an e↵ect of a transition of a
younger sibling.
15Conversely, Chen (2010) finds, using sibling data from the NLSY79, a negative sibling e↵ect for
smoking cigarettes, implying a di↵erentiation e↵ect among siblings.
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In the next section we introduce the multivariate duration model with social interaction
e↵ects and present our identification results. In Section 3.3 we discuss the data set,
estimation method and results of our application. We conclude in Section 3.4.
3.2 A multiple-spell duration model with social in-
teraction e↵ects
In the following, we introduce a model of three parallel spells (J = 3). We restrict attention
to this three-spell case in this section, given that all interesting dynamics occur within
this setting. The extension to more than three spells is straightforward and will not be
further discussed.
3.2.1 General framework
The three group members j = 1, 2, 3 enter into the origin state at member-specific entry
dates dj. In our empirical example of first-time drug use, dj denotes the calendar date at
which sibling j reaches the threshold age after which he will be exposed to the risk of using
drugs. To achieve a compact notation, we introduce the vector d = (d1 d2 d3)
0
. Next, we
denote by Tj the duration of member j until he transitions to the new state (e.g. the state
of having used drugs). Furthermore, we introduce the µ-dimensional vector x 2 X ✓ Rµ,
which holds all relevant observed covariates, member- and group-specific, that a↵ect the
realization of the duration variables. Additionally, the behavior of all group members is
a↵ected by unobservable influences denoted by the random vector V = (V1 V2 V3)
0
, drawn
from the non-degenerate trivariate cumulative density function G, which does not depend
on x and has support V ✓ R3+.
We define our model in terms of conditional transition hazards of each duration Tj given
the realization of the other two durations Tk, Tl, entry dates d, observable influences x
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and unobservable influences Vj
✓j(t|Tk, Tl, d, x, Vj) =
8>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>:
 j,0(t, d, x)Vj
 j,k(t|Tjk, d, x)Vj
 j,l(t|Tjl, d, x)Vj
 j,kl(t|Tjk, Tjl, d, x)Vj
if t  min{Tjk, Tjl},
if Tjk < t  Tjl,
if Tjl < t  Tjk,
if max{Tjk, Tjl} < t.
(3.1)
with Tjk := Tk + dk   dj for j , k , l = 1 , 2 , 3 such that k 6= j 6= l 6= k and k < l .
The stochastic variable Tjk denotes the elapsed time between the entry of member j into
the risk process and the transition of member k into the state of interest. In particular, if
its value is negative (positive), then the transition of member k takes place before (after)
the entry of member j.
The above model suggests a straightforward definition of the interaction e↵ect functions
as ratios of the conditional hazard rates in (3.1)
 j,k(t|Tjk, d, x) :=  j,k(t|Tjk, d, x)
 j,0(t, d, x)
(3.2)
 j,kl(t|Tjk, Tjl, d, x) :=  j,kl(t|Tjk, Tjl, d, x)
 j,q(t|Tjq, d, x) for q = argmink,l {Tjk, Tjl} , (3.3)
with (3.2) representing the e↵ect of the exit of member k on the hazard of member j and
(3.3) the additional e↵ect of the second exit on the hazard of member j. Note that since
the interaction e↵ect functions are defined in terms of hazard rates conditional on the
realization of Vj, they have a causal interpretation. The unobservable terms Vj drop in
the ratios in (3.2) and (3.3). The functions  j,k and  j,kl are components of the conditional
hazard rates ✓j(t|Tk, Tl, d, x, Vj) and are therefore not directly observable from the data.
This poses an identification problem for the social interaction e↵ect functions  j,k and
 j,kl, which we will address in this section.
The identification results in this section build on the assumptions implied by the structure
of model (3.1). Firstly, the unobservable influences (V1 V2 V3)
0
, which are a source of the
dependence between the three durations, are assumed to be time-constant and enter
the hazard rate multiplicatively, reflecting a reinforcing e↵ect between observable and
unobservable influences. The resulting mixed hazard structure is a popular choice in
duration models (see Lancaster, 1992; Van den Berg, 2001, for an overview). Secondly,
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in model (3.1), the e↵ect of a transition of a member k only enters the hazard rate of
member j after it occurs (for all t > Tjk). Known as the ‘no-anticipation’ assumption (see
Abbring and van den Berg, 2003b), this restricts the dependence structure between the
three transitions T1, T2 and T3. It plays a crucial role for the identification and estimation
of model (3.2) as it enables expressing the joint distribution of {T1, T2, T3}|{d, x, V } in
terms of conditional distributions {Tj}|{Tk, Tl, d, x, Vj}.
In this section, we discuss di↵erent sets of assumptions under which the interaction e↵ect
functions (3.2) and (3.3) in Model (3.1) can be identified. We first consider the case of
proportionality of the covariate e↵ects leading to the popular mixed proportional hazard
specification.
Model 3.A. Transition hazard of member j given Tk, Tl, d, x and Vj
✓j(t|Tk, Tl, d, x, Vj) =  j(t) j(x) j(t|Tk, Tl, d, x)Vj
with social interaction e↵ect functions
 j(t|Tk, Tl, d, x) :=  j,k(t|Tjk,Nk, x)Ij,k(t) j,l(t|Tjl,Nl, x)Ij,l(t) j,kl(t|Tjk, Tjl,Nkl, x)Ij,kl(t),
where Nj :=
P3
s=1 I(dj + Tj > ds), Nkl :=
P3
s=1 I(dq + Tq > ds) with q = arg maxk,l{Tjk, Tjl},
Ij,k(t) := I(Tjl   t > Tjk), Ij,kl(t) := I(max{Tjk, Tjll} < t) with j , k , l = 1 , 2 , 3 such that
k 6= j 6= l 6= k and k < l.
Here, I(.) is the indicator function. The variables Nk and Nkl are used to capture the size
of the group at the calendar dates dk + Tk and max{dk + Tk, dl + Tl}, respectively. The
above specification allows the interaction e↵ects to depend on the time of occurrence of
the corresponding transition. In particular, Nj specifies the number of members who have
entered the risk process at calendar date dj+Tj at which member j transitions. Similarly,
Nkl gives the number of the members who have entered the risk process at the calendar
date max{dk + Tk, dl + Tl}, namely when the second transition of member k or l occurs.
Before the first transition takes place, the hazard rates of the three durations are of the
mixed proportional form. The function  j(t) captures the duration dependence and  j(x)
reflects the influence of observable member- and group-specific characteristics.
In order to provide some intuition for Model 3.A, we consider a concrete example in Figure
3.1. Here, the individual labeled as 1 (i.e. the individual who enters the risk process
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Figure 3.1: Example of realized transition times
Note: Example for Model A: The first transition T1 = t1 occurs after the other two members
have entered the risk process (d1 = 0 < d2 < d3 < t1). Member 2 is the second to transition at age t2
and member 3 transitions last at age t3. The arrows represent the social interaction e↵ects  j , a↵ecting
the subsequent transition hazards of the other two group members once member j transitions.
first) transitions into the state of interest (starts using drugs) first at calendar date t1
(T1 < min{d2 + T2, d3 + T3}, with T1 = t1). By then, the individuals labeled as 2 and 3
have both passed their threshold calendar date (d2 and d3, respectively, with d2 < d3 < t1)
and are at risk of transitioning into the state of interest. Before the first transition has
taken place at calendar date t1, the transition hazard of each member j is given by
 j(t) j(x)Vj. After the first transition at calendar time t1, the interaction e↵ect functions
 2,1(t|t1  d2, 3, x) and  3,1(t|t1  d3, 3, x) appear in the hazard rates of the two remaining
durations T2 and T3 for all t > t1   dj for j = 2, 3 respectively. In this example, member
2 is the second to transition at duration T2 = t2, with t2 + d2 > t1 > d3. In this case, an
additional interaction e↵ect term  3,12(t|t1  d3, t2+ d2  d3, 3, x) appears in the hazard of
the surviving duration T3 for all t > t2+ d2  d3. The interaction e↵ect functions  j,k and
 j,kl reflect that the transition of a group member a↵ects the behavior of his fellow peers,
resulting in a potential change in their subsequent transition hazards.
To identify Model 3.A, we employ a set of assumptions formalized below.
Assumption 3.A.1. The function  j : X!(0,1) is such that it attains all values on an
open connected subset of (0,1) and also  j(x⇤) = 1 for some x⇤ 2 X, and j = 1, 2, 3.
Assumption 3.A.2. The function  j : R+!(0,1) is measurable and the integrated
baseline hazard rate ⇤j(t) :=
R t
0  j(!)d! exists and is finite for all t > 0 with ⇤j(t
⇤) = 1
for some particular t⇤ > 0, j = 1, 2, 3.
Assumption 3.A.3. The G is does not depend on x and d. Moreover, for j = 1, 2, 3,
E(Vj) <1 .
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Assumption 3.A.4. For j , k , l = 1 , 2 , 3 such that k 6= j 6= l and k < l. Let q =
argmink,l{Tjk, Tjl} and ⇡(s, y) = max{0,min{s, y}}. The functions  j,k : R+ ⇥ R ⇥
{1, 2, 3} ⇥ X!(0,1), and  j,kl : R+ ⇥ R2 ⇥ {1, 2, 3} ⇥ X!(0,1) are measurable, ii)
the quantities
⌥j,k(t|s,Nk, x) :=
Z t
max{0,s}
 j(!) j,k(!|s,Nk, x)d!,
 j,k(t|s,Nk, x) :=
Z t
0
 j,k(!|s,Nk, x)d!,
⌥j,kl(t|s, y,Nk, x) :=
Z t
⇡(s,y)
 j(!) j,q(!|min{s, y},Nq, x) j,kl(!|s, y,Nkl, x)d!,
and  j,kl(t|s, y,Nkl, x) :=
Z t
0
 j,kl(!|s, y,Nkl, x)d!
exist and are finite, and iii)  j,k(t|s,Nk, x) and  j,kl(t|s, y,Nkl, x) are either cadlag or
caglad in s and in (s, y), respectively.
Assumption 3.A.1 states that there has to be su cient variation of the covariate e↵ects for
each member. A su cient condition for this assumption is the existence of a continuous
group-level characteristic and continuity of the function  j. Moreover, it also imposes
some innocuous normalization. Assumption 3.A.2 is not restrictive, given that it allows
for several parametric choices for the baseline hazard. Additionally, it normalizes the
integrated baseline hazard for some particular value. Assumption 3.A.3 is common in the
analysis of the mixed proportional hazard model (see Elbers and Ridder, 1982) and is
necessary to ensure identification16. Finally, Assumption 3.A.4 gives some (rather) weak
finiteness conditions about the underlying interaction e↵ects functions.
Proposition 3.1. Let d1 = 0, (d2, d3) 2 {R¯2+ : d3   d2}.17 Under Assumptions 3.A.1-
3.A.4, the set of functions {⇤j, j, j, j,kl : j, k, l = 1, 2, 3, k 6= j 6= l, k < l} and G in
Model 3.A are identified from the joint distribution of {T1, T2, T3}|{d, x}.
Thus far, we have considered the case of varying entry dates across members and groups.
In our empirical application, this reflects that siblings usually pass a fixed threshold age
16Ridder and Woutersen (2003) discuss identification of the conventional mixed proportional hazard
model by not imposing any conditions on the first moment of the unobserved term. We do not consider
this case as it would be beyond the scope of this paper.
17We define R¯+ := R+[{1}. The statement dj = 1 implies that the corresponding subject never
enters the risk process. Note that, for a maximal group size of M , all groups in the sample of size J < M
can be expressed by setting dJ+1 = ... = dM =1.
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at di↵erent calendar dates, after which they become at risk of using drugs. Here, it should
be pointed out that we do not exploit full variation in dj across members.18 Instead, we
only exploit variation across entry dates following a certain order 0  d2  d3. The first
born sibling is never born after the second and so forth.
On the one hand, di↵erent entry dates within groups complicate the identification of
Model 3.A, given that the time until the first transition within a group occurs can no
longer be expressed in terms of a competing risk model, for which standard identification
results exist (see Heckman and Honore´, 1989; Abbring and van den Berg, 2003a). On
the other hand, in assuming that the variation in entry dates is exogenous, the required
variation in covariate e↵ects can be reduced to one dimension (see Assumption 3.A.1).
In the following subsection, we discuss the special case of a common entry date for all
members in a group.
3.2.2 Common entry dates
With some parallel-spell data, all group members enter the risk process at the same
calendar date d1 = d2 = d3 = 0. For example, if a new product is introduced to a market,
each member of a peer group becomes at risk of purchasing the new product at the same
point in time. Similarly, a market specific shock can be seen as a starting point after which
each firm in the market is at risk of defaulting. We first replace Assumption 3.A.1 with
Assumption 3.A.5. The function  j : X ! (0,1) is continuous with  j(x⇤) = 1 for
some x⇤ 2 X, and j = 1, 2, 3.Moreover, the vector-valued mapping ( 1(x), 2(x), 3(x); x 2
X) contains a nonempty open subset of R3+.
Assumption 3.A.5 requires su cient variation of the covariate e↵ects across the three
competing exit durations. It is analogous to one of the required assumptions in Abbring
and van den Berg (2003a). Assumption 3.A.5 is a little stronger than Assumption 3.A.1.
Making use of a stronger requirement stems from the fact that we cannot exploit variation
in entry dates in the case of a common entry point for all group members .
18The case of full variation in entry dates across members, that is, when d1, d2, d3 2 R+[{1}, is
a straightforward extension of Model 3.A. The identification of the corresponding model is trivial by
making use of Proposition 3.1.
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Proposition 3.2. Let d1 = 0, d2 = 0, d3 = 0. Under Assumptions 3.A.2, 3.A.3, 3.A.4,
3.A.5, the set of functions {⇤, j,k, j,kl :, k 6= j 6= l, k < l} and G in Model 3.A are
identified from the joint distribution {T1 ,T2 ,T3}|{x}.
A simple two-spell version of Model 3.A with d1 = 0, d2 = 0 is formally introduced in
Abbring and Heckman (2007), with the authors suggesting an identification strategy.
3.2.3 Relaxing the proportionality assumption
In this subsection, we consider a set of conditions under which the proportionality
assumption in Model 3.A may be dropped. For this purpose, we require some of the
covariates to vary over time. More precisely, consider the covariate process  j : R+ !
X ✓ Rµ, which is defined as follows:  j(t) := (x0j(t) x0 j(t) x0g(t))0 , where x j(t) refers to
the row vector of the individual characteristics of all members besides the j th member
and xg(t) holds all group-specific characteristics. Following Brinch (2008), we denote by
P ⇢R+ ⇥ X a family of this type of paths, which leads to the following multiple-spell
duration model
Model 3.B. Transition hazard of duration Tj given Tk, Tl, d,  j(t) and Vj
✓j(t|Tk, Tl, d, j(t), Vj) =  ˜(t, j(t)) j(t|Tk, Tl, d, j(t))Vj
with social interaction e↵ect functions
 j(t|Tk, Tl, d,  ˜j(t)) =  j,k(t|Tjk,Nk, j(t))Ij,k(t) j,l(t|Tjl,Nl, j(t))Ij,l(t)
·  j,kl(t|Tjk, Tjl,Nkl, j(t))Ij,kl(t),
where Nk, Ij,k(t),Nkl, and Ij,kl(t) have the same interpretation as in Model 3.A with
j , k , l = 1 , 2 , 3 such that k 6= j 6= l and k < l.
Furthermore, we employ the following assumptions
Assumption 3.B.1. The function  ˜ : R+ ⇥ X!(0,1) is measurable and the integrated
generalized baseline hazard rate ⇤˜(t, j) :=
R t
0  ˜(!, j(!))d! exists and is finite for all
t > 0 and  j 2 P ,and j = 1, 2, 3.
Assumption 3.B.2. There are two distinct covariate paths  1 2 P  and ⇠1 2 P  such
that  1(t) = ⇠1(t) for some t 2 (ta, tb) with ta < tb and ⇤˜(ta, 1) 6= ⇤˜(ta, ⇠1).
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Assumption 3.B.3. The function G is such that it does not depend on x and d .
Assumption 3.B.4. For j , k , l = 1 , 2 , 3 such that k 6= j 6= l and k < l . Let q =
argmink,l{Tjk, Tjl} and ⇡(s, y) = max{0,min{s, y}}. The functions  j,k : R+ ⇥ R ⇥
{1, 2, 3} ⇥ X!(0,1), and  j,kl : R+ ⇥ R2 ⇥ {1, 2, 3} ⇥ X!(0,1) are measurable, ii)
the quantities
⌥j,k(t|s,Nk, j) :=
Z t
max{0,s}
 ˜(!, j(!)) j,k(!|s,Nk, j(!))d!,
 j,k(t|s,Nk, j) :=
Z t
0
 j,k(!|s,Nk, j(!))d!,
⌥j,kl(t|s, y,Nkl, j) :=
Z t
⇡(s,y)
 ˜(!, j(!)) j,q(!|min{s, y},Nq, j(!)) j,kl(!|s, y,Nkl, j(!))d!,
 j,kl(t|s, y,Nkl, j) :=
Z t
0
 j,kl(!|s, y,Nkl, j(!))d!
exist and are finite, and iii)  j,k(t|s,Nk, j) and  j,kl(t|s, y,Nkl, j) are either cadlag or
caglad in s and in (s, y), respectively.
Assumption 3.B.1 deals with measurability and finiteness conditions of the (integrated)
generalized baseline hazard. Assumption 3.B.2 ensures that two di↵erent covariate paths
exist that agree on an open interval. Note that the latter can be satisfied by simply
considering a single covariate that will meet the condition of Assumption 3.B.2. In
contrast to Assumption 3.A.3, Assumption 3.B.3 does not impose any conditions on the
first moment of the unobserved terms, due to the presence of time-varying covariates
(see Heckman and Taber, 1994; Brinch, 2007). Finally, Assumption 3.B.4 is similar to
Assumption 3.B.4 and is concerned with finiteness conditions of the underlying functions.
Proposition 3.3. Let d1 = 0, (d2, d3) 2 {R¯2+ : d3   d2}. Under Assumptions 3.B.1-3.B.4,
the set of functions {⇤˜, j,k, j,kl : j, k, l = 1, 2, 3, k 6= j 6= l, k < l} and G in Model 3.B
are identified from the joint distribution of {T1, T2, T3}|{d, x}.
Note that, in contrast to Model 3.A the finiteness of the first moment of the unobserved
terms is not necessary due to the presence of time-varying covariates (see Heckman and
Taber, 1994; Brinch, 2007).
As in the case with di↵erent entry dates, we can also relax the proportionality assumption
in the setting with common entry dates. In particular, we introduce the covariate process
⇣j : R+ ! Z ✓ Rµ¯, which is obtained as follows ⇣j(t) := (x0j(t) x0g(t))0 , and the family
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of such processes P⇣⇢R+ ⇥ Z. Note that µ¯ < µ as the process ⇣j(t), in contrast to the
process  j(t), does not include the characteristics of members other than j. Consider the
following assumptions.
Assumption 3.B.5. It holds  ˜(t, j) =  ˜(t, ⇣j) 8 t > 0, j 2 P , ⇣j 2 P⇣ , j = 1, 2, 3. 19
Assumption 3.B.6. The vector-valued mapping (⇤˜(t, ⇣1), ⇤˜(t, ⇣2), ⇤˜(t, ⇣3); ⇣1, ⇣2, ⇣3 2
P⇣ , t 2 R+) contains a nonempty open subset of R3+.
Assumption 3.B.5 implies that the generalized baseline hazard for each member does
not depend on the individual characteristics of the other group members. Moreover,
Assumption 3.B.6 imposes the condition that the three integrated generalized baseline
hazard can independently of each other vary on R3+. A su cient condition for this
statement is the existence of a certain member-specific characteristic that only directly
a↵ects the member but not the other group members.
Proposition 3.4. Let d1 = 0, d2 = 0, d3 = 0. Under Assumptions 3.B.1-3.B.6 the set
of functions {⇤˜, j,k, j,kl : j, k, l = 1, 2, 3, k 6= j 6= l, k < l} and G in Model 3.B are
identified from the joint distribution of {T1, T2, T3}|{d, x}.
3.3 Empirical application
In the following, we present our empirical Application. First, we introduce our data set,
before subsequently discussing the estimation method and finally presenting our results.
3.3.1 Data
In our empirical study, we use data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth
1979 (see National Longitudinal Surveys Handbook, 2005, for an introduction), which
was established in an e↵ort to generate a representative sample of young men and women
aged 14 to 21 living in the United States. Respondents are drawn from cohorts 1957 to
1964 and for each respondent, all individuals aged 14 to 21 living in the same household
19We keep the notation simple here. Specifically, we use the same notation for the extended baseline
hazard,  ˜, although this function does not depend on the individual characteristics of the other group
members as in the case with varying entry dates.
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at the time of the first round in 1979, were also included in the survey.20 Accordingly,
12,686 respondents are included, living in 7,490 unique households. We restrict attention
to single-respondent households, as well as those with more than one respondent where
the respondents are siblings (blood-related and not blood-related) and grew up together in
their parents’ home.21 We observe 8,684 respondents in 5,810 unique households satisfying
these criteria, of which 1,549 comprise two, 516 three and 153 four to six siblings.
In the 1984 survey, three separate questions were asked, addressing first-time marijuana
use. The respondents were asked in which year and month they started using mari-
juana/hashish for the first time in their life. 5,578 respondents report the month and
year, with 3,723 never having used up to the interview date in 1984. Based on this and
using information on the respondents’ birth dates, we can construct the durations until
first time drug use after passing the threshold age of 7 for each household member. For
the respondents who have never used, the durations are censored at the time of the
interview date. For 178 respondents, no transition times are reported (174 respondents
answer the question with ‘Don’t know’ and 4 were not interviewed or refused to respond)
In addition to the question on first-time drug use, a monthly time-line of marijuana
use for the past 4.5 years was established in July 1984. Furthermore, in the surveys of
1988, 1990, 1992 and 1994-2008, respondents are asked how old they were when they first
used marijuana. Combining the information of these three questions provides a detailed
retrospective picture on drug-use behavior, enabling us to construct an index measuring
the degree of uncertainty in the responses due to inconsistencies in the answers. This
index may be used in a sensitivity analysis.
We combine the detailed information on monthly marijuana-use from January 1979 to
July 1984 with annual information on the amount and frequency for all relevant survey
years. Based on this, we can select the cases in which a first-time use is followed by a
long-term change in drug-use behavior.
The resulting distribution of transition times pooled over all household members is
20This way the households are not complete, in the sense that only the siblings from cohorts 1957 to
1964 are included as respondents in the survey. We will refer to these incomplete groups as households
from now on.
21In the majority of all households selected this way, the siblings grew up living with both biological
parents. We can observe the time when individuals leave their parents home and the reason for this move
(e.g. divorce of the parents). In the analysis of social interaction e↵ects we account for this by ruling out
interactions at calendar dates where the members do not live in the same household.
54
CHAPTER 3. SOCIAL INTERACTION EFFECTS IN DURATION MODELS
Figure 3.2: Distribution of age at first
marijuana use
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Figure 3.3: Distribution of the month at
first marijuana use
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presented in Figures 3.2 and 3.3, with the left figure showing the distribution of age
at transition. Before the age of seven, only very few transitions occur. We drop those
cases from the sample22 and choose the age of seven as the threshold age, after which
siblings become at risk of using drugs. The majority of transitions occurs between the
age of 14 and 18. The right figure depicts the distribution of the month at transition.
There is a strong peak over the summer months of June and July, during which American
teenagers often go to summer camp and/or spend much time outside. In September, the
number of transitions increases again, when teenagers enter a new year in high school and
are exposed to many new influences. In our empirical analysis, we control for the di↵erent
e↵ects by adding time-varying dummies for each month to the vector of covariates. Figure
3.4 shows the estimated transition (baseline) hazards from a single spell Cox proportional
hazard model. There is a substantial di↵erence between the first marijuana use times of
the oldest and youngest siblings in the households, with younger siblings transitioning at
an earlier age compared to their older siblings. This e↵ect could be driven by observable or
unobservable characteristics such as the cohort or character traits, which di↵er between
the oldest and youngest sibling. An alternative explanation is the existence of positive
social interaction e↵ects, whereby younger siblings experience the transitions of their older
siblings, thus making them more likely to transition at an early age. To determine the
22These cases are most likely a result of the measurement error caused by the retrospective nature of
the fist-time drug use question.
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Figure 3.4: Transition hazards of the youngest and oldest sibling in
the household from two separate Cox regressions
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Note: Estimated transition hazard rates of two single spell Cox proportional
hazards models using data on first-time marijuana use from the NLSY79; cohorts
1957-1964 of households with at least three siblings.
Dashed curve: Estimated on sample of the youngest sibling in each household; Solid
curve: Estimated on sample of the oldest sibling in each household.
source of this di↵erence, we now proceed with the estimation of our multivariate duration
model with social interaction e↵ects introduced in the previous section.
3.3.2 Maximum likelihood estimation
Model 3.A provides a general framework of a multiple-spell model with interaction e↵ects,
allowing to specify a variety of models fitting di↵erent applications. In order to estimate a
model using data on first-time marijuana use, we specify functional forms of  j,  j,  j and
G. Accordingly, the semi-parametric form of Model 3.A is reduced to a model with a finite
set of parameters that can be estimated using standard maximum likelihood methods.
Figure 3.5 (dashed line) shows the estimated baseline hazard of a Cox proportional hazard
model with a shared frailty term on the household level and a basic set of covariates.
We use the log-logistic density function to approximate this shape in the estimation of
our model. This function has a positive range and is able to approximate the shape of
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Figure 3.5: Parametric approximation of baseline hazard function
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Note: Estimated baseline hazard functions using data on all households with
at least three siblings from the NLSY79 (cohorts 1957-1964) on first-time marijuana
use.
Dashed curve: Cox proportional hazard model; Solid curve: Parametric proportional
hazard model using a log-logistic probability density function for the baseline
hazard; Both models are estimated with a basic set of covariates and a shared
frailty term on the household level.
the baseline hazard estimated by the more flexible Cox model (see Figure 3.5). In the
main model specification, we assume proportionality of the covariate e↵ects (Model 3.A),
leading to the following baseline and regression component function and the corresponding
integral of this function for sibling j in household i at duration t (counted in months)
 j(t)  j(xij(t)) =
↵2,j
↵1,j
(
t
↵1,j
)↵2,j 1(1 + (
t
↵1,j
)↵2,j) 2 e 0,j+ 
0xij(t)
⇤˜j(t, xij(t)) =
tX
⌧=1
[(1 + (
⌧
↵1,j
) ↵2,j) 1   (1 + (⌧   1
↵1,j
) ↵2,j) 1] e 0,j+ 
0xij(⌧ 1)
with ↵q,j = ↵q,oldest for j = 1 and ↵q,j = ↵q,young for j > 1, q = 1, 2.
Furthermore, we specify the social interaction e↵ect function  j with several multiplicative
terms, each representing the influence of an experienced transition of a sibling. For a sibling
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j living in a household i members at time t, this yields
 j(t|Ti, j, xij(t)) =
Y
k2 j
 j,k(t|Ti,jk, xij(t))I(t>Ti,jk),
with  j,k(t|Ti,jk, xij(t)) = exp(  k +  0xxij(t) +  0xint(xij(t)⇥ xik(t) )
and with Ti, j := {Ti,jk : k 2  j},  j := {k 2 Ji : k 6= j},  k =  oldest for j = 1 and
 k =  young for k > 1.
We capture unobserved heterogeneity in the transition hazards by two additive compo-
nents. The term Vj of sibling j of household i is given by
Vij = V
sh
i + V
ind
ij .
Here, the random terms V shi and V
ind
ij are independently drawn from distributions G
sh
and Gind with the mean of Vij normalized to 1. The first term captures unobserved
heterogeneity of the hazard rates across households, while the second reflects unobserved
heterogeneity within households across di↵erent members. We assume that V shi can attain
two values, msh1 and m
sh
2 , with P (V
sh
i = m
sh
1 ) = p
sh, representing two types of households
with high or low susceptibility to drug use. Similarly, V indij can attain two values, m
ind
1 and
mind2 , with P (V
ind
i = m
ind
1 ) = p
ind. Accordingly, the distribution of Vij that is the sum of
V shi and V
ind
ij , has four mass-points. Note that the term V
sh
i that is shared across members
of the same household generates a correlation between terms Vij and Vik ⇢ =
 2sh
 2sh+ 
2
ind
,
where  2sh = V ar(V
sh) and  2ind = V ar(V
ind).
We can now construct the hazard rate and survival function of each household member
j 2 Ji given the transition times of the other members k 2  j
✓j(t|{Ti, j}, xij(t), Vij) =
↵2,j
↵1,j
( t↵1,j )
↵2,j 1
(1 + ( t↵1,j )
↵2,j)2
e 0,j+ 
0xij(t)
·
Y
k2 j
 j,k(t|Ti,jk, xij(t))I(t>Ti,jk) e count
P
l2 j I(t>Ti,jl) Vij (3.4)
Sj(t|{Ti, j}, xij(t), Vij) = exp( 
X
l2 j
I(Ti,jk > 0)[⇤˜j(Ti,jl, xij(t))  ⇤˜j(max
k2 jl
{0, Ti,jk}, xij(t))]
·  j(Ti,jl|{Ti, j}, xij(t)) Vij ) (3.5)
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with { jl} := {k 2 Ji : k 6= j ^ Ti,jk < Ti,jl}.
In the following, we denote the transition durations of each household i by the vector
of random variables Ti = (Ti1 ... TiJi) and their realizations by ti = (ti1 ... tiJi). The
durations in each household are only observed up to a common calendar date at which
the interview is conducted in 1984. We denote the resulting vector of censoring points as
ci = (ci1 ... ciJi).
23 With this information, we can construct the likelihood contribution of
a household i.
 L(ti, ci, xi;↵,  ,  ,m, p)
=
1Z
0
(
Y
j2J
1Z
0
✓j(tij|{Ti, j}, xij(t), Vij)I(cj=0)Sj(tij|{Ti, j}, xij(t), Vij)dGind )dGsh
=
2X
q=1
2X
q1=1
...
2X
qJi=1
Y
j2Ji
[ ✓j(tij|{Ti, j}, xij(t),mshq +mindqj )I(cj=0)
· Sj(tij|{Ti, j}, xij(t),mshq +mindqj )]. (3.6)
3.3.3 Results
We estimate our model of first time use of marijuana based on the likelihood specification
described in Section 3.3.2. In our analysis, we use data on 669 households with at least
three siblings growing up together. The results of three di↵erent model specifications
are reported in Table 3.1. Model I represents a simple framework with covariates and
a basic specification of social interaction e↵ects, yet without accounting for unobserved
characteristics (no correlated e↵ects:  2sh =  
2
ind = 0). Two parameter estimates for the
social interaction e↵ect functions  oldest and  younger are reported ( x =  xint = 0). The
parameter  oldest represents how the transition hazard of a sibling is a↵ected if his/her
oldest sibling starts to use marijuana.  younger measures the e↵ect if one of the younger
siblings starts with this habit. In this simple model, we find highly significant and strongly
positive estimates of these parameters. However, Model II reveals that the estimates
in Model I pick up a dependence between group members generated by unobserved
characteristics (correlated e↵ects). When we account for correlated e↵ects in Model II,
23Note that, household members are censored at the same calendar time. The resulting censoring
durations ci1, ..., ciJi may di↵er due to di↵erent entry dates of the members (age di↵erence between
siblings).
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we still find a highly significant positive e↵ect of a transition of the oldest sibling in the
household, however we do not find a significant e↵ect for the transition of a younger sibling.
In Model III, we allow for additional flexibility of the social interaction e↵ect functions
and find that females are more strongly influenced by a transition of their fellow siblings
than males. Furthermore, we do not find evidence for an e↵ect of family net income on the
strength of social interactions within households. The last two parameters reported for
the social interaction e↵ects reflect the estimated e↵ects of a dummy that has a value of
one if the sibling who starts using drugs and the sibling who is a↵ected by this transition
are both of the same gender. We do not find evidence for this e↵ect of having the same
gender.
The estimated probabilities and mass points described in Section 3.3.2 imply variances
 2sh,  
2
ind of the two distributions G
sh, Gind and correlation ⇢ between the unobserved
heterogeneity terms of two group members Vij and Vik. The parameters are reported in
the under ‘Correlated E↵ects’ in Table 3.1. We find evidence for unobserved heterogeneity
across households ( 2sh ⇡ 0.1), yet not across siblings within households ( 2ind ⇡ 0.01) in
Models II and III. This implies a high correlation of Vij and Vik between two group
members.
In this empirical section, we find evidence that the oldest sibling in a household influences
his younger siblings in terms of his marijuana use. However, we do not find evidence
for an e↵ect of a younger sibling’s transition. Females are more strongly influenced by
the drug use behavior of their siblings than males. Furthermore, besides observable
characteristics and social interaction e↵ects, unobserved characteristics shared among
siblings also explain a substantial part of the dependence in marijuana use behavior.
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Table 3.1: Estimation results of Model 3.A using sibling data on first time marijuana
use
Model I Model II Model III
Variable estimate st.error estimate st.error estimate st.error
Covariates:
Oldest sibling .281*** (.089) .237*** (.098) .266*** (.099)
Female -.543*** (.064) -.619*** (.071) -.736*** (.09)
Birth year -.015 (.019) .008 (.023) .037 (.031)
Number Siblings -.384*** (.122) -.457*** (.147) -.225 (.194)
Family net income -.019 (.036) -.028 (.044) -.009 (.045)
Father employed -.129** (.064) -.122 (.081) -.211* (.109)
Poverty -.04 (.076) -.036 (.095) -.037 (.093)
Both parents in HH .433*** (.157) .475*** (.186) .516*** (.183)
School attendance .004 (.007) -.002 (.008) -.001 (.008)
White .289*** (.063) .386*** (.082) .376*** (.081)
Urban .225*** (.073) .238*** (.091) .252*** (.089)
Social Interaction E↵ects:
Sibling transitioning:
Oldest sibling  oldest .634*** (.08) .347*** (.113) .252* (.146)
Younger sibling  young .386*** (.056) .132 (.085) -.019 (.128)
Sibling a↵ected:
Female - - - - .208** (.104)
Birth year - - - - -.033* (.02)
Number Siblings - - - - -.254 (.156)
Family net income - - - - .005 (.028)
Same characteristics:
Female - - - - .119 (.091)
Male - - - - .021 (.095)
Correlated E↵ects:
Shared term  2sh - - .118 . .105 .
Indiv. term  2ind - - .010 . .008 .
Correlation ⇢ - - .914 . .921 .
Month dummies YES YES YES
Households   3 sib 669 669 669
Time periods 325 325 325
LogLikelihood -10179.3 -7381.5 -7372.4
Note: Estimation of three specifications of Model 3.A described in Section 3.3.2 using data from
the NLSY79 on first time marijuana use of siblings in American households with at least three
siblings growing up together. Model I: Basic specification of social interaction e↵ects; Model II:
Basic specification of social interaction e↵ects with discrete distribution of unobserved household
characteristics; Model III: Flexible specification of social interaction e↵ects with discrete distribution
of unobserved household characteristics. Estimates are reported for  0,1, ,  k,  x,  int, 2sh, 
2
ind and
⇢, whereby *, **, or *** reflect a 0.1, 0.05, or 0.01 significance level.
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3.4 Conclusion
Our empirical results suggest that the oldest sibling has a distinct social role in the
household i.e. his behavior has a strong influence on the younger siblings, but not vice
versa. This reveals that there can be strong asymmetries across di↵erent household
members in terms of their potential influence on others. Our approach can be used to
identify such key members within a group, and can predict the social multiplier e↵ects over
time. This allows predicting the impact of public policies, depending on which members
are initially targeted.24
Our approach provides an alternative to interdependent utility equilibrium models in
studying social interactions from transition data. We argue that in applications such
as substance use of teenagers, a transition of a peer can have the characteristic of an
unanticipated shock and may directly alter the behavior of other group members. Our
approach exploits the information on the exact timing of actions within a group, whereas
standard approaches do not make use of this information. This may be driven by the
limitations of yearly survey data, which is primarily used in studies of social interactions.
However, register data and data of members of online platforms constitute an increasingly
important data source, providing very detailed information on the timing of actions,
making methods exploiting this information increasingly valuable to empirical research.
24At this point, in our empirical analysis we restrict attention to the identification of key members in
a group and leave the calculation of social multiplier e↵ects over time to future work.
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3.A Appendix
3.A.1 Notation
Before proceeding, we introduce some notation and conventions used throughout this
Appendix. The symbol G with some (double) subscript refers to the corresponding
marginal or bivariate distribution. For instance, G12 denotes the bivariate distribution
of (V1 V2)
0
. No superscript at G denotes, as already adopted in the main text, the
full trivariate distribution of (V1 V2 V3)
0
. Also, we will use the generic symbol L to
denote the Laplace Transform of some probability measure. The (double) superscript
at L will indicate the corresponding (mixed) partial derivative. To give an example,
L(23)G denotes the mixed partial derivative with respect to the second and third argument
of the Laplace Transform of G. Finally, let D¯ := {d1 = 0, (d2, d3) 2 R¯2+ : d3   d2},
D := {d1 = 0, (d2, d3) 2 R2+ : d3   d2}, D1 := {d1 = 0, d2 2 R+, d3 = 1}, and
D21 := {d1 = 0, d2 =1, d3 =1}.
For the proof of the propositions we will utilize certain subsurvival functions. More
precisely, for t > 0, x 2 X, d 2 D¯, and j = 1, 2, 3,
QTj(t|d, x) := P(Tj > t, Tj + dj < min
k2{1,2,3} 6=j
(Tk + dk)|d, x). (3.7)
In addition, for t1, t > 0, x 2 X, and j = 2, 3,
QT1(t1, t|d, x) :=
8><>:
P(T1 > t1, T2 > t, T1 < T2 + d2|d, x)
P(T1 > t1, T2 > t+ d3   d2, T3 > t, T1 < min
k2{2,3}
(Tk + dk)|d, x)
if d 2 D1,
if d 2 D.
QT1,Tj(t1, t|d, x) := P(T1 > t1, T2 > t+ d3   d2, T3 > t, T1 < Tj + dj < Tk + dk|d, x) if d 2 D.
Finally, for t1, tj, tk > 0, x 2 X, and j, k = 2, 3 such that j 6= k,
QT1,Tj ,Tk(t1, tj, tk|d, x) := P(T1 > t1, Tj > tj, Tk > tk, T1 < Tj + dj < Tk + dk|d, x) if d 2 D.
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3.A.2 Proof of Proposition 3.1
The proof of Proposition 3.1 consists of three main steps. The first step describes
the identification of the integrated baseline hazards, the regressor functions, and the
distribution function of the unobserved heterogeneity terms. The second step deals with
the identification of the interaction e↵ects caused by the first exit. Finally, the third step
is concerned with the identification of the interaction e↵ects caused by the second exit.
Identification of the set of functions {⇤j, j : j = 1, 2, 3} and G. For all t > 0, x 2 X,
and d 2 D21, we have
P [T1 > t|d, x] =LG1( 1(x)⇤1(t)). (3.8)
Following analogous steps to Elbers and Ridder (1982), we achieve identification of  1,
G1, and ⇤1.
Next, we identify  2 and ⇤2. For almost any t > 0, x 2 X, and d 2 D1, we obtain
@
@t
QT2(t|d, x) =  2(x) 2(t)L(2)G12( 1(x)⇤1(t+ d2), 2(x)⇤2(t)), (3.9)
It is straightforward, by Assumption B.3, to check that
lim
t!0,d2!0

@
@t
QT2(t|d, x)
. @
@t
QT2(t|d, x⇤)
 
=  2(x), (3.10)
which leads to identification of  2. For any t > 0, x 2 X, and d 2 D1,
P
"
2\
j=1
(Tj + dj > t+ d2)
   d, x#=LG12( 1(x)⇤1(t+ d2), 2(x)⇤2(t)). (3.11)
We let t = t⇤ and thus we can trace out LG12 on an open subset of R2+ by varying
appropriately d2 and x. Given that LG12 is real analytic function Abbring and van den Berg
(2003a), we identify LG12 (and consequently G12) on R2+. Then, employing the relation
(3.11), we identify ⇤2. The identification of  3,⇤3, and G follows the same line of argument
as that in identification of  2,⇤2, and G12, and is consequently omitted.
For the second and third step note that for t > 0
 j,k(t|.) =
Z t
0
@⌥j,k(!|.)
@!
[ j(!)]
 1 d!,
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and
 j,kl(t|.) =
Z t
0
@⌥j,kl(!|.)
@!
[ j(!)]
 1  j,kl(!|.)d!.
Hence, to identify  j,k and  j,kl it is su cient to identify ⌥j,k and ⌥j,kl, respectively.
Identification of the set of functions { j,k : j, k = 1, 2, 3, j 6= k}. We begin with the iden-
tification of  2,1 and  3,1. Three di↵erent cases are possible: i) 0 < T1  d2, ii)
d2 < T1  d3, and iii) T1 > d3. The identification methodology can be summarized
as follows. We first identify ⌥2,1 for the cases i) and ii), next we identify ⌥3,1 for the
cases i) and ii), and finally we jointly identify ⌥2,1 and ⌥3,1 for the case iii).
For almost all t1 such that 0 < t1  d2, each t > 0, d 2 D1, and x 2 X,
@QT1(t1, t|d, x)
@t1
=  1(x) 1(t1)L(1)G12( 1(x)⇤1(t1), 2(x)⌥2,1(t|t1   d2, 1, x)). (3.12)
By the first step, all the quantities on the right hand side are known except for the term
⌥2,1. By exploiting the facts that L(1)G12 is strictly increasing in its arguments and that
⌥2,1(t|t1  d2, 1, x) is either cadlag or caglad in t1  d2 (Assumption A.4), we can identify
⌥2,1 for the case i). Similarly, for almost every t1 such that d2 < t1  d3, all t > t1   d2,
d 2 D1, and x 2 X,
@QT1(t1, t|d, x)
@t1
=  1(x) 1(t1)L(1)G12( 1(x)⇤1(t1), 2(x)(⇤2(t1   d2) + ⌥2,1(t|t1   d2, 2, x))).
(3.13)
Identical arguments to the previous case give identification of ⌥2,1 for the case ii).
Next, we proceed with the identification of ⌥3,1 for the first two cases. More precisely, for
almost all 0 < t1  d2, all t > 0, d 2 D, and x 2 X we obtain
@QT1(t1, t|d, x)
@t1
=  1(x) 1(t1)L(1)G ( 1(x)⇤1(t1), 2(x)⌥2,1(t+ d3   d2|t1   d2, 1, x),
 3(x)⌥3,1(t|t1   d3, 1, x)). (3.14)
Next, we note that for almost every d2 < t1  d3, all t > 0, d 2 D¯, and x 2 X,
@QT1(t1, t|d, x)
@t1
=  1(x) 1(t1)L(1)G ( 1(x)⇤1(t1),
 2(x) (⇤2(t1   d2) + ⌥2,1(t+ d3   d2|t1   d2, 2, x)) ,
 3(x)⌥3,1(t|t1   d3, 2, x)). (3.15)
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Recall that ⌥2,1 has been identified for the two above cases. Then, the ⌥3,1 can be uniquely
determined for the corresponding cases.
Finally, we turn our attention to the case iii). Note that for almost all t > 0, d 2 D,
x 2 X,
 j(t+ ⌘j) =
@QTj(t|d, x)
@t
h
L(j)G ( 1(x)⇤1(t+ d3), 2(x)⇤2(t+ d3   d2), 3(x)⇤3(t)) j(x)
i 1
,
(3.16)
where j = 2, 3, ⌘2 = d3   d2, and ⌘3 = 0. For almost all t1 > d3, almost each t > t1   d3,
d 2 D¯, x 2 X,
 j(t+ ⌘j) j,1(t+ ⌘j|t1   dj, 3, x) =
h
L(1j)G ( 1(x)⇤1(t1),
 2(x)(⇤2(t1   d2) + ⌥2,1(t+ d3   d2|t1   d2, 3, x)),
 3(x)(⇤3(t1   d3) + ⌥3,1(t|t1   d3, 3, x)))
⇥  1(x) 1(t1) 2(x)
i 1@2QT1,Tj(t1, t|d, x)
@t1@t
.
(3.17)
The rest of this part is analogous to the proof of Proposition 1 of Drepper and E↵raimidis
(2012). We fix t1, x, d2, and d3. Define Hj(t) := ⇤j(t + ⌘j) and Qj(t) := @QTj (t|d,x)@t for
0  t  t1 d3, and Hj(t) := ⇤j(t1 dj)+⌥j,1(t+⌘j|t1 dj, x, 3) and Qj(t) := @QT1,Tj (t|d,x)@t1@t
for t > t1   d3. Finally, gj:= 1(t1) 1(x) j(x) and we supress dependence of ⇤1(t1) and
 j(x) on t1 and x, respectively.
The equations (3.16), (3.17), by using the definitions of the previous paragraph, imply
that we have the following system of two di↵erential equations for almost all t > 0
d
dt
H(t) = f (t,H(t)) ,
H(⌧) =  ⌧ , for some specific ⌧ 2 (0, t1   d3) (initial conditions), (3.18)
where H := (H2 H3)0 and f := (f2 f3)0 , with
fj (t,H) =
8><>:
h
L(2)G ( 1⇤1(t), 2H2, 3H3) j
i 1Qj(t)h
L(12)G ( 1⇤1 , 2H2, 3H3)gj
i 1Qj(t)
if 0 < t  t1   d3,
if t > t1   dj.
It is straightforward to verify that all the requirements of Lemma 1 of Drepper and
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E↵raimidis (2012) are satisfied. Hence, H1 and H2 are uniquely determined on R+ (using
also the fact that H1(0) = H2(0) = 0). By definition, identification of ⌥j,1(t|t1   dj, 3, x)
follows for each t > d3   d2 with t1, x, d2, and d3 be fixed. Since ⌥j,1(t|t1   dj, 3, x) is
either cadlag or caglad with respect to t1  dj, identification of ⌥j,1 for the case t1 > d3 is
obtained. By utilizing all the results of the previous paragraphs we derive identification
of ⌥j,1 for the cases 0  T1  d2, d2  T1  d3, and T1 > d3.
For the identification of the remaining interaction e↵ect functions, we briefly discuss the
necessary steps which are similar to the preceding paragraphs. Regarding the identification
of  1,2 and  3,2, there are two possible scenarios: i) d2 < T2  d3   d2, ii) T2 > d3   d2.
We first identify  1,2 and  3,2 for the case i). In particular, we let d 2 D1 and we identify
 1,2. Based on this result, we can also directly identify  1,3 by considering d 2 D. To
jointly identify  1,2 and  3,2 for the the case ii), we let d 2 D and by making use of
Lemma 1, we achieve identification. Finally, to jointly identify  2,3 and  1,3, we let d 2 D
and working analogously to the previous paragraphs as well as utilizing Lemma 1, we get
the desired result.
Identification of the set of functions { j,kl : j, k, l = 1, 2, 3, k 6= j 6= l, k < l}. We will re-
strict our attention to ⌥3,12; the arguments for the identification of the other combinations
of j, k, l are similar and thus we will omit the proof for the corresponding combinations.
Two scenarios are possible: i) T1  T2 + d2 < T3 + d3 and ii) T2  T1 + d1 < T3 + d3.
We will analyze the case i) as the proof for the case ii) is completely analogous. We can
write for all t > 0, almost all 0 < t1 < d2, almost all t2  d3   d2, d 2 D, and x 2 X,
@2QT1,T2,T3(t1, t2, t|x)
@t1@t2
= L(12)G ( 1(x)⇤1(t1), 2(x)⌥2,1(t2|t1   d2, 1, x),
 3(x)⌥3,12(t|t1   d3, t2 + d2   d3, 2, x))
⇥  1(t1) 1(x) 2(t2) 2(x) 2,1(t2|t1   d2, 1, x), (3.19)
Likewise, for all t > 0, almost all 0 < t1 < d2, almost every t2 > d3   d2, d 2 D, and
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x 2 X,
@2QT1,T2,T3(t1, t2, t|x)
@t1@t2
= L(12)G ( 1(x)⇤1(t1), 2(x)⌥2,1(t2|t1   d2, 1, x),
 3(x)⌥3,12(t|t1   d3, t2 + d2   d3, 3, x))
⇥  1(t1) 1(x) 2(t2) 2(x) 2,1(t2|t1   d2, 1, x). (3.20)
The left hand side of the above equation is observed from the data. By Propositions 3.1 and
3.2, all the quantities on the right-hand side are known except for ⌥3,12. Given that L(23)G is
strictly decreasing in its arguments, the identification of ⌥3,12 follows by using also the fact
that ⌥3,12(t|t1  d3, t2+ d2  d3,N12, x) is either cadlag or caglad in (t1  d3, t2+ d2  d3).
If d2 < t1 < d3, the steps are almost identical by replacing  2(x)⌥2,1(t2|t1   d2, 1, x)
with  2(x) (⇤2(t1   d2) + ⌥2,1(t2|t1   d2, 2, x)) and  2,1(t2|t1   d2, 1, x) with  2,1(t2|t1  
d2, 2, x). Similarly, if t1 > d3 we are encountered with a single subcase and we replace
 2(x)⌥2,1(t2|t1   d2, 2, x) with  2(x) (⇤2(t1   d2) + ⌥2,1(t2|t1   d2, 3, x)) and  2,1(t2|t1  
d2, 1, x) with  2,1(t2|t1   d2, 3, x).
3.A.3 Proof of Proposition 3.2
The identification strategy we follow is the same as in the proof of Proposition 3.1. Note
that, by construction, we always have Nk = Nkl = 3 and consequently, we will omit for
notational simplicity this information.
Identification of the set of functions {⇤j, j : j = 1, 2, 3} and G. The result is directly ob-
tained by making use of the distribution of
{minj2{1,2,3}(T1, T2, T3), argminj2{1,2,3}(T1, T2, T3)}|{x} and the identification result of
Abbring and van den Berg (2003a).
Identification of the set of functions { j,k : j, k = 1, 2, 3, j 6= k}. We will give in outline
the proof of the joint identification of ⌥2,1 and ⌥3,1 which, by definition, uniquely
determine the quantities  2,1 and  3,1, respectively. The (joint) identification of ⌥1,2,⌥3,2
and also ⌥1,3,⌥2,3 can be derived in a similar manner and as consequence, we will not
discuss here these two cases.
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Now, for any x 2 X and almost all t > 0, we have
 j(t) =
h
L(j)G ( 1(x)⇤1(t), 2(x)⇤2(t), 3(x)⇤3(t)) j(x)
i 1 @QTj(t|x)
@t
. (3.21)
Similarly, we obtain for each x 2 X, almost all 0 < t1 < t, and j = 2, 3
 j(t) j,1(t|t1, x) =
h
L(1j)G ( 1(x)⇤1(t1), 2(x) (⇤2(t1) + ⌥2,1(t|t1, x)) ,
 3(x)(⇤1(t1) + ⌥3,1(t|t1, x))) j(x) 1(t1) 1(x)] 1 @
2QT1,Tj(t1, t|x)
@t1@t
.
(3.22)
The equations (3.21) and (3.22) imply that we have a system of two di↵erential equations.
Following similar arguments to the proof of Proposition 3.1 and employing the result of
Lemma 1 of Drepper and E↵raimidis (2012), we can solve with respect to ⌥2,1(t|t1, x)
and ⌥3,1(t|t1, x). Using the fact that the latter quantities are either cadlag or caglad with
respect to t1, the identification of ⌥2,1 and ⌥3,1 follows.
Identification of the set of functions { j,kl : j, k, l = 1, 2, 3, k 6= j 6= l, k < l}. We will re-
strict our attention on ⌥3,12 which automatically, by definition, yields identification of
 3,12. the arguments for identification of the other combinations of j, k, l are similar
and thus we will omit the proof for these cases. There are two possible scenarios: i)
T1 < T2  T3 and ii) T1 < T3  T2.
For all t > 0 and almost all 0 < t1 < t2 < t, we have
@2QT1,T2,T3(t1, t2, t|x)
@t1@t2
= L(12)G ( 1(x)⇤1(t1), 2(x) (⇤2(t1) + ⌥2,1(t2|t1, x)) , 3(x)⇤3(t3)
 3(x) (⇤3(t1) + ⌥3,1(t2|t1, x) + ⌥3,12(t|t1, t2, x)))
⇥  1(t) 1(x) 2(x) 2(t2) 2,1(t2|t1, x). (3.23)
The left-hand side of the above equation is observed from the data. By the two previous
results, all the quantities on the right-hand side are known except for ⌥3,21. Given that
L(23)G is strictly decreasing in its arguments, the identification of ⌥3,12 follows (using also
the fact that ⌥3,12(t|t1, t2, x) is either cadlag or caglad in (t1, t2) for any t1, t2 > 0 and
x 2 X). Employing the statements of the two preceding results we prove the identification
of  3,12 for the case i) The steps are very similar for the case ii)and thus are omitted.
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The proof is complete.
3.A.4 Proof of Proposition 3.3
Proof of Proposition 3.3. It is straightforward, by Assumption 3.B.2, to show that for all
t 2 (ta, tb), 1 2 P , and d 2 D21,
P [T1 > t|d, 1] =LG1(L 1G1(⇤˜(t, 1)) + C) (3.24)
for some C 6= 0. Applying the result of Brinch (2007), identification of ⇤˜ follows. Next,
for any t > 0,  1, 2, 3 2 P , and d 2 D,
P
"
3\
j=1
(Tj + dj > t+ d3)
   d, 1, 2, 3#=LG(⇤˜(t+ d3, 1), ⇤˜(t+ d3   d2, 2), ⇤˜(t, 3))
(3.25)
By continuity of ⇤˜(., ) for any   2 X and varying appropriately t, d2, and d3, we identify
LG which yields identification of G. The identification methodology of the functions which
capture the interaction e↵ects is completely analogous to the proof of Proposition 3.1 and
thus the details are omitted.
3.A.5 Proof of Proposition 3.4
Proof of Proposition 3.4. Consider the scenario ⇣(t) = ⇣1(t) = ⇣2(t) = ⇣3(t) for all t > 0,
that is, all members in the group are characterized by the same realized covariate paths.
Then, for t > 0, ⇣ 2 P⇣ ,
P
"
3\
j=1
Tj > t
   ⇣# = LG(⇤˜(t, ⇣), ⇤˜(t, ⇣), ⇤˜(t, ⇣))
= LG˜(⇤˜(t, ⇣))
with G˜ being the distribution of the random sum V1+V2+V3. Applying the result of Brinch
(2007), we achieve identification of ⇤˜ and G˜. Next, we have for t > 0 and ⇣1, ⇣2, ⇣3 2 P⇣ ,
P
"
3\
j=1
Tj > t
   ⇣1, ⇣2, ⇣3# = LG(⇤˜(t, ⇣1), ⇤˜(t, ⇣2), ⇤˜(t, ⇣3)).
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By Assumption 3.B.5, the arguments of the Laplace Transform attain all values in an
open subset of R3+ which in turn, by the real analyticity property, yields identification of
LG and consequently of G. The identification strategy for the interaction e↵ects is the
same with the proof of Proposition 3.2 and therefore the details are omitted.
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Chapter 4
Ine ciencies from Strategic
Behaviour in International
Cooperation: Evidence from the
Southern Common Market1
4.1 Introduction
Under what circumstances do actors cooperate in international relations and which
incorporation mechanism ensures e cient contracting? International institutions often
have low capabilities to sanction its members for non compliance with signed agreements.
Consequently, international actors have an incentive to free-ride on the cooperation
e↵orts of their partners without contributing themselves by ratifying signed agreements
at the domestic level (Keohane, 1984; Oye, 1985; Snidal, 1985). This paper argues that
institutions can solve this important cooperation dilemma in ways that have previously
not been considered within existing literature on international relations. If treaties
simultaneously enter in force in the whole region only once all signatory states have
ratified, incentives for free riding no longer exist. The short term incentives for individual
defection–a menace to international cooperation, which occupies a prominent place in the
literature–cannot arise.
However, we further argue that solving free riding by such institutional means does not
1This chapter is joint work with Christian Arnold and Gerard van den Berg
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fully eliminate cooperation problems; rather, it merely alters their nature. Participants
cooperating under such a regulatory regime may feel tempted to make promises that they
do not intend to keep. If costs from non-compliance at the domestic level are su ciently
low, those who contract may wish to reap the benefits of positive public exposure from
contracting now, even in the light of reputation costs from not keeping your promise in
the future. Under such circumstances, actors may sign contracts that would even involve
detrimental e↵ects for them if implemented, because they can easily prevent their e↵ect
in the whole region by refraining from ratification. The result is inflationary contracting
without any e↵ective policy change in the region.
In this paper, we consider the theoretical and empirical implications of a change in the
standard incorporation rules towards a mechanism in which treaties enter in force only
once all signatory states have ratified. We present the case of Mercosur as an empirical
example of this unusual incorporation mechanism and study the empirical implications
using the complete record of ratification durations of all 1,024 regulations adopted in
Mercosur between 1994 and 2008. This paper builds on the work by Arnold (2013), who
outlines the incorporation mechanism and ratification problems in Mercosur in detail.
A striking feature of Mercosur’s ratification record is that only half of all regulations
signed at the negotiation table before 2004 have entered into force within five years of
their introduction. For the other half, at least one of the member countries has not ratified
the regulation after 5 years. Using multivariate duration methods, we find that if actors
are exposed to high public or political pressure at the time of signing an international
agreement, this significantly prolongs the subsequent ratification process at the domestic
level. For example, if there is high public exposure of a regulation in a member country at
the time of contracting, political actors may be inclined to signal a cooperative attitude
by signing the international agreement, knowing that they can easily prevent the policy
change from taking e↵ect in the whole region by prolonging domestic ratification for as
long as necessary. As a result, too many regulations are introduced in Mercosur and some
members pay the costs of domestic ratification while one member’s inactiveness prevents
the policy change from taking e↵ect. We argue in this paper that although the unusual
mechanism in Mercosur prevents the common problem of free-riding,it in fact causes a
new problem of ine cient contracting.
This paper illustrates the e↵ects from the distinct ratification rules according to the
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following structure. Following a brief literature review on international cooperation in
Section 4.2, we set out with theoretical considerations in Section 4.3. After spotlighting
the consequences of ratification rules for the production of collective goods, we present
our formal model reflecting the incorporation mechanism in Mercosur.
A second part of the paper subsequently turns to the empirical example. In Section 4.4,
we present our data set on regional cooperation in the Southern Common Market, a
regional integration scheme between Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay that uses
the intriguing incorporation rules presented previously. We provide empirical evidence for
our theoretical claims in Section 4.5 with an empirical analysis of the ratification record
on all 1,024 regulations adopted between 1994 and 2008, before Section 4.6 concludes.
4.2 Literature
In principle, international cooperation consists of two steps. Governments contract on
common future conduct. However, authorities still need to keep their promise from the
negotiation tables by altering their behavior in line with the terms of an agreement.
The ratification of international agreements reflects a key step towards such compliance.
Incorporating international rules into domestic law allows national courts to hold their
governments accountable to international commitments (Fearon, 1998; Hathaway, 2007;
Keohane, 1984; Koremenos et al., 2001; Scharpf, 1997).
Institutions facilitate cooperation against the backdrop of an anarchic international
society. They may shape normative beliefs of actors and alter their behavior (Risse et al.,
1999; Checkel, 2005; Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998). Moreover, institutions can change
benefits from certain courses of action, thus taking e↵ect on the choice of optimal strategies
and mitigating the danger of market failure.
Both stages of international cooperation challenge actors in di↵erent ways and institutions
can be supportive on both occasions. Self-interested actors only consent to international
agreements if they expect a positive reward from doing so. First and foremost, they seek to
achieve this by changing the status quo of current conditions of international cooperation.
Actors need to solve distributional conflicts and coordinate on one among many possible
pareto optimal outcomes (Fearon, 1998; Krasner, 1991; Stein, 1983). Institutions reduce
transaction costs during bargaining (Koremenos et al., 2001; Williamson, 1975) by
simplifying the exchange of information between actors, allowing contracting parties
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to identify e cient bargaining solutions in practice (Young, 1991), and serve as focal
points for the choice between multiple pareto e cient bargaining solutions (Garrett
and Weingast, 1993). Moreover, institutions o↵er a stable context for the negotiation
of multiple issues at one time. Logrolling and linkage politics may o↵er pareto e cient
bargaining outcomes where separate bargaining would not lead to conclusive results (Stein,
1980; Tollison and Willett, 1979).
Those who sign international agreements may yet be interested in gains from agreements
other than a mere change in the status quo. For instance, governments can use
international rules as a signal to seeksupport from domestic or transnational advocacy
groups (Bu¨the and Milner, 2008; Hathaway, 2007; Simmons and Danner, 2010; Whitehead
and Barahona de Brito, 2005). Moreover, country leaders may even want to create distinct
reputations in relation to di↵erent audiences. They can try to maintain a country’s image
as a reliable economic partner at the international level. In the meantime, democratically
liable governments need to safeguard national interests and may try to undermine binding
international contracts with means that are less visible to foreign partners (Kono, 2006).
Once all parties come to an agreement, cooperation problems fundamentally change.
Conventionally, international regulations only produce the intended e↵ect if all contracting
parties make an e↵ort to adapt the necessary behavior. However, given that such adaption
is costly, each contracting party has incentives to save on these investments and hope for
others providing the collective good (Keohane, 1984; Oye, 1985; Snidal, 1985). Actors can
overcome incentives to renege on cooperative behavior when institutions impose costs on
those who defect.
Explicit retaliation compels non-compliers to stick to the cooperative behavior initially
promised. International enforcement institutions such as courts or tribunals can increase
costs for non-compliance to a remarkable extent (Alter, 2002, 2006; Carrubba, 2005;
Downs et al., 1996; Gilligan et al., 2010). Furthermore, domestic institutions can also
play an important role in sanctioning their own governments (Hathaway, 2007); for
instance, national courts (Hathaway, 2003; Powell and Staton, 2009) or interest groups
(Dai, 2006, 2007; Martin, 2008) can hold their own governments accountable. When
international organizations harness domestic counterparts, international and domestic
institutions may commonly exert such pressure on governments (Koremenos et al., 2001).
Institutions permit not only explicit but also implicit ways of retaliation. The reputation
76
CHAPTER 4. INEFFICIENT CONTRACTING IN MERCOSUR
of a government e↵ectively defines whether partners are willing to cooperate in further
instances (Fearon, 1998; Guzman, 2008; Snidal, 1985). Furthermore, e↵ective monitoring
increases such reputation costs (Kono, 2007).
Despite various explanations concerning how institutions a↵ect actors, theories predict
mixed prospects for successful international cooperation. Some argue that states sign
only those accords that bear little e↵orts for adaption with respect to the status quo
(Downs et al., 1996). However, contracting under high costs can serve as a screening device
to identify those partners who truly wish to implement and comply with a negotiation
result (Long et al., 2007; Martin, 2000, 2005; Simmons and Danner, 2010; Von Stein,
2005). The constraining capacity of international institutions favors few, but well complied
agreements. The more embracing an international institution’s capacity to sanction, the
harder it is for the parties to reach a compromise and engage in cooperation (Fearon,
1998; Goodli↵e and Hawkins, 2006). Nonetheless, only strong enforcement mechanisms can
ascertain e↵ective compliance (Goldstein et al., 2007; Guzman, 2008; Hathaway, 2005).
4.3 How di↵erent ratification rules a↵ect strategic
considerations for international cooperation
Our model reflects classical game theoretic approaches used for the representation of
international cooperation (Snidal, 1985; Stein, 1982). All current models implicitly assume
that each of the contracting parties decides about the e↵ectivity of an international
agreement on its own. Changing this rule has important consequences for the production
of collective goods, as well as an important e↵ect on the strategic structure of international
cooperation.
4.3.1 Free riding and threshold provision
First, all parties agree on a contract and commit to comply with its terms. In a second
step, actors decide whether or not to keep their promise from the negotiation table. If a
government implements the terms of an agreement at the domestic level, it has to bear the
costs of adaption. By contrast, if authorities refrain from doing so and prefer to save the
costs, it may still be the case that other governments invest su cient e↵orts to produce the
e↵ects from joint action. However, given that not all contracting partners put in practice
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what has been previously agreed, the overall welfare of collaboration declines. Overall,
the investment in a change of the status quo only pays o↵ if all participate, although
each single partner has incentives to free ride on the e↵orts of their partners (Olson, 1965;
Ostrom, 1990).
Such rules for ratification are not the only ones in international politics. Rather than
enacting an international agreement on its own, states may condition the e↵ectiveness
on the commitment of partners. In some international regimes, agreements only become
e↵ective once all signatory countries have ratified.2 Under these rules, only the joint
e↵orts of all trigger actual policy change. Accordingly, as long as one of the contracting
partners lacks ratification, the benefit from the policy change is not produced; therefore,
no motive to free ride on others’ e↵orts arises. In contrast to the rules mentioned above,
each individual party has an incentive to invest in policy adaption, because the production
of the beneficial collective good only occurs if all participate.3
The fundamentally di↵erent e↵ects from both rules can be best understood in a public
goods framework. The production functions for the collective good di↵er between the first
and second set of rules in important ways, as visualized in Figure 4.1. The horizontal axis
depicts the proportion of contributors to a collective good, while the vertical axis charts
the ratio of the collective good that is produced for each of the production functions.
The grey line represents a production function that leads to the free riding commonly
expected in international relations. The more actors that participate in the production of
the collective good, the higher the ratio of the good provided. Incentives for free riding
exist because parts of the collective good are delivered even when only some cooperate.
Defectors are reluctant to invest adaption costs as long as their marginal return from the
collective good remains lower.
The black line exemplifies the production function for the latter ratification rule. Collective
goods produced with such technologies are know as step-level or provision-point goods
within public choice literature (Bagnoli and Lipman, 1989; Kragt et al., 1983; Olson, 1965;
Schram et al., 2008). In contrast to the previous case, the collective good is only produced
once all comply with their commitments. Consequently, those who do not comply with
2Other thresholds for e↵ectiveness of an international agreement are likewise possible.
3Under the former rules, enforcement of contracts had to be accomplished at the international level
via the threat of implicit and explicit sanctions. Now, domestic courts guarantee governments’ e↵ective
compliance with agreements beneficial to them.
78
CHAPTER 4. INEFFICIENT CONTRACTING IN MERCOSUR
Figure 4.1: Two production functions for the provision of
collective goods
Proportion of Contributors
 
Pr
op
or
tio
n 
of
 a
 C
oll
ec
tiv
e 
Go
od
 P
riv
ide
d
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
Immediate Legal Validity
Last Country Triggers Validity
Note: Figure adapted from Ostrom (2003).
their obligations are o↵ered no reward for their reluctance and will be eager to keep their
promises from the negotiation table. Of course, this is only true provided that the policy
is beneficial to all parties. In the next section, we discuss the consequences of parties
secretly opposing the policy change.
4.3.2 Changing the nature of the game
The di↵erent rules for ratification fundamentally alter how partners collectively produce
a good and thus change the strategic character of interaction (Heckathorn, 1996). With
the new rules for ratification, actors no longer face the problem of free riding but may
now struggle with ine cient contracting.
To illustrate these consequences, we conceive of a simple game theoretic model whereby
two players4 A and B interact at two stages. In the first round, they may coordinate on
a common policy that they promise to later ratify. They make their decision based on
the awareness of reputation gains from signaling cooperation today and the anticipated
4In our empirical example of Mercosur four players have to decide on international agreements. The
consequences of this extension is briefly discussed at the beginning of Section 4.5.
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derived utility from their future ratification decision. In the second round, both actors
may choose to keep their promise from the negotiation table or rather defect from their
commitment. Here, they take their decision in the light of reputation costs that arise from
defection and the utility from putting the agreement into practice.
The relationship between these costs and benefits during the two rounds determines
the overall dynamic of the game, leading to three scenarios. First, partners consider
contracting, but cannot find a bargaining solution in the first round that all partners
would agree on. Second, benefits from the new policy are so high that contracting and
subsequent ratification is beneficial to all. Finally, the cooperation trap of the game
played under these rules for ratification is ine cient contracting. This outcome occurs
if the proposed policy change is not beneficial or even harmful to at least one player and
reputation gains of contracting are relatively high in comparison to negligible reputation
costs from non ratification at the second stage. Under this cost constellation, actors may
engage in contracting and benefit from the reputation gains of their signature, knowing
that they may easily forestall detrimental policies at low costs. Consequently, international
actors sign the international agreement without ratifying it at a later point in time.
We now develop the model in more formal terms. The strategic setting that political actors
face can be described by a two-step cooperation game with incomplete information (see
Figure 4.2). At the first stage (Contracting stage), the two countries A and B choose to
Figure 4.2: Two player two-step game of international cooperation
D C
D 0, 0  RA, RB
C RA, RB XA +RA, XB +RB
Stage 1: Contracting
D R
D  rA, rB  rA, 0
R 0, rB UA, UB
Stage 2: Ratification
Note: Stage 2 of the game is only reached if players cooperate on Stage 1. In particular, an
agreement only enters into force, if both countries first sign the international contract (C,C on Stage 1)
and then ratify it at the Ratification Stage (R,R on Stage 2).
Rj : reputation gains from contracting of player j = A,B;  rj : reputation costs of non ratification; Xj :
expected utility from ratification stage; Uj : Utility from policy change being ratified by both players.
introduce a new policy. If neither of the partners cooperates (D,D), both players remain
with the status quo and receive no pay-o↵. In the case where both agree on the introduction
of the policy (C,C), each actor j = A,B receives their expected utility from the ratification
stage Xj and reputation gain Rj from their signature. The game subsequently proceeds
to the second stage (Ratification stage). However, if, for example, country B defects while
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A decides to cooperate (C,D), then country A improves its reputation as a cooperative
partner (gains RA), whereas country B has to accept a less benevolent standing (loses
RB).
Once the regulation reaches the Ratification stage, both actors decide whether or not
to adhere to the terms of the agreement and enact it into domestic law. While in the
first round actors faced the reputation loss  Rj whenever they defect, they now face
less severe reputation costs  rj for not ratifying the agreement.5 Whenever both players
choose to ratify the agreement (R,R), their e↵orts collectively produce the international
policy change with corresponding utility Uj.
International actors may evaluate the utility of the common policy di↵erently. Those who
have to ratify an international regulation either cherish the policy (Uj = H) or rather
disapprove a change in the status quo (Uj = L). At the outset, nature draws the utilities
UA and UB independently from a distribution with P (Uj = H) = p and P (Uj = L) = 1 p,
p 2 [0, 1]. Players know the distribution from which the types Uj are drawn, while the
realization Uj is private information to player j.
Concluding the description of the game, we impose the following assumptions on the
payo↵s:
Rj, rj, ⇢, H > 0 (3.1)
 rj > L (3.2)
with ⇢ being the discount factor for the payo↵ at the ratification stage. Assumption (3.2)
formalizes the statement that a country of type L will be more strongly harmed by the
policy change than from the reputation loss  rj that it would su↵er from defecting at the
second stage. As a result, a country of type L always chooses not to ratify the regulation
as long as the policy would enter into force otherwise.
To understand the dynamic of the game, we first consider possible equilibria at the
ratification stage, given that contracting by both players has taken place. In a second step,
we subsequently turn to the overall dynamic of the game and consider actors anticipating
5As such, defection at the second stage corresponds to choosing an incorporation time of 1. Since
the strategy of infinitely delaying incorporation can only be indirectly observed by the other country, it is
di cult to publicly condemn this behavior. Instead, political actors have to face a less severe reputation
loss within the political system and against lobbies supporting the law.
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the outcomes at the ratification stage during contracting.
Under assumptions (3.1) and (3.2), di↵erent combinations of types H and L lead to
three di↵erent action situations at the ratification stage, all of which are characterized by
di↵erent Nash equilibria. If a player benefits from a the policy change Uj = H, irrespective
of the partner’s strategy, a player’s best response is always quick ratification. Thus, if both
players benefit from the policy change UA = H,UB = H, it will be ratified as quickly as
possible by both players (R,R). If, on the other hand, player A is of type L while player B
is of type H and thus ratifies quickly, the best response of L is to defect (assumption 3.2),
while in response B still has an incentive to ratify quickly to avoid reputation loss  rB
(D,R). The reversed scenario occurs for UA = H,UB = L respectively (R,D). As a result,
opposed preferences lead to equilibria whereby one contracting partner does not fulfill their
obligation and hence the policy change never enters into force (ine cient contracting).
Finally, if both countries are of type UA = L,UB = L, two equilibria may arise. If A
chooses to defect, the best response of B is quick ratification to avoid reputation costs
 rB.6 In turn, the best response of A is to defect (D,R). The second equilibrium occurs in
case of the reversed combination of strategies (R,D). In the following, we assume that the
two players will coordinate on either one of the two equilibria with probability 12 . Similar
to the previous case, the policy change never enters into force (ine cient contracting).
Actors who consider international cooperation during the first round anticipate the
equilibrium outcomes from the ratification stage. From the perspective of player j,
successful contracting leads to the following expected utilities:
Xj =
8><>:
⇢pH
 ⇢12(1 + p)rj
if Uj = H
if Uj = L.
Considering the structure of payo↵s in figure 4.2, it is easy to understand under which
conditions both actors are eager to introduce a new policy. As long as XA + RA >  RA
and XB + RB >  RB, both players’ best response to contracting is to sign the contract
themselves (C,C). For players with Uj = H, this condition is always satisfied: ⇢pH+Rj >
 Rj. Thus, if the policy is beneficial to both parties, actors contract at the first stage
6In order to avoid unnecessary reputation loss, the best response of B to defection is quick ratification.
This can be interpreted as a minor form of free-riding on the defection e↵orts of the other player in order
to avoid reputation loss  rB .
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and the regulation is subsequently quickly ratified by both. This theoretical implication
is also in line with our empirical findings presented in Section 4.5. Regulations known to
be beneficial to all members are on average more quickly ratified by all member countries
compared to regulations with unknown preference distributions. Note that in standard
public goods games, the incentive to free-ride would cause a less favorable ratification
record for a mutually beneficial policy change.
A country with Uj = L will only choose to agree to introducing the new policy if the public
reputation loss from defecting now is larger than the expected (internal) reputation loss
from defecting at the ratification stage:
 ⇢1
2
(1 + p)rj +Rj >  Rj
, 1
2
⇢(1 + p)rj| {z }
Xj,L
< 2Rj (3.3)
Condition (3.3) reveals the potential ine ciency resulting from the legislative mechanism
in Mercosur. If inequality (3.3) holds, a country of type L prefers the risk of an expected
future reputation loss of not ratifying ⇢12(1+p)rj to the e↵ective reputation costs 2Rj of
not signing the agreement during the negotiations. As long as incentives to contract today
are su ciently high to outweigh the expected losses tomorrow, actors who are secretly
opposed to the regulation (Uj = L) prefer to publicly sign the international agreement,
knowing that they benefit immediately and can meanwhile prevent the policy at little
cost tomorrow.
Table 4.1 summarizes the equilibrium outcomes of the two-step cooperation game
depending on the utilities derived from the policy change UA, UB 2 {H,L}, expected
utilities XB,L, XA,L and reputation gains from contracting RA, RB. Note that the three
highlighted cells in Table 4.1 {UA = L, 12XA,L < RA, UB = H}, {UA = H,UB =
L, 12XB,L < RB} and {UA = L, 12XA,L < RA, UB = L, 12XB,L < RB} result in the
introduction of the regulation, although the policy change never enters into force, given
that one of the contracting partners fails to keep their promise. We claim in this paper
that the slow ratification behavior observed in Mercosur can be partly explained by this
process of ine cient contracting.
In the dataset of Mercosur, we only observe the regulations that have passed the
contracting stage, i.e. whereby all members have signed the contract. Accordingly, in the
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Table 4.1: Summary of equilibrium outcomes
Typ H
Typ L
1
2XB,L < RB
1
2XB,L   RB
Type H
(C,C) (C,C) (C,D)
(R,R) (R,D) -
Type L
1
2XA,L < RA
(C,C) (C,C) (C,D)
(D,R) (R,D) or (D,R) -
1
2XA,L   RA
(D,C) (D,C) (C,D) or (D,C)
- - -
Note: The equilibrium outcomes depend on the realization of preferences
UA, UB 2 {H,L}, expected utilities XB,L, XA,L and reputation costs RA, RB .
The first row of each cell represents the combination of strategies of player A and B
at the Contracting stage. The second row reflects the strategies at the Ratification
stage.
empirical analysis we are interested in identifying the factors that increase the likelihood
of the occurrence of ine cient contracting conditional on the event that the regulation
has been signed by all members. In order to derive an expression for this conditional
probability, in the following we consider RA (RB) in inequality (3.3) as a positive
random variable that varies across regulations independently from UA, UB and RB (RA).
Furthermore, we assume that a component Ej of Rj is observable Rj = Ej+Runobsj . Here,
Ej denotes a set of observable influences, such as the public and political environment at
the time of contract signing, that directly a↵ect the potential reputation gain (or loss) Rj
( Rj) of (not) signing the international agreement. We denote by pXj(Rj) = P (12Xj,L <
Rj) 2 (0, 1] with @pXA (RA)@RA > 0 the probability of a su ciently high realization of Rj,
according to which, if country j is of type L, it prefers to publicly sign the regulation
despite secretly opposing it. Furthermore, we assume p   12 .7
Now, we can derive an expression for the probability of country A not ratifying the
regulation given that both A and B have signed it at the contracting stage:
P (DA|CA, CB) =P (DA, CA, CB)
P (CA, CB)
=
p(1  p)pXA(RA) + 12(1  p)2pXA(RA)pXB(RB)
p2 + p(1  p)[pXA(RA) + pXB(RB)] + (1  p)2pXA(RA)pXB(RB)
. (3.4)
7Note that the parameter p has a rather abstract interpretation since it reflects the distribution of
preferences over the full set of regulations that are discussed (but not necessarily signed) at the negotiation
table. We assume here that it is more likely that a country benefits from a regulation considered at the
negotiation table than to be harmed by it.
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Taking the derivative with respect to EA yields:
@P (DA|CA, CB)
@EA
=
p(1  p)pXA(RA)(1  P (DA|CA, CB)) + (1  p)2pXB(RB))@pXA (RA)@EA (12   P (DA|CA, CB)
P (CA, CB)
> 0. (3.5)
The last inequality follows directly from
@pXA (RA)
@EA
> 0 and (3.4) < 12 . Thus, the theoretical
model implies that if the public and political environment places increasing pressure on
international decision makers at the negotiation table, ine cient contracting is more likely
to occur. Indeed, we find empirical evidence of this e↵ect in the ratification behavior of
international actors in Mercosur. Note that the conditional probability in (3.4) is closely
connected to the quantity that we model in the empirical section, where we specify a
statistical model for the ratification durations in Mercosur for all regulations that have
been signed by all signatory members.
4.4 The Southern Common Market
We now present the empirical case of the Southern Common Market, a regional integration
scheme between Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay that uses the regulatory regime
explained above for the ratification of its regulations. Interestingly, its member countries
duly ratify only two-thirds of all policies, but are apparently reluctant to fulfill their
obligations in the extant cases. First, we provide a brief overview over the institution of
Mercosur, before subsequently presenting our ratification data set in detail.
4.4.1 Southern Common Market and the rules for ratification
Figure 4.3 depicts the institutions relevant for regional cooperation and explains the rules
for ratification as established in the Protocol of Olivos (POP) from 1994. According to
this treaty, the member states unanimously take decisions in one of the three decision
bodies: the Common Market Council (CMC), the Common Market Group (CMG) or the
Trade Commission (TC) (Bouzas and Soltz, 2001; Lavopa, 2003; Ventura and Perotti,
2004). Each member state incorporates Mercosur regulations into the respective domestic
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juridical system and subsequently communicates successful ratification to the Secretariat.
However, according to Article 42 POP, a regulation is not yet legally in force; only 30
days after every member state successfully ratified does a regulation develop its binding
character in all Mercosur countries. When one single state complies with the legal term of
an agreement in the Southern Common Market, this member country prepares the e↵ect
of a Mercosur regulation, although it does not yet trigger it. The institutional design
ensures that rules enter into force in all countries at the same time.8
In view of these intriguing rules for ratification, Mercosur represents an apposite case
to observe the dynamics of the theoretical model in practice. Reputation costs from
Figure 4.3: Regulatory framework for International Cooper-
ation in Mercosur
Argentina
Brazil
Paraguay
Uruguay
Argentina
Brazil
Paraguay
Uruguay
Preparation Decision Incorporation Information Validity
Secretariat
of the 
Mercosur
CMC
CMG
TC
Various 
Preparatory 
Negotiation 
Fora
non ratification are particularly low, while for many regulations the public, political or
institutional environment during contracting ensures high rewards from contracting alone.
This renders political actors in Mercosur particularly susceptible to ine cient contracting.
Moreover, we can empirically validate whether the theoretical prediction of no free-riding
in the case of mutually beneficial policies is empirically confirmed in Mercosur.
During ratification, the threat of implicit sanctions such as reputation loss is lower in
Mercosur in comparison to other international regimes, given that information concerning
the status quo of ratification is not publicly available. While the secretariat collects
information on successfully incorporated cases, access to this database remains restricted,
with neither interest groups nor citizens able to gain any insight. The Secretariat only
8Alejandro Pastori, who was the legal adviser of the Uruguayan Foreign Minister during the
negotiations of the Protocol of Ouro Preto in 1994, compared this procedure to a swimming pool. All
swimmers would step close to edge. Only if everyone was ready, all would jump at the same time.
(Interview in Montevideo, April 2009)
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provides information for individual regulations, thus making it hard for public actors
to hold their governments accountable.9 Mercosur’s procedures are similar regarding
information vis-A˜ -vis partner governments. While meetings and minutes exist that intend
to brief about ratification endeavors in particular policy fields, the overall ratification
record remains o cially under disclosure.
Typically, e↵ective dispute settlement mechanisms allow for overcoming cooperation
problems with explicit sanctions (Downs et al., 1996; Fearon, 1998; Yarbrough and
Yarbrough, 1997). Mercosur’s institutional provisions remain comparably limited in this
respect and largely intergovernmental in character (Lenz, 2012; Malamud, 2005; Pena and
Rozemberg, 2005). According to the categorization for dispute settlement in international
trade from Yarbrough and Yarbrough (1997), Mercosur’s dispute settlement system would
file in the second weakest category. While a third party may settle a dispute and advice
retaliatory measures, it neither implements nor controls implementation (Bouzas et al.,
2008, 100). In the terms of Keohane et al. (2000), Mercosur’s dispute resolution displays a
moderate level of legalization (Krapohl et al., 2009). Despite the existence of institutions
for conflict adjudication, their independence, access and legal embeddedness do not
provide for an e↵ective enforcement of non-compliance.
4.4.2 Measuring actors’ ratification behavior
Mercosur is not only an intriguing case due to its particular rules for ratification, but
also given it empirical ratification record. We use information relating to the success and
duration of ratification in the four member countries concerning all 1,024 regulations
adopted between 1994 and 2008 (Arnold, 2013).10 Pooling this information, our data set
contains 3,560 data points and o↵ers insight into the ratification success and duration as
measured at the end of 2008.
Mercosur’s members do not incorporate all regulations into the respective domestic legal
bodies, with Table 4.2 o↵ering insight into the dimension of this issue. Half of the
regulations introduced in Mercosur between 1994 and 2003 have not entered in force
five years after their introduction date due to at least one of the member countries failing
9The Secretariat’s website allows for querying the status quo of single regulations, only.
10While the four countries agreed on 1700 regulations overall, only 1024 of them require active
ratification to become legally e↵ective.
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Table 4.2: Percentage of ratification success in Mercosur
Non ratification %
by at least one member 50.4 %
by Argentina 21.7 %
by Brazil 18.8 %
by Paraguay 25.5 %
by Uruguay 26.3 %
Note: Percentage of regulations introduced between 1994
and 2003 that have not been ratified by at least one of the
four Mercosur countries five years after their introduction
(below: non ratification percentage by a specific member
country).
to ratified the agreement at the domestic level. When examining the potential culprits, we
find that the two smaller countries of Paraguay and Uruguay have the worst ratification
record in the region with 25% of the regulations not incorporated into national law five
years after their introduction.
One natural explanation for the poor overall ratification record in Mercosur is the
ine ciency of the national administrative systems in the region. However, within
Mercosur, Uruguay is known to have by far the most e cient and least corrupt
administration, although it has the worst ratification record in Merosur, closely followed by
Paraguay. Thus, there has to be a di↵erent explanation for the poor ratification behavior
observed. The strategy of not keeping promises from the negotiation table, as outlined in
Section 4.3.2, may be one way for the economically and geographically smaller countries
of Paraguay and Uruguay to respond to the dominating role of Brazil and possibly also
Argentina within the region. The incorporation mechanism of Mercosur provides the
smaller countries with the same political power as the larger ones, thus enabling them to
prevent policy changes from taking e↵ect in the whole region.
The graphs in Figure 4.4 indicate the development of ratification success over time between
1994 and 2008. The vertical axis shows the success ratio for each country, calculated as
all ratified regulations in relation to the overall number of regulations introduced. The
introduction of regulations briefly peaked in 1996, causing the success ratio to plummet.
The success ratio subsequently increased, reaching a level between 63.0% in Uruguay and
75.7% in Brazil in 2008. Since 1997, while Brazil seems to perform best, Uruguay worst
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Figure 4.4: Ratification success in Mercosur over time
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Note: Ratification success of regulations in Mercosur for all four member countries. The
connected points indicate the incorporation status per country as of the respective year.
and Argentina and Paraguay usually in between. Overall, the ratification success of the
four countries follows a similar path over time.
Moreover, in Figure 4.5 we report the empirical density of the successfully incorporated
ratification spells (grey curve) and the censored cases (blue curve). The upper graph
summarizes the data with the help of boxplots.11
We find that successful ratification takes 585 days on average, with the respective 25%
quantile at 162 days, the median at 330 days and the 75% quantile at 774 days, with a
maximum of 4,161 days. While in 75% of cases, ratification takes less than 26 months (774
days), one-quarter of all policies take between 26 months and 11 years (4,161 days) until
they are ratified. Overall, most of the policies find their way into the respective domestic
legal system in the four member countries in little time, while the right skewed character
of the distribution shows that a substantial number of regulations take considerably more
time.
To explain the variation in the success and duration of ratification in Mercosur
with multivariate analysis, we measure a number of additional variables, capturing
11The black bar within the box stands for the median. The outside edges of the boxes indicate the
25% quantile and the 75% quantile. The whiskers report outliers: any datapoint outside 1.5 times the
interquartile range is printed using a black circle.
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Figure 4.5: Distribution of ratification durations in Mercosur
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characteristics of the political, institutional and economic context and the regulations
themselves. First, we divide Mercosur’s policies according to a series of categories
(Table 4.3). Among all 3,560 regulations12, politicians adopted 599 of them in the Common
Market Council and bureaucrats signed 2,961 in the Common Market Group and the
Trade Commission. In addition, we distinguish between six policy types. 725 regulations
relate to the common external tari↵, while 800 announce governmental cooperation. In
104 cases, the four members consider Mercosur interna, whereas 87 policies address the
internal market, 276 policies define exceptions from the common external tari↵ and 1,537
concern technical regulations. Moreover, 31 regulations could not be attributed. Finally,
not all countries need to ratify all policies; accordingly, Argentina has to incorporate 870
Mercosur rules into domestic law, Brazil 882 policies, Paraguay 929 policies and Uruguay
879 policies.
In addition to these categories, four additional variables measure the political context
12Here, the regulations are counted several times depending on the number of signatory member
countries.
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Table 4.3: Distribution of ratification durations over three categorical variables
n
Decision Bodies
CMC 599
CMG and TC 2961
Policies
Common External Tari↵ 725
Governmental Cooperation 800
Mercosur Interna 104
Internal Market 87
Tari↵ Exception 276
Technical Regulations 1537
Others 31
Countries
Argentina 870
Brazil 882
Paraguay 929
Uruguay 879
(Table 4.4). ‘Public support of Mercosur in country’ measures citizens’ attitudes regarding
regional cooperation on a yearly basis.13 Survey data from the Latinobarometro shows
that the population adopts a comparably positive stance towards regional cooperation,
on average. Support for Mercosur ranks at 82%, with a standard deviation of 0.06 across
all regulations. The variable ‘Mercosur presidency’ indicates whether the meeting during
which the regulation was signed was held in the respective country, which implies a higher
media coverage of signed regulations and Mercosur topics in general. Mercosur has a
rotating presidency and typically the country chairing the meetings is also the host of
13Since there is no question concerning Mercosur which has been asked every year, three di↵erent
question wordings are used. Despite their di↵erence, all of them address a general consent towards
Mercosur. The question which has been asked most frequently is: “Are you in favor or against economic
integration in Latin America?”. Respondents can answer the question with very much in favour, a little
in favour, a little against and very much against. We coded the two positive categories as consent and
the two negative ones as dissent. In the year 2003, marked with a small star, respondents were asked
“Among the institutions that are on the list, please evaluate them in general terms and give them a mark
between 0 and 10, where 0 is very bad and 10 would be very good, or else tell me whether you have not
heard enough to provide an opinion about: Mercosur”. We rescaled the answers to di↵erentiate between
those who reject Mercosur and those who do not and coded all responses larger and equal to 5 as positive
and those that are smaller than 5 as negative. Finally, in the years 2004, 2006 and 2007, the question was
“Treaties on international free trade have a very positive, positive, negative, very negative or no impact
at all on your employment opportunities?”. Again, we merge the two top categories and the two lower
ones.
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the negotiations. The variable takes a mean of 0.24 and a standard deviation of 0.43.
Furthermore, analyzing media coverage of Mercosur’s trade disputes, Go´mez-Mera (2009)
devises an annual score capturing the perceived level of large salient conflicts between
Mercosur’s governments, with a mean of 1.69 and a standard deviation of 1.29 (‘Conflict
level in Mercosur’).
Finally, in order to capture the number of domestic actors who have to be coordinated
for ratification, we introduce the number of veto players (‘Size of opposition in country’)
of the respective domestic political system. We operationalize this number with the index
from Beck et al. (2001). In our sample, this takes a mean of 3.83 and varies with a standard
deviation of 1.22.
We further introduce four variables capturing idiosyncrasies of Mercosur’s policies. We
Table 4.4: Descriptive statistics of measures of the political context and idiosyncrasies
of the regulations
Mean s.d. Min Max
Political Context
Public Support of Mercosur in country 0.82 0.06 0.63 0.94
Mercosur presidency 0.24 0.43 0 1
Conflict level in Mercosur (sqrt) 1.69 1.29 0.00 4.30
Size of opposition in country 3.83 1.22 2 6
Policies
Complexity of Policy 0.29 1.30 -2.41 4.23
Technical annex 0.66 0.47 0 1
Number of references in rreamble (sqrt) 1.83 0.52 0.00 3.87
Overrules Mercosur regulation 0.14 0.35 0 1
approximate the complexity of a regulation with its length and count the number of words
and paragraphs.14 We decompose the variance of regulations’ measures for length into the
principal component in order to tap the latent complexity dimension. Assigning principle
component scores to each regulation, it is possible to interpret complexity on a common
scale (Bartholomew et al., 2008; Joli↵e, 2002). The mean in our pooled sample is 0.29, with
a standard deviation of 1.30. Next, a dummy variable captures whether a policy contains
an annex with comprehensive technical details, taking a mean of 0.66 and a standard
14We use the software JFreq to count the number of words and rely on handcoding for the number of
paragraphs. Both values are log transformed to account for their skewed distributions.
92
CHAPTER 4. INEFFICIENT CONTRACTING IN MERCOSUR
deviation of 0.47. The number of references to xisting Mercosur rules approximates the
amount of existing Mercosur legislation that a policy builds upon. Taking the square root
to correct for the skew of the variable’s distribution, we report an average of 1.83 and a
standard deviation of 0.52. Finally, another dummy is used to indicate whether a policy
overrules existing legislation, with this variable reporting a mean of 0.14 and a standard
deviation of 0.35.
4.5 Analyzing the ratification behavior in Mercosur
We argue that part of the reason behind Mercosur’s poor ratification record is that the
South American actors follow the incentive structure outlined in the theoretical section.
However, we have to bear in mind that the two-step game of cooperation only captures
the strategic interaction of international actors in a very simplistic way. When analyzing
the data on ratification durations in Mercosur, we have to abstract from this simple
mechanism in several ways.
4.5.1 Relation of cooperation game to empirical analysis
First, after a regulation is signed by the member countries, actors have a larger choice
set than merely to defect (never ratify) or cooperate (ratify as quickly as possible). In
fact, within the boundaries of the domestic administrative system, political actors in
Mercosur can choose practically any ratification duration (measured in days after contract
signing). Accordingly, di↵erent lengths of ratification durations can be interpreted as
di↵erent degrees of defectiveness. If a policy change is disadvantageous, political actors
may decide not to completely defect but rather postpone ratification as long as possible.
Furthermore, many of the observed ratification durations are right-censored due to the
end of the window of observation in 2008. We account for this demanding structure of the
data by using a multivariate continuous duration approach to jointly model the ratification
hazards of the four member countries. This method allows accounting for the continuous
duration characteristic of the data and the corresponding problem of right-censoring.
Second, the preferences of international actors towards a regulation may not remain
constant but rather change over time. This could be due to a change in the political
decision makers themselves, i.e. a shift of power within the domestic decision body or a
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change of the political leader due to elections. Additionally, the economic environment that
the political actors face may also change over time. Thus, regulations that are beneficial
to a country at the time of contract signing may not be beneficial a few years later. We
observe several political and economic variables, capturing such changes over time on a
yearly basis. The use of a hazard rate approach enables us to account for such time-varying
observable changes.
Third, not only two but four countries are involved in international contracting in
Mercosur. However, one can think of two potentially opposing parties at the negotiation
table, namely the countries in favor of the regulation of interest and those potentially
opposing it. Since an increase in the number of international actors also increases the
likelihood of at least one actor secretly opposing the regulation, one would expect a higher
probability of a defective outcome (no policy change). Thus, the problem of ine cient
contracting outlined in the two player game is magnified in a game with four international
actors.15
It is important to understand that the existence of multiple equilibria in the ratification
period prevents the full identification of the underlying preferences from the observed
ratification behavior. For example, if country A cooperates in the ratification period, while
country B defects, this does not automatically reveal that the regulation is beneficial to
country A, since it is also possible that A anticipated that B will defect and consequently
decided to free-ride on B’s defection e↵ort. Thus, with the given set of assumptions,
identification of the underlying preferences is not possible from the data.
Furthermore, when studying the ratification behavior of international contracting, one
typically only observes the regulations signed by all members, whereas those regulations
already discarded at the negotiation table are usually not documented. Indeed, this is also
true for data on Mercosur. Consequently, the distribution of preferences for regulations
underlying our dataset is highly selective and does not represent the original distribution
from which the utilities/preferences are drawn in the theoretical model. Similarly to the
conditional probability (3.4), in the next section we conduct inference conditional on the
15Note that, in a game with more than two players the problem of multiple equilibira briefly discussed
in Section 4.3.2 will become more complex. For example, a regulation may be discussed addressing an
exception to the common external tari↵ for Brazil that is not beneficial or even harmful to the other
three members. If the public or political pressure to cooperate is su ciently high, Argentina, Paraguay
and Uruguay will sign the regulation. Several equilibriums are now possible that result in defection. Each
of the three secretly opposing countries could be the one to defect (three possible equilibria).
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event that a regulation has been signed by all necessary member countries.
In summary, the objective of the following empirical study is not to identify the parameters
and preferences of the game presented in the previous section. Rather, the purpose of the
theoretical model is to illustrate the potential for ine cient contracting induced by the
incorporation mechanism in Mercosur. In the empirical analysis, we focus on identifying
how a certain political, public or institutional environment in a country at the time of
contract signing can lengthen the subsequent time until ratification at the domestic level.
The results suggest that, conditional on a regulation being signed, high political or public
pressure at the time when this decision is made significantly lengthens the subsequent
ratification duration in the four member countries. We o↵er the occurrence of ine cient
contracting defined in our theoretical model as an explanation for this empirical finding.
4.5.2 Empirical model
We analyze the observed ratification durations in Mercosur using survival analysis, thus
making use of both the success and duration for ratification. In survival models, the unit
of analysis enters the observation period with a discrete characteristic and alters this
state after a certain amount of time. Here, Mercosur’s members adopt a regulation at the
Mercosur level and subsequently change its status once they ratify it domestically. If it
were for the discrete change only, any ordinal model would su ce. However, event history
models seek to answer how long it takes until a certain event occurs, such that duration
and status are both of interest (Beck and Katz, 1996; Box-Ste↵ensmeier and Jones, 1997;
Johnson and Albert, 1999).
We conceive and model ratification as a process whereby a regulation has a certain
probability of being ratified each day, given that ratification has not succeeded up to this
point. We model such ratification hazards, making use of the popular proportional hazard
assumption that states that the e↵ect of covariates is constant over time and enters the
hazard rate multiplicatively. This leads to the following model for the ratification hazard
of regulation i in country j at ratification duration t:
✓(t|xijt) =  (t) ex0ijt  (Model I and II)
Here, the function  (t) captures the dependence of theratification hazard on the time t
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passed since regulation i was signed by country j. Given that we have little prior knowledge
about the shape of this function, we choose a piecewise constant specification. With each
additional year since contract signing, a new parameter captures the possibly di↵erent
level of the ratification hazard.
The e↵ect of covariates is reflected in the vector  
x0ijt  = c+ cj + yt + r
0
i 
r +m0ij 
m +  0ijt 
 .
Here, the covariate vector xijt includes a constant, dummys for the member countries cj,
dummys for each calendar year (1994,...,2008) yt and characteristics of the regulation ri
such as measures of complexity of the document signed or the policy field that it addresses.
mij holds the main variables of interest in our analysis specific to the meeting at which
the contract is signed. These covariates vary across regulations i and/or over the four
countries j and capture the public, political, institutional or economic environment faced
by the political actors at the time of contract signing. The variables of interest include
a dummy indicating whether the regulation is signed by politicians vs. bureaucrats, the
measure of public support of Mercosur in country j at the time, an indicator whether
country j holds the presidency of Mercosur and consequently is the host of the meeting,
a measure of the conflict level in Mercosur and the ratio of delegates at the meeting of
country j. This list of variables reflects the observable component Ej of Rj for regulation
i in Section 4.3.2. Additionally, mij includes the size of the politic opposition in country
j (number of veto players) and two measures of trade levels inside and outside Mercosur
in the economic sector that the regulation addresses. This completes the list of covariates
included in the most basic model that we consider (Model I in Table 4.5).
In Model II, a similar set of variables  ijt is added, controlling for the change in the above
list of variables mij over time compared to their level at the time of contract signing.16
The idea is to capture the potential change in preferences of the political actors induced
by a change in the politic or economic environment compared to the situation when they
first signed the regulation.
Note that the political or institutional environment at the time of contract signing may
somewhat reflect the environment during the subsequent ratification period. For example,
16In addition we control for a change in the political leader of a country compared to the time of
contracting.
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if public support and media coverage of Mercosur at the time of contract signing is high,
it is more likely that this environment will be similar during the ratification period. The
potential reputation loss rj of political actors may be higher during the ratification period,
making them more inclined to ratify quickly. Consequently, inModel I we expect a positive
bias in the estimates of the variables measuring the environment at contract signing. In
order to avoid this bias, we control for the change of these variables  ijt during the
ratification period compared to their level at the time of contract signing in Models II-III.
Model III is motivated by the strong heterogeneity in the ratification durations across
the regulations signed in Mercosur. Despite our dataset enabling us to observe many
regulation characteristics driving this heterogeneity in ratification hazards, we are most
likely unable to explain all variation across regulations by observable variables. Although
this problem is usually of no greater concern, due to the duration characteristic of our
dataset, the existence of unobserved heterogeneity across regulations can lead to a bias
in the estimated baseline hazard and covariate e↵ects (Lancaster, 1990; Van den Berg,
2001) 17. We expect a bias of the covariate e↵ects towards zero in Model II compared to
Model III (see Tabel 4.5). The bias is avoided in Model III, where we account for the e↵ect
of unobserved regulation characteristics by a random term Vi.
✓(t|xijt, Vi) =  (t) ex0ijt  Vi (Model III) (3.6)
We assume that Vi is drawn from a Gamma distribution with mean 1 and variance
parameter  2. Estimates of Model III are reported in Appendix 4.A, specifying an
inverse Gaussian distribution. The estimated covariate e↵ects are a↵ected little by
this change, while the overall model fit is higher in the Gamma model. Note that
Vi generates dependence between ratification durations of the four member countries
for each regulation. We argue that, conditional on covariates, unobservable regulation
characteristics represent the main source of dependence in our dataset.
Other sources of dependence are also possible. For example, if pressure at the negotiation
table is relatively high compared to the expected costs of non ratification, actors have
an incentive to lie. The theoretical model in Section 4.3.2 predicts that actors secretly
opposing the policy change during the ratification period will respond reversely to the
17A bias occurs if the underlying true model is the mixed proportional hazard model.
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strategy of the international partner as a best response. If player B ratifies quickly, player
A will choose to defect if he is of type L. If, on the other hand, player B defects, A
will free-ride on the defection e↵orts of his partner and choose to ratify quickly to avoid
reputation costs. Thus, depending on the level of pressure during negotiations, there may
exist a negative dependence among ratification durations, caused by strategic interaction.
The existence of such an e↵ect could be investigated by using a correlated frailty model
in order to estimate the sign of correlation depending on the level of pressure during
negotiations. However, this extension is left to further research at this point.
In Table 4.5, we report estimates of the baseline specification without time-varying
controls (Model I) and the specification with time-varying controls (Model II), as well
as the mixed proportional hazard model(Model III). The first two proportional hazard
models rely on the assumption of no dependence within regulations conditional on
covariates. On the other hand, the mixed proportional hazard model accounts for a
dependence based on unobserved regulation characteristics. It is not a priory clear which
model is more suitable to fit the data. In Model II, we e↵ectively assume that we observe
all relevant regulation characteristics influencing the ratification durations of the four
member countries. Conversely, Model III is based on the assumption that unobservable
influences enter the ratification hazard multiplicatively and are independent of covariates.
For this reason, we report both models I and II and restrict attention to e↵ects robust
across the two specifications.
4.5.3 Empirical analysis
We use data on all 1,024 regulations signed between 1994 and 2008 that require ratification
at the domestic level in at least one member country of Mercosur.18 This leads to 3,560
observed ratification durations (Table 4.5).Model I-III represent estimations in continuous
time; however, the set of time-varying variables  ijt and the baseline hazard vary on a
yearly basis, leading to 13,057 regulation ⇥ country ⇥ year observations.
In Table 4.5, the estimates of the covariate e↵ects   in equation (5) are reported for
Models I-II and (6) , with standard errors in parentheses. Note that the estimates of the
piecewise constant baseline hazard function and the calendar year dummys are omitted
from the estimation outputs. We present point estimates and corresponding confidence
18Most regulations need to be ratified by all four members.
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Table 4.5: Parameter estimates of three proportional hazard models with Gamma
unobserved heterogeneity distribution
Three Piecewise Constant Models: Model I Model II Model III
Variable Estimate St.Error Estimate St.Error Estimate St.Error
Member Countries
Brazil .235*** (.071) .118 (.077) .217*** (.083)
Paraguay -.095 (.067) -.149** (.074) -.107 (.079)
Uruguay -.078 (.067) -.064 (.068) .044 (.073)
Regulation Characteristics
Governmental cooperation -.76*** (.065) -.775*** (.065) -1.137*** (.109)
Internal market -.639*** (.138) -.641*** (.139) -1.005*** (.229)
Technical regulations -.799*** (.061) -.824*** (.063) -1.307*** (.099)
Exception to common external tari↵ .351*** (.106) .504*** (.107) .745*** (.165)
Mercosur interna -.083 (.131) -.071 (.132) -.215 (.213)
Word count -.026*** (.008) -.023*** (.008) -.022** (.01)
Number articles -.053 (.164) -.056 (.165) -.144 (.255)
Number of references in preamble .071*** (.011) .063*** (.011) .056*** (.018)
Technical annex .117*** (.048) .126*** (.048) .117 (.078)
Overrules Mercosur regulation -.132** (.066) -.125* (.066) -.102 (.1)
Year of contract signing -.07*** (.008) -.249*** (.024) -.281*** (.025)
Deadline stated in regulation .276*** (.058) .256*** (.06) .27*** (.098)
Environment at Contract Signing
Common Market Council -.656*** (.072) -.734*** (.073) -.879*** (.111)
Public support of Mercosur in country -.009** (.004) -.015*** (.005) -.016*** (.005)
Mercosur presidency -.123*** (.045) -.24*** (.064) -.253*** (.065)
Conflict level in Mercosur -.103*** (.018) -.236*** (.055) -.168* (.086)
Percentage delegates other countries -.01*** (.002) -.01*** (.002) -.013*** (.002)
Size of opposition in country -.033* (.02) .023 (.024) .037 (.026)
Exports to Mercosur -.081* (.046) -.07 (.047) .019 (.054)
Imports from rest of world .014 (.01) .025*** (.01) .039*** (.011)
Change since Contract Signing
d Public support of Merc. in country . (.) -.006 (.004) -.005 (.004)
d Presidency of Mercosur . (.) -.087** (.041) -.074* (.042)
d Number of veto players . (.) .074*** (.023) .108*** (.024)
d Conflict level in Mercosur . (.) -.027** (.013) -.012 (.02)
d Exports to Mercosur . (.) -.003 (.063) .086 (.073)
d Imports from rest of world . (.) -.102*** (.039) -.104* (.058)
d Political leader(presidency) . (.) -.15** (.076) -.109 (.081)
Unobs. Heterog. (Gamma Dist.)
log(Variance parameter) . (.) . (.) -.706*** (.089)
Variance Parameter .494
Log Likelihood -5313 -5170 -4995
Regulations 1024 1024 1024
Regulations ⇥ countries 3560 3560 3560
Regulations ⇥ countries ⇥ years 13057 13057 13057
Note: Parameter estimates of three proportional hazard models with a piecewise constant baseline
hazard. Estimates are reported as   coe cients of Models I-III. Standard errors are reported in
parentheses. Estimates with *, ** or *** reflect a 0.1, 0.05 or 0.01 significance level.
99
CHAPTER 4. INEFFICIENT CONTRACTING IN MERCOSUR
bands of the piecewiese constant baseline hazard in Figure 4.6. 19
Figure 4.6: Estimates of a piecewise constant baseline hazard
function
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Note: Estimates of the piecewise constant baseline hazard function
 (t) of Model III in Table 4.5. Dotted lines denote 95% confidence bands.
The main focus of the empirical analysis is to measure the e↵ect of the public, political
and institutional environment at the time of contract signing on subsequent ratification
durations. The estimates of Models I-III suggest that if public and political pressure on
international actors during the time of contracting is high, the subsequent ratification
process at the domestic level is slowed significantly in the respective country. The
estimated e↵ects vary in size yet do not change signs across Models I-III (see first five
estimates under ‘Environment at Contract Signing’ in Table 4.5.
In particular, regulations introduced in the Common Market Council have a 1  e .879 ⇡
0.58% (Model III) lower ratification hazard compared to those introduced in the Common
Market Group or Trade Commission (1   e .734 ⇡ 0.52% in Model II). Whereas in the
Common Market Group and Trade Commission bureaucrats sit at the negotiation table,
in the Common Market Council negotiations are conducted by politicians. In general,
19The wider confidence bands for earlier years compared to later years come from rescaling the
confidence bands of estimated coe cients  0 to confidence bands of hazard ratios: confband(exp( 0)) =
[exp( lower0 ), exp( 
upper
0 )]. Here,  
lower
0 and  
upper
0 denote the confidence intervals of the estimated
coe cients  0.
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regulations signed in the Common Market Council receive higher media attention in the
four member countries compared to those signed by bureaucrats. The significant negative
e↵ect on the ratification hazards suggests that ratification takes significantly longer for
regulations that are initially signed by politicians compared to bureaucrats.
In addition, we find a significant negative e↵ect on the ratification hazard if the public
is more supportive of the Southern Common Market at the time of contract signing.
International actors secretly opposed to a regulation are more inclined to sign it when
public opinion in their country is strongly in favor of regional integration. Thus, in terms
of ratification at the domestic level, the political actors have no incentive to speed up the
process, resulting in a low ratification hazard. A 1% increase in the ratio of supporters in a
country lowers the ratification hazard by 1 e .016 ⇡ 1.6% in Model III (1 e .015 ⇡ 1.5%
in Model II).
We find a similar e↵ect for a country holding the presidency of Mercosur at the time of
contract signing. The presidency rotates between members, with the main negotiations
hosted by the respective country, resulting in higher media coverage of the negotiation
outcomes and topics relating to Mercosur in general. This environment puts additional
pressure on political actors to signal an attitude towards international cooperation, thus
making them more inclined to sign regulations that they have little incentive to ratify
later. The estimates in Table 4.5 imply that if a country holds the presidency at the time
of contract signing, this corresponds to a 1   e .253 ⇡ 22.4% (Model III) decrease in the
subsequent ratification hazard (1  e .24 ⇡ 21.3% in Model II).
Furthermore, negotiation outcomes are influenced by the overall level of conflict between
the four members of Mercosur. In times of high levels of conflict, signals are particularly
necessary to communicate a sustained interest in regional cooperation. This places
contracting in Mercosur at center stage, given that it is capable of reassuring the partners
of an interest in cooperation despite few, but salient conflicts. We find a significant negative
e↵ect of   =  .168 for a 1 point increase in the measure of conflict level constructed by
Go´mez-Mera (2009), implying a 1 e .168 ⇡ 15.5% decrease in the subsequent ratification
hazard (1  e .236 ⇡ 21.0% in Model II).
The ratio of delegates at the negotiation meetings representing the other countries may
influence whether political actors feel pressured to sign a regulation. The estimates in
Model III suggest that a 1% increase in the ratio of foreign delegates at the negotiation
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meeting lowers the ratification hazard by 1  e .013 ⇡ 1.3% in Model III (1  e .01 ⇡ 1.0%
in Model II). 20
We do not find evidence of an e↵ect for the size of the politic opposition in a country.
We also include export levels to Mercosur for the regulations addressing internal trade, as
well as import levels from the rest of the world for regulations addressing external trade
in the economic sector that the regulation addresses, with these two variables reflecting
the economic environment that decision makers face at the time of contract signing.
However, we do not find robust evidence for an e↵ect significantly di↵erent from zero for
Models II-III.
Finally, we find strong heterogeneity in ratification hazards across policy types. In
particular, we find that regulations addressing governmental cooperation in Mercosur
have relatively low ratification hazards compared to the reference category of the common
external tari↵ (1   e 1.137 ⇡ 68.0% less in Model III and 1   e 0.775 ⇡ 54.0% less in
Model II). Political actors find regulations on general governmental cooperation that
simply announce future cooperation particularly useful to create a positive image in the
press. These regulations allow for making broad cooperative claims without necessarily
changing the status quo through costly adaptation. If political actors wish to create a
positive image as proactive regional leaders, they should be particularly prone to doing
so by relying on these type of policies.
Conversely, regulations addressing the common external tari↵ are beneficial to all members
of Mercosur in most cases . Consequently, ratification is relatively quick. Recall that in the
standard case of regional economic cooperation, the common external tari↵ is one of the
most common policy areas for free riding. A country benefits tremendously if all others
implement a common, higher tari↵, given that private actors prefer to trade with lower
tari↵ barriers. While regional cooperation with short term incentives for defection lead to
expect deviations from a common cooperative course, the ratification rules implemented
in Mercosur prevent such behavior. Here, empirical results are in line with the theoretical
expectations, namely that exceptions from the common external tari↵ are beneficial
policies. Actors are always eager to contract and subsequently ratify such regulations. An
20Note, that at each meeting several regulations are signed. Consequently, delegates of all four member
countries are present at each meeting but depending on the meeting and the decision body (Common
Market Council, Common Market Group or Trade Commission), a di↵erent ratio of country delegates is
present.
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additional benefit from contracting alone does not have any influence on the propensity
to put a policy into practice. Considering the short ratification durations for regulations
addressing the common external tari↵, incentives for free riding clearly do not cause
Mercosur’s eminent ratification issues.
4.6 Conclusion
This paper shows that cooperation problems that arise from incentives for free riding
are not necessarily as intractable as the literature in international relations suggests.
So far, implicit and explicit means of retaliation are believed to be the only means of
solving such cooperation issues. We argue that rules for ratification may do so just the
like. When the last country determines the overall e↵ectiveness of a policy, incentives for
individual defection do not arise. However, the second insight of this paper reveals that
altering ratification rules in this way does not solve all cooperation issues. If incentives for
contracting are high and costs from non ratification low, actors may adopt policies that
provide little benefit from collective action. Under these conditions, ine cient contracting
may lead to many international rules that are signed, yet not ratified.
We o↵er empirical evidence for our theoretical considerations, based upon the Southern
Common Market, a regional cooperation scheme between Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and
Uruguay, which adopted 1,024 regulations at the regional level between 1994 and 2008.
Mercosur is particularly suitable for illustrating our theoretical considerations. First, it
uses the above-mentioned rules for ratification, with policies only becoming e↵ective in the
whole region once the last country incorporates a regulation into domestic law. Second,
due to the general institutional provisions, reputation costs of postponing ratification are
particularly low.
We collect and analyze the complete ratification record on all policies and find proof
for our theoretical claims. Rules on the common external tari↵ typically o↵er individual
incentives for defection. By contrast, actors in the Southern Common Market prefer to
realize the collective good and do not depart from commonly agreed policies. Against
the backdrop of low costs for non ratification, incentives from contracting allures actors
to first contract and then refrain from ratification when the utility from collective goods
are low. Politicians are eager to use a high popularity of Mercosur to create a positive
image among their electorate. In the meantime, ratification rules easily allow for halting
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the overall e↵ectiveness of rules that are of little benefit. When bureaucrats decide such
e↵ects do not arise, since these decision makers do not share the same incentives as their
politically accountable principals. In a similar vein, if politicians adopt policies that create
collective goods with a high utility, they do not halt ratification processes and ratification
is swift.
This paper makes an important contribution towards understanding how international
institutions produce outcomes in international cooperation (Jacobson, 2000; Simmons,
2000; Simmons and Danner, 2010; Von Stein, 2005). The ratification rules that the
Southern Common Market uses inhibit free riding, whereby actors incorporate regulations
beneficial to all without regress. However, the institutional design encourages ine cient
contracting, since actors may adopt policies that provide benefits from contracting only
and refrain from their incorporation.
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4.A Appendix
Table 4.6: Parameter estimates of three proportional hazard models with Inverse
Gaussian unobserved heterogeneity distribution
Three Piecewise Constant Models: Model I Model II Model III
Variable Estimate St.Error Estimate St.Error Estimate St.Error
Member Countries
Brazil .235*** (.071) .118 (.077) .198*** (.082)
Paraguay -.095 (.067) -.149** (.074) -.119 (.079)
Uruguay -.078 (.067) -.064 (.068) .028 (.072)
Regulation Characteristics
Governmental cooperation -.76*** (.065) -.775*** (.065) -1.045*** (.103)
Internal market -.639*** (.138) -.641*** (.139) -.878*** (.223)
Technical regulations -.799*** (.061) -.824*** (.063) -1.162*** (.095)
Exception to common external tari↵ .351*** (.106) .504*** (.107) .673*** (.152)
Mercosur interna -.083 (.131) -.071 (.132) -.095 (.2)
Word count -.026*** (.008) -.023*** (.008) -.025** (.011)
Number articles -.053 (.164) -.056 (.165) -.112 (.255)
Number of references in preamble .071*** (.011) .063*** (.011) .066*** (.018)
Technical annex .117*** (.048) .126*** (.048) .122 (.075)
Overrules Mercosur regulation -.132** (.066) -.125* (.066) -.116 (.098)
Year of contract signing -.07*** (.008) -.249*** (.024) -.272*** (.026)
Deadline stated in regulation .276*** (.058) .256*** (.06) .311*** (.094)
Environment at Contract Signing
Common Market Council -.656*** (.072) -.734*** (.073) -.872*** (.106)
Public support of Mercosur in country -.009** (.004) -.015*** (.005) -.016*** (.005)
Mercosur presidency -.123*** (.045) -.24*** (.064) -.249*** (.065)
Conflict level in Mercosur -.103*** (.018) -.236*** (.055) -.229*** (.084)
Percentage delegates other countries -.01*** (.002) -.01*** (.002) -.013*** (.002)
Size of opposition in country -.033* (.02) .023 (.024) .037 (.025)
Exports to Mercosur -.081* (.046) -.07 (.047) .008 (.053)
Imports from rest of world .014 (.01) .025*** (.01) .035*** (.011)
Change since Contract Signing
d Public support of Merc. in country . (.) -.006 (.004) -.005 (.004)
d Presidency of Mercosur . (.) -.087** (.041) -.075* (.042)
d Number of veto players . (.) .074*** (.023) .103*** (.024)
d Conflict level in Mercosur . (.) -.027** (.013) -.022 (.02)
d Exports to Mercosur . (.) -.003 (.063) .05 (.069)
d Imports from rest of world . (.) -.102*** (.039) -.104** (.05)
d Political leader(presidency) . (.) -.15** (.076) -.106 (.08)
Unobs. Heterog. (Inv. Gaussian)
log(Variance parameter) . (.) . (.) -.473*** (.125)
Variance Parameter .623
Log Likelihood -5313 -5170 -5022
Regulations 1024 1024 1024
Regulations ⇥ countries 3560 3560 3560
Regulations ⇥ countries ⇥ years 13057 13057 13057
Note: Parameter estimates of three proportional hazard models with a piecewise constant baseline
hazard. Estimates are reported as   coe cients of Models I-III. Standard errors are reported in
parentheses. Estimates with *, ** or *** reflect a 0.1, 0.05 or 0.01 significance level.
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Chapter 5
Inference for Shared-Frailty Survival
Models with Left-Truncated Data1
5.1 Introduction
In this paper, we consider inference for shared-frailty survival models. These are Mixed
Proportional Hazard (MPH) models in which systematic unobserved determinants of
duration outcomes are identical within units or groups of individuals. We allow the
spell durations to be subject to left-truncation, meaning that the duration outcome is
only observed if it exceeds a certain threshold value, and we focus on random-e↵ects
likelihood-based inference. We show that the Stata software package command to estimate
shared-frailty survival models in the presence of left-truncated duration data should not
be applied, given that it maximizes a likelihood function that does not su ciently take
account of dynamic selection before the truncation points.
In order to explain this and motivate the relevance of our contribution, we start with an
introduction of the survival models with unobserved heterogeneity (or frailty terms) that
are included in Stata for statistical inference. Shared-frailty models are an important class
of such models.
Empirical survival studies or studies in duration analysis commonly adopt some version
of the Mixed Proportional Hazard (MPH) model for the hazard rate. The MPH model
stipulates that the individual hazard rate (or exit rate out of the current state) ✓ depends
on the elapsed duration t, explanatory variables x and unobserved determinants v, such
1This chapter is joint work with Gerard van den Berg.
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that
✓(t|x, v) =  (t) (x)v
at all t, x, v for some functions   and   (see Lancaster, 1990; Van den Berg, 2001, for
surveys). Here,   is the function of interest, although   is sometimes also of interest.
Typically, at least some elements of the vector x are time-varying, although we ignore this
in this paper for ease of exposition. Notice that without loss of generality, v can be seen
as the joint multiplicative e↵ect of a vector of unobserved determinants on the individual
hazard rate. The term v is often called the frailty term. It is not directly estimated from
the data, given that it varies across individuals. Moreover, in contrast to linear regression
analysis, ignoring unobserved heterogeneity leads to biased estimates of   and  , because
individuals with a high v leave the state of interest on average earlier than individuals with
low v. This phenomenon is called “weeding out” or “sorting”, which may occur at di↵erent
speeds for di↵erent x, causing the composition of survivors in terms of v to change over
time. In general, ignoring this leads to a negative bias in the estimate of  (t) and a bias in
the estimated covariate e↵ects (Lancaster, 1990; Van den Berg, 2001). The most common
approach for inference is to assume that v has a distribution G in the population and to
estimate its parameters along with (the parameters of)   and   using Maximum Likelihood
Estimation, where the likelihood contribution of an individual spell integrates over G. In
econometrics, this is called random-e↵ects estimation. To ensure that identification is not
fully driven by functional form assumptions, it is assumed that x and v are independently
distributed in the population and that E(v) = 1. The population constitutes the inflow
into the state of interest (although this may be modified; see below). By far the most
common functional form for G is the gamma distribution, which can be justified as an
approximation to a wide class of frailty distributions (Abbring and van den Berg, 2007).
The approximation improves with left-truncation of the durations. An alternative frailty
distribution is the inverse-Gaussian distribution.
It is often natural to assume that small subsets of di↵erent individuals or spell durations
share the same value of v. For example, di↵erent unemployment spells of the same person
may share the same unobserved determinant v, or the mortality rates of identical twins
may be assumed to depend on identical unobserved determinants v. In general, the data
may identify groups or units or strata such that di↵erent spells within a group or unit
or stratum share the same v. Data with this feature are often called multi-spell duration
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data. To keep the terminology simple, consider the case where we observe at most two
spells for each unit in the sample. The unit has a given value of v, and we assume that
its spell durations are independent drawings from the univariate duration distribution
of t given x, v, where, naturally, v is unobserved, so that the durations given x are not
independent. Whether x is also identical across spells or individuals within a unit depends
on the context. For ease of exposition, we take the data to consist of a random sample of
units. We return to this below.
The multi-spell MPH model was first proposed by Clayton (1978) and is nowadays known
under the name “shared-frailty model”. Notice that it has the same unknown functions as
the single-spell MPH model, namely  ,  and G. The empirical analysis of shared-frailty
models is widespread (see e.g. Hougaard, 2000, and Van den Berg, 2001, for surveys). If the
underlying modeling assumptions are correct, multi-spell data enable identification of the
MPH model under weaker assumptions than single-spell data, and the estimation results
are more robust with respect to functional-form assumptions (see Hougard, 2000; Van den
Berg, 2001, for surveys). By straightforward extension of the estimation with single-spell
data, the most common estimation methods are random-e↵ect procedures where each unit
or group provides a likelihood contribution that integrates over the distribution G of v
across the units and where  ,  and G are parameterized.2
The Stata software package o↵ers a large number of pre-programmed estimation routines
for survival analysis. In this sense, Stata is unique among the available software packages
covering survival analysis; indeed, it has become popular among empirical researchers.
The two main survival model estimation commands streg and stcox also capture the
shared-frailty model by invoking the option shared() to indicate which individuals share
the same value of v. Gutierrez (2002) provides an overview of parametric shared-frailty
models in Stata. See Hirsch and Wienke (2012) for an overview of software packages with
estimation routines for shared-frailty models.
Sampling schemes where durations are left-truncated are common in both single-spell and
in multi-spell survival analysis Guo (1992). For example, unemployment duration spells
are often only recorded in register data if the duration exceeds one month. Population
2If di↵erent individuals within a unit or group have di↵erent values of x then Stratified Partial
Likelihood Estimation can be used as an alternative (fixed e↵ects) method Ridder and Tunali (1999);
Chamberlain (1985); Kalbfleisch and Prentice (2011). In Section 5.3 we give a brief overview of the use
of this method in Stata.
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register data typically follow individuals from a given point in calendar time onwards,
with the starting points of the spells that are ongoing at the beginning of the register’s
observation window often also observed. The spells that started, for instance, t0 time
units before the beginning of the observation window are subsequently only observed if
the duration exceeds t0. With the increasing availability of such register data in socio-
economic and health research, the usage of left-truncated duration data has increased.
This also applies to multi-spell data. For example, death causes of Danish twins were
only systematically recorded as of January 1, 1943; therefore, in studying death causes
among those born before 1943, it makes sense to restrict attention to both twin members
being alive on January 1, 1943.3 If the duration from birth until death due to a specific
death cause is the relevant duration variable, then this variable is left-truncated at the
age attained on January 1, 1943. Hence, the left-truncation points as measured in the
age dimension di↵er across twin pairs. In studies with hospital patients, only those who
survive up to the point when the trial period at the hospital starts are observed. If the
patient subsequently experiences remission and relapse, subsequent illness spells may not
be left-truncated.
Stata allows for left-truncation of the duration data through the enter() option when
declaring the data as duration data by the stset command. Importantly, the value t0 of
the truncation threshold may di↵er across individuals (as well as across spells for a given
unit, in the case of the shared-frailty model).
Notice that left-truncation gives rise to a second selection issue, in addition to the selection
generated by the dynamic weeding-out. After all, surviving up to some threshold value
is more likely if the frailty term is small. The Stata routine for shared-frailty models4
ignores the fact that the second selection impacts on the first selection. Restricting the
outcome to exceed a lower threshold implies that the frailty distribution in the sample
systematically di↵ers from that in the population upon inflow into the state of interest.5
If the former distribution is nevertheless assumed to equal the latter, then, as we shall
see, the resulting estimators of   and   are inconsistent. One may redefine the population
3After all, if a twin member is observed to have died before 1943 then it is not known whether this
was due to the cause of interest or due to another cause. In the latter case, the moment of death due
to the cause of interest is right-censored by an event with an unknown distribution, and inference would
include the estimation of this distribution.
4This routine is available since Version 7, up to and including the current Version 13.
5See Ridder (1984) for an account of the di↵erences between frailty distributions in di↵erent types of
single-spell samples.
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to be the survivors at t0, although this only makes sense if t0 is identical across all units
and spells.
The interplay between left-truncation and dynamic selection has always been recognized in
the single-spell survival analysis literature. As we discuss below, the role of this interplay
has been obscured with multiple spells. However, we are not the first to point out the
importance of dealing with the above interplay, including its implication for the frailty
distribution in the sample in shared frailty models. Indeed, Jensen et al. (2004) provide
a lucid account. They contrast the correct likelihood function to the likelihood function
where the interplay is ignored for the case of gamma-distributed frailties, and they discuss
the bias when using the latter. They point out that Nielsen et al. (1992), a seminal paper
in survival analysis, used the incorrect likelihood in the case of left-truncated data in
the shared frailty model. Elsewhere within the literature, Rondeau and Gonzalez (2005)
use the correct likelihood for their semi-parametric estimator of the shared frailty model
in the case of left-truncated data, whereas Do and Ma (2010) use the other likelihood
function for their semi-parametric estimator in the same setting.
With an update to release 12, that carries over to the current release 13, Stata has reacted
to our work. As of this update, estimation of a shared frailty model with streg or stcox
with left-truncated data or gaps generates an error message for the user. The error message
explains how both commands streg and stcox implicitly assume that the corresponding
frailty distribution is independent of the covariates and the truncation points. Although
it is not recommended to use the commands in this setting, the error message may be
overwritten by using the option forceshared.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 5.2, we discuss left-
truncation in multiple spell duration data in more detail. We show the conditions under
which the likelihood function of the parametric model in the streg,shared() command
is misspecified for left-truncated data, and present the correct likelihood function. In
Section 5.3, we demonstrate in a short simulation study with the streg command
how the magnitude of the bias resulting from the misspecification depends on the level
of truncation and variance of the frailty distribution. Additionally, in Section 5.4, we
discuss the analogous problem with the stcox command in Stata for the semi-parametric
estimation of the shared gamma frailty model and discuss how the misspecification may
be fixed. We list published articles that use this Stata command to semi-parametrically
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estimate the shared gamma frailty model with left-truncated data. Finally, Section 5.5
concludes. In Appendix 5.A.4, we introduce a corrected parametric Stata command called
stregshared.
5.2 Likelihood specification with left-truncated du-
ration data and shared frailties
Consider a random sample of single spells, where the MPH model applies. The random
sample consists of independent draws from the distribution of T |X for various values
x of X, where T denotes the random duration variable. We consider likelihood-based
inference, and for the moment take  ,  and G to be parametric functions. The spell
durations may be independently right-censored, although we are not concerned with that
here. Consequently, the likelihood contribution of a single spell is the probability density
function fu(t|x) of T |X evaluated at the observation (t, x), with
fu(t|x) = Ev(fc(t|x, v)) =
Z
v
 (t) (x)v exp( ⇤(t) (x)v)dG(v)
in which ⇤(t) :=
R t
0  (u)du denotes the so-called integrated baseline hazard, and fc is the
probability density function of T |X, V .
Next, consider a random sample of units, each with j = 1, 2 spells that share their
frailty term v. Throughout the paper, we assume that, conditional on v and x, the spells
are independent. The likelihood contribution of a unit with non-truncated uncensored
duration outcomes t1|x1 and t2|x2 subsequently equals
R
v fc(t1|x1, v)fc(t2|x2, v)dG(v).
Left-truncation of a single-spell duration outcome variable means that the variable is
only observed if its value exceeds a lower threshold, say t0. Throughout the paper, we are
only concerned with deterministic t0. In a random sample of left-truncated single spells,
the individual likelihood contribution equals fu(t|x)/(1   Fu(t0|x)), with Fu being the
distribution function associated with the density fu. With multiple spells per unit (or
group or stratum), left-truncation of a spell duration outcome can be defined analogously,
regardless of whether other spells are observed for this unit where the outcome exceeds its
lower threshold. However, sometimes none of the duration outcomes of a unit are observed
or used if at least one of them is left-truncated. The study of cause-specific mortality with
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twin data mentioned in Section 5.1 is such an example. It is useful to consider this case
first for expositional reasons. If the number of spells (observed or not observed) of a unit
is known, the model can be used to derive the likelihood function. Suppose that each unit
consists of two spells j = 1, 2, which are observed conditional on both spell durations
surviving up to their truncation points t01 and t02, respectively. This might be called
“strong left-truncation”. In the simple case of no censoring, the likelihood contribution L
of the unit is now given by the density function of t1, t2|T1 > t01, T2 > t02, x, which can
be expressed as
L =
Z 1
0
fc(t1|T1 > t01, x1, v)fc(t2|T2 > t02, x2, v) dG(v|T1 > t01, T2 > t02, x) (5.1)
with x = (x1, x2) and Tj denoting the random duration variables. Therefore, we average
over the conditional frailty distribution G(v|T1 > t01, T2 > t02, x) in units where both
spells survive up to their truncation points t0j (and given x). This is the distribution of v
in the sample of observed spells, which can be expressed in terms of the model primitives
through
dG(v|T1 > t01, T2 > t02, x) = (1  Fc(t01|x1, v))(1  Fc(t02|x2, v))dG(v)R1
0 (1  Fc(t01|x1, w))(1  Fc(t02|x2, w))dG(w)
where
1  Fc(t0j|xj, v) = exp( ⇤(t0j) (xj)v).
Note that even if only one of the spells j within a unit has t0j > 0, the distribution
G(v|T1 > t01, T2 > t02, x) di↵ers from G(v).
Assuming a gamma-distributed frailty with E(v) = 1 and V ar(v) =  2 yields6
L =  (x1) (t1) (x2) (t2)( 
2 + 1)(1 +  2M(t01, t02))
1/ 2(1 +  2M(t1, t2))
 (1/ 2+2), (5.2)
where M(t1, t2) =  (x1)⇤(t1) +  (x2)⇤(t2). For ease of exposition, note that we omit the
dependence of M on x1, x2.
Rather than the above type of left-truncation, we may consider sampling schemes with
di↵erent types of reduced observability of low spell durations in a shared-frailty model.
6See Appendix 5.A.1 for details.
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If only one spell per unit is not left-truncated, one may nevertheless include it in the
data used for inference. However, given that the number of spells per unit equals two,
we directly infer that the other spell duration tj satisfies tj  t0j. In other words, tj is
left-censored rather than left-truncated. The unit then provides a likelihood contribution
equal to
R
v f(t1|x1, v)F (t2|x2, v)dG(v), where we took j = 2 and Fc denotes the cumulative
distribution function of t2|x2, v.
Alternatively, the number of spells per unit may not be fixed and may increase with
the sample size. Jensen et al. (2004) provide a detailed formal likelihood derivation in a
rather general dynamic sampling framework where the number of (possibly simultaneously
occurring) spells per unit may increase with the time that units are followed, and where
all observed spells per unit are used for the statistical inference. Under some assumptions,
the likelihood contributions are identical to equation (5.1). In particular, if two spells are
observed for some unit, then the distribution of the frailty term of this unit, conditional
on the two spell durations exceeding t01 and t02, respectively, equals G(v|T1 > t01, T2 >
t02, x).7 Equation (5.2) replicates likelihood equations in e.g. Jensen et al. (2004) and
Rondeau and Gonzalez (2005) for the shared gamma frailty model with left-truncated
data.
We now turn to the likelihood function used in Stata. The Stata Manual (e.g., see Stata,
2009, p.383) provides a likelihood contribution for the case of two possibly left-truncated
spells and a shared gamma frailty model. This is used in the streg command with the
options frailty(gamma) and shared(). In the absence of right-censoring, the likelihood
contribution states that8
LStata =  (x1) (t1) (x2) (t2)( 
2 + 1)(1 +  2(M(t1, t2) M(t01, t02))) (1/ 2+2). (5.3)
which evidently di↵ers from Equation (5.2). It is shown in Appendix 5.A.2 that the right
7Because of the dynamically evolving sampling scheme, where new spells per unit may start during
the observation window, they need to make an approximation to deal with changes in the composition
of the inflow during the observation window. This is an additional complication that does not a↵ect the
issues we focus on but which does not allow us to draw on their simulation results to assess the bias due
to ignoring the interplay between left-truncation and dynamic selection.
8We translate the notation of the Stata Manual, as follows: Sij(tij) = e  (xij)⇤(tij) and hij(tij) =
 (xij) (tij), where we omit the index i.
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hand side of Equation (5.3) can be rewritten as
LStata =
Z 1
0
fc(t1|T1 > t01, x1, v)fc(t2|T2 > t02, x2, v) dG(v) (5.4)
where G(v) is a gamma distribution. This expression corresponds to the likelihood
contribution presented in (Gutierrez, 2002, p.34) for general frailty distributions. By
comparing Equations (5.4) and (5.1), it is clear under which conditions Equations (5.3)
and (5.2) di↵er, as well as the underlying reason for them to di↵er. First, they di↵er
if and only if V ar(v) > 0 and at least one of the following inequalities applies also:
t01 > 0, t02 > 0. Secondly, they di↵er because the conditional densities in Equation
(5.4) are averaged over the inflow distribution G(v) rather than the frailty distribution
G(v|T1 > t01, T2 > t02, x), conditional on the spell durations being left-truncated. The
critical issue is that the likelihood in (5.3) treats the data as if no sorting had taken place
prior to the beginning of the observation window. Therefore, it is implicitly assumed that
the inflow distribution of frailties at t = 0 does not change until the point of truncation.
However, since the subjects are at risk from t = 0 onwards, this assumption cannot hold.
The above problem carries over to the case where the frailty is assumed to follow an
inverse-Gaussian frailty distribution in the streg command. The likelihood function for
a shared frailty model with shared inverse-Gaussian frailties and left-truncated duration
data is derived in Appendix 5.A.3. This may be contrasted to the function given in the
Stata Manual (Stata, 2009, p.383).
An ad-hoc approach to deal with the discrepancy between the likelihood function and
the Stata routine is to simply assume from the outset that the frailty distribution in the
sample does not depend on x and the truncation points. This e↵ectively amounts to a
redefinition of the population, as the inflow into the state of interest at the moment of left-
truncation, with the assumption that in this newly defined population, v is independent of
x and of the elapsed time spent in the state of interest at the truncation point. Under this
assumption, the Stata likelihood is correct. If the truncation points are not dispersed in
the original population then such an approach may make sense. It replaces the assumption
that v and x are independent in the inflow into the state of interest with the assumption
that they are independent at the moment of truncation. If an MPH model guides the exit
rate between the inflow and the truncation point, the latter assumption generally entails
that x and v are dependent in the original population that constitutes the inflow into the
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state of interest.
However, if the truncation points t0j are dispersed then this approach does not make
much sense. For example, consider two units i, i0 each with two spells j. The units have
identical systematic duration determinants including identical x within and across units,
although their left-truncation points di↵er. In obvious notation, we take 0 < t0i1 = t0i2 <
t0i01 = t0i02 <1, so that there is no dispersion of truncation points within each unit. The
ad-hoc approach would require the distribution of v in the first unit at t0i1 to equal the
distribution of v in the second unit at t0i01. However, in the first unit, in between t0i1 and
t0i01, the frailty distribution changes with time in accordance to the shared frailty model,
leading to a di↵erent distribution at t0i01 than at t0i1. By implication, the distributions
of v at t0i01 would di↵er across units, not because the units behave di↵erently, but rather
due to the way in which they have been sampled.
The Stata issues discussed thus far refer to the use of the options shared and frailty() in
the streg command, in conjunction with the use of the option enter() in the command
stset. The streg command with the options shared and frailty() corresponds to
parametric shared-frailty models. However, Stata also o↵ers a routine for the semi-
parametric estimation of shared-frailty models, which can also be applied in the case
of left-truncated data. In Section 5.4, we discuss this routine in detail and explain how it
su↵ers from a very similar misspecification as in the parametric case.
We finish this section by revisiting the cases where the Stata likelihood function and our
own likelihood function coincide. Recall that if none of the spells are left-truncated then
they coincide, and if there is no systematic unobserved heterogeneity (so Var(v) = 0)
then they coincide as well. If a unit or group always consists of one single spell, the Stata
likelihood and our likelihood do not coincide, but our likelihood should then coincide with
the likelihood of the MLE estimator for a single-spell MPH setting with left-truncated
data. We know that the latter is correctly specified in Stata. By implication, with left-
truncated data, the Stata estimator for the shared frailty model with a single spell per
unit does not equal the Stata estimator for the corresponding MPH model with single-
spell data. This is readily verified. In the latter case, the frailty distribution conditions on
survival until the truncation point, whereas in the former case it does not.
According to Hirsch and Wienke (2012), none of the other software packages with
estimation routines for shared-frailty models allow for left-truncation, with the exception
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of an R package called Frailtypack. This uses the semi-parametric Rondeau and Gonzalez
(2005) estimator, which uses a full likelihood function that takes account of the interplay
between dynamic selection and left-truncation (their estimator penalizes non-smoothness
of the baseline hazard function  (t)).
5.3 Simulation results
Recall that we are not primarily interested in small-sample properties of estimators,
but rather in the appropriate choice of likelihood function, which should be visible in
estimates based on a large sample. We simulate data from a shared frailty model, with
the sample consisting of units each comprising two spells with a shared gamma frailty. The
baseline hazard  (t) follows either a Weibull specification ( (t) = ↵t↵ 1) or a Gompertz
specification ( (t) = e↵t). Furthermore,  (X) = eX  with X = (1 x) and x being a single
time-constant covariate.
In a first step, the covariate xij is drawn from a standard normal distribution for each
spell j of unit i, and the frailty term vi is drawn from a gamma distribution with E(v) = 1
and V ar(v) =  2 for each unit i. The unknown model parameters are   ⌘ ( 0,  1),↵ and
 2. These have the following possible values:
 0 = 0,  1 = 1, ↵ = 1,  
2 2 {0.5, 1, 2}. (5.5)
In the case of the Weibull model, ↵ = 1 implies the Exponential model with no duration
dependence of the baseline hazard, whereas the Gompertz model with ↵ = 1 incorporates a
strong positive duration dependence. We present simulation results for both cases to reflect
applications ranging from economics to mortality studies. Furthermore, we distinguish
between three di↵erent values of the variance  2 of the frailty distribution. These values
are in line with those in the simulations in Jensen et al. (2004).
In a second step, for given covariates, frailty terms and parameter values, the durations ti1
and ti2 are drawn independently from the distributions Fc(tj|xijvj), j = 1, 2, respectively.9
Next, we draw the left-truncation thresholds t0i1 and t0i2 from a uniform distribution with
9We use the following transformation of the variable u drawn from a uniform distribution U(0, 1):
tij = ↵ 1 log(1   ↵ log(1   uij)(eXij vi) 1) which is the inverse of the cumulative distribution function
Fc(tij |Xij , vi) = 1  exp( eXij ↵ 1(e↵tij   1)vi).
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range (0, b). All units with ti1  t0i1 or ti2  t0i2 are dropped. This way the sample only
contains those units for which both spell durations exceed their left-truncation points. The
fraction c 2 [0, 1] of data that are dropped due to left-truncation can be fine-tuned by
modifying b. E↵ectively, the sample size of 50,000 units is determined by the requirement
that each of the spells of these units has a duration exceeding a left-truncation point. In
fact, if the data are sampled from the Exponential model and if  2 is large, the estimation
of the parameters  0,↵ is numerically cumbersome.10 This suggests that a larger sample
is needed for reliable inference, however in light of the computational burden, we opt for
the alternative of assuming that the researcher knows that  0 = 0.
Figure 5.1: Simulation results of an Exponential shared gamma frailty model
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Note: Simulation results of an Exponential shared gamma frailty model with left-truncated data
using the Stata command streg with the option shared().
In the last step of the simulation procedure we use the stset and streg commands to
10More precisely, the estimation routine su↵ers from occasional numerical problems. This even occurs
in the absence of left-truncation (c = 0) if  2   4.
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Figure 5.2: Simulation results of a Gompertz shared gamma frailty model
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Note: Simulation results of a shared gamma frailty model with Gompertz duration dependence
and left-truncated data using the Stata command streg with the option shared().
estimate a shared frailty model in Stata,
. stset duration, failure(cens==0) enter(t0)
. streg x , distribution(gompertz) frailty(gamma) shared(id) nohr
The results are summarized in Figures 5.1 and 5.2. The panels show the estimates of
the constant  0 (in the case of the Gompertz specification), the covariate e↵ect  1, the
Gompertz duration dependence parameter ↵, and the variance  2 of the gamma frailty
distribution. We performed separate simulations with 30 di↵erent truncation rates c 2
[0, 1), and we connect the resulting points to obtain the displayed curves.
All estimates move away from their true value as the truncation rate c increases from zero.
In particular, the covariate e↵ect and the level of the hazard rate are under-estimated at
any positive truncation rate.
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In general, this is to be expected. As c increases, the simulated distributions of t0i1 and t0i2
move to the right, and thus the di↵erence between G(v) and G(v|Ti1 > t0i1, Ti2 > t0i2, x)
increases. With truncated data, units with large v will have exited the state relatively
often before having reached the truncation point, so the mean of v|Ti1 > t0i1, Ti2 >
t0i2, x decreases in t0ij. As the mean of the frailty distribution is fixed to E(v) = 1 in
the estimation, this decrease in the mean is compensated by an under-estimation of the
magnitude of the other determinants of the level of the individual hazard rate (which by
themselves have increasing e↵ects on the individual hazard rate).
The bias towards zero of the estimate  1 can be explained analogously. The true frailty
distribution after truncation G(v|Ti1 > t0i1, Ti2 > t0i2, x) depends on the covariates x.
Spells with a large value of exp(Xij ) as well as a large vi terminate on average earlier
than other spells. Therefore, in the case of a positive  1, an observation in the truncated
sample with a large x is more likely to have a small vi than observations with a low x.
The association between x and the observed hazard rates right after the truncation point
is therefore smaller than  1. If one neglect this by ignoring the dynamic selection before
the truncation point, the resulting estimate of  1 will be biased towards zero.
Figures 5.1 and 5.2 also show that the bias of the estimates depends on the variance of
the frailty distribution. As the latter increases, the estimates of the hazard level and the
covariate e↵ect move further away from their true values. Again, this is what would be
expected. Notice that none of the biases vanish for the sample size n ! 1 for a given
truncation rate.
It is important to bear in mind that the simulation results in Figures 5.1 and 5.2 depend
on the choice of baseline hazard and the gamma frailty distribution, as well as the choice
of the parameter values. For di↵erent models, the magnitude of the bias may di↵er from
the presented results.
For Stata users who wish to avoid misspecification of the likelihood function when
estimating shared frailty models with left-truncated duration data, we programmed the
Stata command stregshared, implementing the changes to the likelihood discussed in
Section 5.2. In Appendix 5.A.4, we provide a brief description of this new command.
Simulations using stregshared confirm that the estimator is correct and that the
estimates converge to their true values as n!1 independent of the level of truncation.
An alternative to the shared frailty model is stratified partial likelihood estimation,
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if di↵erent individuals within a unit or group have di↵erent values of x (Ridder and
Tunali, 1999; Chamberlain, 1985; Kalbfleisch and Prentice, 2011). This alternative model
is implemented in Stata with the option strata() in the stcox command. It has the
advantage, that the functional form assumptions imposed on the frailty distribution in
the shared frailty model, are not needed. However, with this (fixed e↵ects) method only
variation within units is exploited and thus a substantial part of the information in the
data is lost.
5.4 Inference for semi-parametric shared frailty mod-
els
The Stata command stcox with the option shared() allows for the semi-parametric
estimation of a shared-frailty model where G(v) is assumed to be a gamma distribution,
 (x) = exp(x0 ), and  (t) is an unspecified function (Cleves et al., 2008). This command
can be used in conjunction with the left-truncation option enter() in the command
stset.
5.4.1 Inference with non-truncated data
The semi-parametric estimation method is developed by Therneau and Grambsch (2000),
who do not discuss left-truncation of the duration data. The estimator maximizes a
profiled penalized partial likelihood (PPL) using two nested loops. In the inner loop,
for a given value of the frailty variance parameter ✓, the following log penalized partial
likelihood function is maximized to derive optimal values for the vector of covariate
coe cients   and the frailty vector v
PPL( , v; ✓) = l( , v)  g(v; ✓) (5.6)
with l( , v) =
UX
j=1
X
i2Uj
[(xi  + vi)  log
X
l2Rj
exp(xl  + log vl)]
and g(v; ✓) =  1
✓
GX
g=1
(log(vg)  vg).
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In this penalized model,   reflects the unconstrained and v the constrained parameter
vector. The index j = 1, ..., U runs over the ordered failure times, Uj denotes the set of
failures at time tj and Rj is the set of observations k that have not failed before tj (that
is, all k such that tj  tk). The function l( , v) is the log partial likelihood function from
a standard Cox regression with optimal values of the frailty terms v treated like observed
covariate e↵ects11. The penalty function g(v; ✓) in (5.6) reflects the negative log density
of the gamma frailty distribution. It penalizes the distance between the fitted gamma
distribution and the estimated frailty terms.
In the outer loop, the optimal values for   and v depending on the value of ✓ are substituted
in (5.6), resulting in the log profile penalized partial likelihood
PPL(✓) = logL( (✓), v(✓); ✓). (5.7)
Therneau and Grambsch (2000, p.256-258) show that the observed data log-likelihood can
be expressed as
L(✓) = PPL(✓) +
GX
g=1
[
1
✓
  log(1
✓
+ dg)  1
✓
log ✓ + log(
 (1✓ + dg)
 1✓
)]. (5.8)
Here, dg is the number of failures in group g. Therneau and Grambsch further suggest
that it is useful to maximize L(✓)+
PG
g=1 dg rather than (5.8), since the PPL(✓) converges
to l( ˆ) PGg=1 dg as ✓ goes to zero. The Stata command stcox maximizes L(✓)+PGg=1 dg
based on (5.8) over ✓ and the final estimates of   and v are obtained by maximizing the
log penalized partial likelihood in (5.6) using the optimal value of ✓.
We should point out that apart from the issues discussed in this paper, the stcox
command with the shared option also has the disadvantage of under-estimating the
reported standard errors of the estimated   coe cients, given that they are obtained
under the assumption that the true variance of the gamma frailty distribution equals the
estimated variance (Cleves et al., 2008).
An alternative to using the penalized partial log-likelihood in (5.6) in the inner loop
is to directly maximize the full likelihood using the EM algorithm (see Parner, 1997;
Therneau and Grambsch, 2000). The advantage of the PPL over the full likelihood
11The expression for l( , v) in Equation (5.6) handles ties by using the Peto-Breslow approximation
(Peto, 1972; Breslow, 1974).
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approach constitutes that the baseline hazard function   drops from the partial likelihood
in (5.6), thus strongly reducing the parameter space to optimize over. Consequently, this
renders estimation using the PPL much faster compared to using the EM approach.
In their description of the PPL, Therneau and Grambsch (2000) do not mention how
to deal with left-truncated data. Nevertheless, Stata o↵ers the option to estimated the
semi-parametric shared frailty model with left-truncated data. In fact, in Stata only the
at risk set Rj in (5.6) is adjusted for truncation in the inner loop, i.e. Rj is adjusted
to the set of observations k that have not failed before tj and have additionally passed
their truncation point t0k (that is, all k such that t0k < tj  tk). However, since the
penalty function g(v; ✓) in (5.6) that reflects the frailty distribution remains unchanged,
the resulting profile penalized partial likelihood su↵ers from the same misspecification as
in the parametric case that we outline in detail in our paper. In the same way as streg,
the stcox command ignores the weeding-out process before the left-truncation points,
a↵ecting the distribution of unobserved determinants.
These findings are confirmed by our simulation results using the command stcox with
the option shared in a similar manner as reported for the Weibull or Gompertz model
in the previous section. Given that the semi-parametric estimator does not impose the
Weibull or Gompertz functional form for the duration dependence  , standard errors are
larger than above. However, point estimates should be close to their asymptotic values
with our sample size. Instead, it emerges that the estimates are similar to those obtained
with the appropriate streg command, for all truncation rates c considered.
5.4.2 Left-truncated data: correcting the misspecification
Correcting the evident misspecification in the semi-parametric estimation command is not
as straightforward as in the parametric case. In fact, with left-truncated data, the PPL
of Therneau and Grambsch can no longer be used; instead, a full likelihood approach
has to be employed. In the following, we explain in detail why the concept of using a
penalized partial model does not carry over to left-truncated data, and show how the
full likelihood approach using the EM algorithm suggested by Parner (1997) can be
adjusted to account for left-truncation in the data. We implement this adjusted estimator.
However, simulations reveal that due to the large parameter space to optimize over and
the additional uncertainty that comes from the approximation of the baseline hazard at
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the truncation points  (t0), the estimator is highly unstable in samples of reasonable size.
We conclude that further research is needed in this area before a usable estimator can be
o↵ered.
For non-truncated data, Therneau and Grambsch (2000, p.253-255) provide a justification
for using the penalized partial likelihood estimator presented in (5.6) for the case of
gamma frailties. They show that for a given frailty variance parameter ✓, the solution to
the penalized score equations of (5.6) coincides with the solution to the EM-algorithm of
Parner (1997), which is based on the full likelihood. However, this result does not carry
over to the case of left-truncation. In particular, in order to account for the change in the
frailty distribution caused by left-truncation, the penalty function g(v; ✓) in (5.6) would
have to be replaced by a function that reflects the negative frailty log density conditional
on the durations T having passed their truncation points t0
gtrunc(v|T > t0, x; ✓) =  log
GY
g=1
(1  Fc(t0g|xg, vg))fv(vg; ✓)
(1  Fu(t0g|xg; ✓))
= 
GX
g=1

log f(vg; ✓)  A0g( ,  )vg   1
✓
log(1 + ✓A0g( ,  ))
 
(5.9)
with A0g( ,  ) =
X
l2Qg
exp(xl )⇤(t0l) and ⇤(t) =
Z t
0
 (u)du.
Here, the index g runs over the groups 1, ..., G, fv is the density function of V , Fu is
the cumulative distribution function of T |X, Fc the one of T |X, V and Qg denotes the
set of observations in group g. In contrast to the penalty function g(v; ✓) in (5.6), the
conditional log density function in (5.9) depends on the baseline hazard function   as
well as the covariate coe cients  . In a penalized partial likelihood such as in (5.6),
the partial likelihood function l( , v) may depend on both parameters, constraint (v)
and unconstrained ( ), while the penalty function g(v; ✓) depends on the constraint
parameter alone (see Therneau and Grambsch, 2000, p.120). This central property of
a penalized model would be violated if g(v|T > t0, x; ✓) were to be used as a penalty
function. Consequently, with left-truncated data, the resulting full likelihood can not be
conveniently reduced to a penalized partial likelihood. Furthermore, the main advantage
of the PPL, namely that the baseline hazard function   drops from the penalized partial
likelihood in (5.6), can no longer be exploited. In other words, with left-truncated data,
it is necessary to go back to the full likelihood approach in line with Parner (1997), which
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we briefly outline in the following.
In the inner loop, maximization of the full likelihood with the EM algorithm involves the
two usual steps. In the Maximization step, the function   and the parameter vector  
is estimated using a standard Cox regression, with v treated as a fixed value or o↵set.
In the Expectation step, the conditional expectation of v given the data is computed
using the estimates of   and   from the previous step. In the case of gamma frailties,
the computation is straightforward (see Nielsen et al., 1992; Klein, 1992; Therneau and
Grambsch, 2000, p.253)
E(vg|T = t, x) = dg +
1
✓
Ag( ,  ) +
1
✓
. (5.10)
Adjusting the EM algorithm in the inner loop to the case of left-truncated data simply
involves a small change in the Maximization Step. The set of observations at risk in the
partial likelihood is adjusted to account for the left truncation points (that is, Rj =
{k : t0k < tj  tk}. There is no need to explicitly account for the change in the frailty
distribution in the Expectation step, given that the estimates of v are computed using
all information in the data (see Equation (5.10)), thereby capturing the e↵ects of left-
truncation.
In addition to adjusting the Maximization step of the EM algorithm in the inner loop, we
also have to account for the changes in the outer loop in the log profile likelihood. This
involves deriving the full data log-likelihood function conditional on the durations having
passed their truncation points. The log likelihood contribution for group g is given as (for
ease of notation we ignore censoring here)
log ftrunc(t|T > t0, x)
= log
R
v
Q
l2Qg fc(tl|xl, vg) dG(v)R
v
Q
l2Qg(1  Fc(t0l|xl, vg)) dG(v)
= log
Q
l2Qg(e
xl  (tl))( 1)dgL(dg)v [Ag( ,  )]
Lv[A0g( ,  )]
=
X
l2Qg
log(exl  (tl))  (1
✓
+ dg) log(1 + ✓Ag( ,  )) +
1
✓
log(1 + ✓A0g( ,  )) +mg(✓)
with mg(✓) = dg log ✓ + log
 (1✓ + dg)
 (1✓ )
and Ag( ,  ) =
X
l2Qg
exl ⇤(tl). (5.11)
Here, Lv is the Laplace transform with respect to the frailty distribution G(v) and L
(q)
v
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is its q’s derivative. The last equality follows from the assumption of gamma-distributed
frailties, which implies Lv(s) = (1+ ✓s) 
1
✓ and L(q)v [s] = ( ✓)q(1+ ✓s) ( 1✓+q)  (
1
✓+q)
 ( 1✓ )
. In the
outer loop, the optimal values for ⇤(tl), ⇤(t0l) and   from the inner loop are substituted
in (5.11) and the resulting profile log-likelihood
logLtrunc(⇤(tl; ✓),⇤(t0l; ✓);  (✓); ✓) (5.12)
is maximized over ✓. In contrast to the log profile likelihood in (5.7), here the cumulative
baseline hazard functions evaluated at each failure time ⇤(tl; ✓) and each truncation point
⇤(t0l; ✓) need to be computed based on the current value of ✓. Estimates of ⇤(tl; ✓) are
taken from the solution to the EM algorithm of the inner loop. However, the points ⇤(t0l; ✓)
need to be approximated based on the estimates of the cumulative baseline hazard function
at the realized failure times ⇤(tl; ✓).
Depending on the lack of dispersion in the truncation points across the sample, this
approximation can be highly imprecise. Indeed, the extreme case of no dispersion is not an
uncommon one. In several applications, every spell in the sample has the same truncation
point t0. For example, the life-spans of twins are sometimes only observed if they have
reached a certain age t0. Furthermore, unemployment spells are often only recorded in
register data if the duration exceeds one month. In these examples no failures are observed
on the interval 0 to t0. Nonetheless, in order to account for the weeding-out process over
this interval, it is necessary to know the baseline hazard function over the same interval
0 to t0. In parametric models such as the Gompertz model, the baseline hazard function
over the missing years 0 to t0 is e↵ectively extrapolated from the interval [t0,1) based on
the parametric form assumed. In the semi-parametric case, no information on the function
 (t) over the interval [0, t0) exists and thus approximation becomes increasingly arbitrary
with longer truncation intervals. In a more favorable truncation scheme, truncation points
are evenly spread out on some interval [0, c) and su ciently many failures are observed
over this range.
Simulations with grouped duration data and dispersed truncation points show that
estimations even turn out to be very slow and unstable with this favorable truncation
scheme, with estimates strongly depending on the choice of starting values. Due to the
computational complexity of the EM approach, our simulations are restricted to 2,000
groups with 5 members resulting in a sample size of 10,000. It is conceivable that the
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approximation of ⇤(tl; ✓) improves with increasing sample size, which may in turn improve
the stableness of the estimator. However, the question of whether this procedure performs
well with larger sample sizes remains open.
5.4.3 The use of Stata’s semi-parametric shared frailty estima-
tor with left-truncated data in empirical work
Stata’s stcoxmodel has been frequently used in the empirical literature to estimate shared
gamma frailty models, and sometimes the data are left-truncated. Gottard and Rampichini
(2006) study the e↵ects of poverty on time to childbirth among young women in Bolivia.
In their data, individuals within a region are assumed to share their frailty term, and are
only included in their sample if they have reached at least the age of 14 at the time of the
survey in 1998. Hence, left-truncation points vary across individuals. They state that they
use the stcox, shared command in their empirical analysis. Another example is provided
by Studenski et al. (2011), who study the e↵ect of gait speed on survival among elderly
individuals. They use data from 9 di↵erent cohort studies and estimate shared gamma
frailty models with Stata in a sensitivity analysis of their main results, with the frailty
taken to be cohort-study-specific. The individual lifetime durations are left-truncated by
the entry age into the study. Hemmelgarn et al. (2007) study multidisciplinary care for
elderly patients with chronic kidney disease, including its e↵ect on survival. They assume
shared frailties for matched treated and untreated individuals, and estimate shared frailty
models with Stata and/or SAS. Their data are subject to left-truncation. Matching on
age ensures that both lifetime durations need to exceed a left-truncation point in order
for the pair to be included in the sample.
5.5 Conclusion
This paper analyzes the implications of ignoring the e↵ect of left-truncation of duration
data on the distribution of unit-specific unobserved determinants in the sample, if multiple
durations are observed per unit. In the presence of unobserved heterogeneity, it is vital
to correctly account for the truncation that influences the composition of survivors in the
sample, especially if the truncation thresholds vary across units.
Stata users estimating shared frailty models with the streg or stcox command need
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to be aware that with left-truncated data, the estimators of the covariate e↵ects, the
duration dependence and the variance of the frailty distribution may be inconsistent. The
magnitude of the bias depends on the level of truncation, as well as on the variance of the
frailty distribution of the data generating process. The good news is that the parameter
estimates for the covariate e↵ects are typically biased towards zero. Therefore, in the
worst case, e↵ects have been underestimated by Stata.
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5.A Appendix
First, note that the gamma and Inverse-Gaussian distributions are both special cases of
the non-negative exponential family with density
f(v) = v e  vm(v) ( , ) 1. (5.13)
A shared frailty model with a frailty distribution of this family has the following survival
function (see Hougard, 2000):
S(t1, t2|x) =
Z 1
0
v e ( +M(t1,t2))vm(v) dv
1
 ( , )
=
 ( , +M(t1, t2))
 ( , )
, (5.14)
with M(t1, t2) =  (x1)⇤(t1) +  (x2)⇤(t2). The second equality follows from the fact that
(5.13) is equivalent to  ( , ) =
R1
0 v
 e  vm(v) dv and therefore  ( ,  + M(t1, t2)) =R1
0 v
 e ( +M(t1,t2))vm(v) dv.
5.A.1 Gamma frailty
Let us assume a gamma distributed frailty with E(v) = 1 and V ar(v) =  2. This implies
the following restrictions on the density function in (5.13)
  = 1/ 2   1,   = 1/ 2, m(v) = 1,  ( , ) =   ( +1) (  + 1), (5.15)
where  ( 2) is the gamma function. Substituting the expression for  ( , ) into the right
hand side of equation (5.14) leads to
S(t1, t2|x) = (1/ 
2 +M(t1, t2)) 1/ 
2
 (1/ 2)
1/ 2 1/ 
2
 (1/ 2)
= (1 +  2M(t1, t2))
 1/ 2 . (5.16)
Since f(t1, t2|x) = @2(1 S(t1,t2|x))@t1@t2 it follows
f(t1, t2|x) = @M(t1, t2)
@t1
@M(t1, t2)
@t2
( 2 + 1)(1 +  2M(t1, t2))
 (1/ 2+2). (5.17)
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Finally, let us consider the likelihood contribution of a group i comprising two subjects
with truncation points t01 and t02 and no censoring. Combining the results from equation
(5.16) and (5.17) leads to
f(t1, t2|T1 > t01, T2 > t02, x) = f(t1, t2|x)
S(t01, t02|x)
=  (x1) (t1) (x2) (t2)( 
2 + 1)(1 +  2M(t01, t02))
1/ 2(1 +  2M(t1, t2))
 (1/ 2+2)
which is equation (5.2) from section 2.
5.A.2 Likelihood function in the Stata Manual
The Stata Reference Manual (Stata, 2009, p.383) presents the following likelihood
contribution for a group i of a shared frailty model with a gamma frailty in the case
of no censoring
L =  (x1) (t1) (x2) (t2)( 
2 + 1)(1 +  2(M(t1, t2) M(t01, t02))) (1/ 2+2).
Rearranging and choosing   = 1/ 2   1 and   = 1/ 2 according to (5.15) yields
L =  (x1) (t1) (x2) (t2)
( +M(t1, t2) M(t01, t02)) ( +3) (  + 3)
( ) ( +1) (  + 1)
.
Since we know that  (  + 2,  + x) = (  + x) ( +3) (  + 3) from (5.15) and that  (  +
2, + x) =
R1
0 v
 +2e ( +x)vm(v) dv from equation (5.14) it follows
L =  (x1) (t1) (x2) (t2)
Z 1
0
v2e (M(t1,t2) M(t01,t02))v
v e  vm(v)
  ( +1) (  + 1)
dv
and once the restrictions (5.15) for the gamma distribution are imposed again
L =
Z 1
0
f(t1, t2|T1 > t01, T2 > t02, x, v) dG(v).
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5.A.3 Inverse-Gaussian frailty
Let us assume Inverse-Gaussian distributed frailty terms. Like with the gamma frailty,
this imposes restrictions on the density in (5.13)
  =  1/2, m(v) =  1/2⇡ 1/2e  v v 1,  ( 1/2, ) = e (4  )1/2 .
Assuming  =   gives a mean frailty of 1 and choosing  2 = 1/(2 ) yields V ar(v) =  2.
Substituting the expression for  ( , ) into the right hand side of equation (5.14) leads to
S(t1, t2|x) = exp( (4(
1
2 2 )(
1
2 2 +M(t1, t2)))
1/2)
exp( (4( 12 2 )2)
1
2 )
= exp(1/ 2   1/ 2(1 + 2 2M(t1, t2))1/2). (5.18)
Since f(t1, t2|x) = @2(1 S(t1,t2|x))@t1@t2 it follows
f(t1, t2|x) = @M(t1, t2)
@t1
@M(t1, t2)
@t2
(1 +  2(1 + 2 2M(t1, t2)) 
1
2 )S(t1, t2|x)
1 + 2 2M(t1, t2)
. (5.19)
Finally, let us consider the likelihood contribution of a group i comprising two subjects
with truncation points t01 and t02 and no censoring. Combining the results from equation
(5.18) and (5.19) yields
f(t1, t2|T1 > t01, T2 > t02, x)
=
f(t1, t2|x)
S(t01, t02|x)
=  (x1) (t1) (x2) (t2)
⇥ (1 +  
2(1 + 2 2M(t1, t2)) 
1
2 ) exp(1/ 2   1/ 2(1 + 2 2M(t1, t2))1/2)
(1 + 2 2M(t1, t2)) exp(1/ 2   1/ 2(1 + 2 2M(t01, t02))1/2) .
5.A.4 The command stregshared
Syntax
The command stregshared (see http://vandenberg.vwl.uni-mannheim.de/2999.0.html)
is designed as an alternative to streg when fitting a shared gamma frailty model to left-
truncated duration data. The size of the units over which the frailties are shared should
not exceed two when using stregshared. The functional form of the baseline hazard can
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be specified as piecewise constant, Weibull, exponential or Gompertz. The command has
a similar syntax to streg:
stregshared varlist [if] [in], shared(varname) [ noconstant
distribution(baseline) cuts(numlist) ]
Description
stregshared is implemented as a v0 evaluator and uses Stata’s modified Newton-Raphson
maximization algorithm. The command fits the same shared frailty model as the streg
command with the shared() option, with the only di↵erence being the adjusted likelihood
function described in Section 2. Like streg, it requires the data to be defined as duration
data by stset and uses the same variables in the same format as input arguments as
streg.
Options
noconstant suppresses the constant term. The default is to include a constant in the
model. Note that varlist should not include a constant term, when the option noconstant
is not used.
distribution(baseline) sets the baseline hazard function to be of the type baseline, where
baseline can be specified as weibull, exponential or gompertz. If this option is not used,
a Weibull model is estimated. Note that the piecewise constant model requires this option
to be specified as d(exponential).
cuts(numlist) specifies the cuto↵ points of a piecewise constant baseline hazard. When
the options noconstant and d(exponential) are used, the option cuts(numlist ) allows
estimating a piecewise constant model. Here, numlist holds the list of cuto↵ points, where
the numbers have to be in strictly ascending order. For example, if the baseline function
should be piecewise constant on the intervals [0, 5.5), [5.5, 10) and [10,1], use: nocon
d(exponential) cuts(5.5,10). The option cuts() cannot be used with d(weibull) or
d(gompertz).
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shared(varname) specifies a variable defining the units within which the frailty is shared.
The variable in varname is the same variable used in the option shared of streg. Recall
that stregshared can only deal with a unit size of one or two spells. It is not a problem
for the command if some (but not all) of the units only have one spell and others have
two. However, it cannot be used with units holding more than two spells. The shared()
option has to be specified.
Comparison to streg
Given that the stregshared command was designed as an alternative to streg, it
is intended to work in a very similar way. Therefore, if one uses the original streg
Stata command after stset to estimate a shared gamma-frailty model with a Weibull
distribution
. stset duration, failure(fail == 1) enter(truncation)
. streg x1 x2 x3, shared(id) d(weibull) frailty(gamma) nohr
the same arguments can be used with the stregshared command in order to estimate
the same model with the adjustment in the likelihood function from Section 2:
. stset duration, failure(fail == 1) enter(truncation)
. stregshared x1 x2 x3, shared(id) d(weibull)
Here, id is the variable that identifies the unit. The same variable is used in the
option shared() in streg. Note that the option nohr which causes streg to display
the estimated parameter values rather than of the hazard ratios, is not used in our
command. stregshared will display the parameter values as well as the hazard ratios
in the estimation results.
In this example, the data are left-truncated and thus the enter(truncation) option in
stset is used, with truncation being the variable that holds the left-truncation points
for each spell. If the enter() option is not used in stset, stregshared and streg will
yield the same estimation results.
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Saved Results
When an estimation is run with stregshared, the command shows the choice of baseline
function, the starting values, the number of units and total observations used in the
estimation and, finally, the estimation results. These results include the parameter
estimates, standard deviations, values of the test statistics and the hazard ratios.
stregshared saves the following in e():
Scalars :
est base ancillary parameter (for Weibull or Gompertz function)
est theta frailty parameter
Matrices :
est b coe cient vector
est matrix complete matrix of estimation results
(estimates, std. err. and test statistics)
To display the matrix of estimation results after running stregshared, type:
matrix list e(est matrix)
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